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Introduction
The three essays in this thesis share a common theme: customer loyalty.
Customer loyalty is a fundamental concept in strategic marketing, and it 
is accepted by its practitioners that the pattern of loyal behvaiour varies con­
siderably across markets, and within a market, across consumers.* 1 Chapter 1 
explores this observation. In particular, it asks what drives some consumers 
to establish relations of loyalty with an individual seller, whilst others adopt 
a strategy of shopping around.
The chapter develops a model where buyers and sellers meet repeatedly 
and where, on each purchasing opportunity, boundedly rational buyers choose 
which seller to address on the basis of the records of his experience with the 
sellers. In turn, a buyer’s record of a seller is reinforced by the experienced 
payoff and past outcomes are discounted as buyers are assumed to be forget­
ful. The model presented borrows heavily from that in Weisbuch et al. (1995) 
though it differs in one crucial respect. Weisbuch et ah’s (1995) setting is 
such that consumers are assured of having their demand met when meeting a 
seller and that the utility enjoyed by a buyer is the same irrepective of where 
the purchase is made. Given this, buyers appear to face no uncertainty and 
there is no motivation for consumers to learn about which seller to address. 
The model developed in Chapter 1, on the other hand, introduces this un­
certainty by allowing for the possibility that upon visiting a seller, a buyer 
is faced with empty shelves. In such a setting, a buyer’s expected utility is 
dependent on the number of other buyers that have selected to visit the same 
seller in the same period. The model allows to investigate how the number 
of buyers affects the shopping behaviour of the buyers themselves.
Whether buyers’ shopping behaviour develops into one of exhibiting loy­
alty to a seller or into one of shopping around is dependent on the parameters 
that define the buyers’ learning process. The influence of these parameters is
1 Sec, for example, Ehrenberg (1988) and Reichheld (1996).
1
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2as intuition would suggest. The greater the payoff to a buyer from having his 
demand met and the less forgetful a buyer is of his past experience, the more 
likely it is that he will become loyal to a seller. Similarly, the greater the 
relevance attached by a buyer to his record of past experiences with sellers, 
the more likely it is that he will become loyal.
The results obtained echo those of Weisbuch et al. (1995). Indeed, the 
results are exactly reproduced when the number of consumers is allowed to 
approach infinity. Outside this special case, however, the results of the two 
models diverge. Under the model developed in the chapter, for given values 
of the parameters shaping the learning process of buyers and for a given 
number of buyers, buyers are more likely to shop around than they would 
be in the setting of Weisbuch et al. (1995). When the number of buyers in 
the market is relatively small the divergence in the predictions of the two 
models can be particularly poignant. Where Weisbuch et al (1995) would 
predict that buyers develop loyal relations with a seller, the model developed 
in Chapter 1 would predict that buyers shop around.
Chapter 1 also examines the effect on buyers’ shopping behaviour as the 
number of buyers in the market changes. This comparative statics exercise 
is carried out under two scenarios. First, it is assumed that the aggregate 
supply of the good provided by the sellers is sufficient to meet aggregate de­
mand. In such a context, buyers are more likely to develop loyal behaviour 
as the number of buyers in the market increases. However, for some values 
of the parameters defining the buyers’ learning process, buyers will always 
adopt a searching behaviour, irrespective of market size. The second scenario 
allows for the possibility that there is a mismatch between aggregate supply 
and demand. In this context, the findings show that the greater the relative 
scarcity of the good, the more likely it is that consumers develop a behaviour 
of shopping around. Conversely, the greater the extent to which aggregate 
supply exceeds aggregate demand, the more likely it is that consumers be­
come loyal to a seller.
The differing degree of loyalty exhibited by consumers can form a basis 
on which firms are able to price discriminate. As noted by Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1997), this type of discrimination falls outside the more familiar first, 
second or third degree forms of price discrimination.2 Although such type of 
discrimination can be carried out at a fairly basic level - familiar customers 
may often enjoy a discount at the corner shop - the information required
2See, for example, Wilson (1993).
3for firms at large to practice this type of price discrimination is becoming 
increasingly available. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on one vehicle through which 
firms discriminate between consumers according to their loyalty. These two 
chapters examine the the role of loyalty-inducing schemes, in particular air­
lines’ frequent-flyer programmes (FFP s).
Loyalty-inducing schemes, such as F F P s , reward customers that pur­
chase repeatedly from the same firm. Typically, such loyal customers re­
ceive discounts, coupons for future purchases or they benefit from preferred 
treatment. Both Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the anti-competitive effects 
of loyalty schemes. The two chapters contrast markedly, however, in the 
assumption made over the ability of loyalty schemes in inducing customers 
to become loyal. The motivation for Chapter 2 stems from the observation 
that there exists scant evidence to show that loyalty-schemes are actually 
succesful in inducing customers to become loyal. Chapter 3, on the other 
hand, builds on the premise that the loyalty schemes of airlines are succesful 
in creating for the carriers a portfolio of loyal passengers. While the two 
premises cannot be reconciled, the findings of the two chapters should be 
interpreted as complementary. If it is accepted that F F P s  induce loyalty, 
Chapter 3 finds that the schemes enhance the market power of the larger 
airlines and may act as barriers to entry. If, on the other hand, it is as­
sumed that FFPs are not successful in inducing loyalty, Chapter 2 suggests 
that these schemes can still act as vehicles to raise prices above what they 
would be if such programs were not available. Either way, the findings point 
towards the anti-competitive effects of loyalty schemes.
Literature in industrial economics has generally noted that such schemes 
create switching-costs and consequently lock-in customers.3 In turn, firms 
are able to exploit the set of locked-in customers by setting price above what 
they would otherwise be and thereby earn profits higher than those that 
would be earned if loyalty schemes did not exist. These results hinge on 
the assumption that such schemes do indeed induce switching costs. In fact, 
however, there is scant empirical evidence to back the claim that loyalty 
schemes are actually succesful in locking in customers, and thereby create 
switching costs.
Motivated by the lack of such evidence, Chapter 2 offers an alternative 
rationale for the ubiquity of these programmes. In particular, in a setting 
w'here two duopolists compete over price and over the value of the discount
3See for example Klemperer (1995).
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4to hand to repeat-buyers, it is shown that although customers are not locked- 
in by the promise to future discounts, the firms will nevertheless find it in 
their interest to reward repeat buyers. Doing so enables firms to set higher 
prices and enjoy greater profits. This result stems from the fact that a firm’s 
promise to offer a discount induces a rival firm to compete less aggressively 
since the latter knows that the former must face the burden of discounts. 
Diagrammatically, the reaasoning boils down to the observation that the 
launch of a loyalty-programme by one firm shifts the reaction curve of the 
rival outwards.
The model presented in Chapter 2 distinguishes between those consumer 
who participate in the market on every purchasing opportunity - the frequent 
consumers - and those that take part only once. It is shown that the equi­
librium prices, the discount offered by the firms and the firms’ profits are 
all increasing with the share of the frequent consumers. Lastly, the model 
presented suggests that while under some conditions, the set of frequent con­
sumers is better off when firms adopt the loyalty-program, those that take 
part in the market only once are invariably worse off.
Chapter 3 addresses the concern that F F P s  act as barriers to entry 
as they further insulate large incumbents from competition. The reasoning 
behind this view is based on the following logic. The convex structure of 
F F P s  reward schedule is such that frequent flyers have the incentive to 
concentrate all flights on a few7 number of airlines. In order to be able to 
collect a better reward a traveller is likely to choose the airline which flies 
more often from the nearby airport, the one that flies most frequently on 
the more travelled route and the one whose menu of destinations to wThich 
a prize can be redeemed is more appealing. Other things equal, therefore, a 
F F P  is more attractive when it is run by a larger airline.
Chapter 3 explores the extent to which F F P s  tilts the playing field in 
favour of the larger airlines. It does so by exploiting a series of events that 
took place over the course of 1998 and involved six of the American major 
carriers. In the course of that year, three sets of pairwise agreements were 
established - US Airways partnered American Airlines, Continental joined 
forces with Northwest and Delta with United Airlines. With the exception 
of the link between Contintal and Northwest, the three sets of alliances were 
limited to marketing agreements and centred on making an airline treat its 
partner’s FFP  as if it were its own. This F F P  reciprocity meant that a mem­
ber of an airline’s loyalty scheme could also clock up air miles when travelling 
on its partnering airline and could redeem prizes on either. Overnight, the
5opportunities for a member of the F F P  of one of the six airlines involved to 
earn air miles and redeem prizes doubled. If, as argued, FFP s  contribute 
to an airline’s market power, then the boost received by an airline by allying 
itself with another should have a noticeable effect on fares.
The chapter attempts to establish whether such an effect did take place 
by estimating a price equation and testing for the size and signficance of 
explanatory variables reflecting the arrangements of the F F P  alliances. Data 
were used on average fares and traffic covering the thousand largest domestic 
city-pair markets within the 48 contiguous states of America. An initial 
set of results is obtained by modelling the formation of alliances - be it 
of the observed airline or of a rival - through a pair of dummy variables. 
Under such a specification, the analysis of Chapter 3 suggests that an airline 
that has joined an alliance earns a premium of around 1 per cent. On the 
other hand, an airline serving a route where no competitor has formed an 
alliance enjoys a premium of around 1.9 per cent compared to those routes 
where a competitor has joined an alliance. Further insights are given when 
the size of the alliances is taken into account. Under this specification, the 
results suggest that the effect of forming an on fare levels is not due to 
changes in the relative attractiveness of F F P s  at the route level. Instead, the 
results suggest that airlines raise their average fare levels due to the greater 
diffusion of their F F P  at the airport and in the national market at large. 
The results point towards the conclusion that the formation of the FFP  
alliances have enhanced the market power of those airlines involved. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that F F P s  benefit the airlines which 
are able to offer a greater menu of flights, and lends support, therefore, to 
the concerns raised by the competition authorities over the anti-competitive 
effects of FFPs.
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Chapter 1
A study on the effects of 
market size on buyer-seller 
relationships
1 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
In the second half of the nineteenth century, hundreds of men regularly sought 
work on a daily basis at unloading the ships in the docks of London and 
Liverpool. At each centre, in the early morning, the master called out the 
necessary number of names for the work at hand.1 Those chosen were hired 
for the day. The supply of labour generally exceeded demand and the dockers 
who turned up at a centre faced the risk of not being called. For a given task, 
the larger the crowd at a centre the less likely that an individual worker would 
be called upon. In turn, not being called meant foregoing a day’s work, which 
is to say, a day’s pay. As described in Lovell (1969) and Taplin (1985), the 
behaviour of the men when seeking work differed markedly amongst them. 
On the one hand, the so called loafers would, on different days, look for work 
at different centres. On the other hand, the regulars - accounting for the 
greater proportion of the work force - invariably addressed the same centre.2
The above description begs a question: if a day’s work was a day’s work
1 See Mayhew (1861, pp.301 —312) for a vivid description of the working world of 
London dock-labourers in the mid-nineteenth century.
2 See the first chapter in Taplin (1985) for an account of these differences in behaviour 
and. in particular, of the high degree of immobility characterising the regulars.
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and wages were the same across centres, why did some workers remain loyal to 
a centre whilst others searched around and chose to address different centres 
on different days?
Although broad, the strokes with which I have described the above work 
arrangements will have served, I hope, to highlight one feature of markets 
that is often overlooked in economic analysis. Namely that different buyers 
adopt different shopping habits - some will become loyal and address the 
same seller over time whilst others will visit a  number of them, each with 
some frequency.
The varied behaviour amongst the dock labourers in the English ports 
shopping for a day’s work is mirrored by buyers in other markets with similar 
characteristics, namely the high frequency with which individuals meet to 
trade. One that has been studied recently in some detail is the Marseille fish 
market where a stable population of sellers and buyers interact on a daily 
basis ( see Weisbuch et al. 1995, Kirman and Vriend 1997, and Herreiner 
1998). A finding in these studies is that while a  large number of the buyers 
are loyal clients of a particular seller, others search and divide their patronage 
amongst two or three stores. Hence, the strength of the relations established 
between buyers and sellers is seen to vary across the population. Here the 
strength of a relation between a buyer-seller pair refers to the frequency with 
which the pair is matched.
To marketing practitioners the co-existence of these varied behaviours is 
not new .3 Ehrenberg’s (1988) study on repeat purchasing sets off from work 
in this field which established that ’’empirically, the finding is that most 
people tend to develop habits of buying one or some small number of brands, 
each fairly regularly” (Ehrenberg, 1988, p.5, my italics).
The quote from Ehrenberg, and the italicized phrase in particular, pro­
vides the cue to introduce the model presented in Weisbuch et al. (1995). In 
turn, this model serves as a platform for the model treated in this chapter.
At the heart of Weisbuch et al. (1995) is the view that the strength of 
a buyer-seller relation should be viewed as an evolving arrangement that is 
moulded by the experience of these individuals in the market. The authors 
treat the strength of buyer-seller relations as endogenous and examine the 
question of what drives some, consumers to establish strong relations with a 
particular seller, repeatedly patronising him, whilst others adopt a strategy of
■Tor a review of studies within the marketing literature which seek to account for varied 
shopping behaviour see McAllister and Pessemier (1982).
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shopping around. Consumers are boundedly rational and learn about which 
seller to address on the basis of the outcomes of past visits. Whether buyers 
become loyal or not then depends on the parameters shaping their learning 
rule and on the level of utility obtained from each transaction.
In Weisbuch et al. (1995) stores are identical and they have unlimited 
stocks.4 It follows that consumers are certain of being served by a store 
on every purchase occasion and that the benefit from being served does not 
differ amongst stores. In such a context there seems to be little reason for 
buyers to go through a learning process at all - why update the record one 
has of sellers and why pay attention to such records when all assure equal 
service? In the model analysed in the chapter, sellers stock a limited quantity 
of the perishable good. In the event that the demand at one store exceeds 
the available stock, some customers will be turned back unserved. It follows 
that the benefit enjoyed by a buyer when addressing a seller is dependent 
on the actions of the other buyers and that this benefit varies over time as 
buyers’ choice of which seller to address also varies.
As in Weisbuch et al. (1995), buyers will be modelled as boundedly 
rational agents who must choose in each time period which of two sellers to 
address. The choice rule followed by a buyer is shaped by the records of 
his experience with the two sellers. In turn, a buyer’s record of a seller is 
reinforced by the experienced payoff and past outcomes are discounted as 
buyers are assumed to be forgetful.
In this chapter I am interested in describing the steady-state behaviour of 
buyers though attention will be restricted to those steady-states where either 
all buyers are indifferent between visiting either seller or there are two groups 
of buyers where each group becomes loyal to one of the sellers. What leads 
consumers to exhibit one sort of behaviour or the other is the main question 
to be explored.
The results I obtain echo those established by Weisbuch et al. (1995). 
Indeed, their exact results are reproduced when the number of consumers 
in the market is allowed to approach infinity. Outside this special case, 
in particular when the number of market participants is small, the model 
explored in this chapter tells a different story from that of Weisbuch et al.
4 Weisbuch et al. (1995) relax the assumption that the utility from consuming a unit 
of the good at different stores is identical. However, in the models solved analytically the 
authors, they do not relax the assumption that the stock of good is unlimited. The latter 
assumption, though not explicit, is implicit in their assumption that consumers are always 
served.
wrni mm
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(1995).
In comparison with the setting described in Weisbuch et al. (1995), 
buyers are more likely to randomise between sellers rather than become loyal 
to a  particular one. By choosing appropriate parameter values, it is straight­
forward to construct an example where, in the setting of Weisbuch et al 
(1995), buyers become biased towards a seller and visit him on eight times 
out of every ten occasions. For these same parameter values, the model 
presented below suggests that buyers will remain indifferent between sellers 
unless there axe more than 75 buyers in the market.5 Only for a market 
size bigger than this will buyers also develop a preference for a particular 
seller, though the magnitude of the bias will always be smaller than in the 
Weisbuch et al. (1995) setting. It is only when the number of buyers is 
allowed to approach infinity that the results of the two models coincide.
In the model first described below, where the supply of the good in the 
market is such that the demand of all buyers could be matched, buyers are 
more likely to develop a loyalty towards a seller as the market size increases. 
Nevertheless, for some parameter values, buyers will always search.
By moving away from the assumption that aggregate supply equals aggre­
gate demand, I am able to see how relative scarcity affects buyer behaviour 
in the steady-state. For a given number of buyers, which is to say, for a given 
aggregate demand, the larger the stock of the good supplied by sellers, the 
more likely it is that consumers become loyal to a seller. Given the discus­
sion in the previous paragraph, this result implies that increasing the sellers’ 
supply of the good, brings the result closer to that of Weisbuch et al. (1995). 
The intuition for this is immediate. As the stocks of each seller increase, it 
is less likely that consumers face empty shelves and so the closer one is to 
Weisbuch et al.’s (1995) assumption that buyers are certain of being served. 
On the other hand, the greater the number of buyers chasing a given supply, 
the more likely it is that consumers will search stores rather than become 
loyal to one. In fact, if the number of buyers is sufficiently large, then all 
buyers will be searchers.
Whether buyers adopt one behaviour or the other depends on the pa­
rameters that define the buyers’ learning process. The influence on buyers’ 
behaviour of the parameters defining their learning rule is as intuition would
5This example corresponds to the setting where /3 = 2 and ^  = 0.96 - the notation is 
explained in Section 1.3. For these parameter values, buyers in the setting of Weisbuch et 
al. (1995) will patronise their favourite seller with a probability of 0.8301,
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suggest. The greater the benefit to a buyer of having his demand met and 
the less forgetful buyers are of their past experience, the more likely it is 
that consumers develop a  loyalty towards a seller. Similarly, the greater the 
relevance attached by buyers to their past experience when selecting which 
seller to visit, the more likely it is that buyers become loyal to one of them.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we present a review 
of the literature that has modelled exchange economies and paid explicit 
attention to the existence and development of the relations between buyers 
and sellers. This section introduces the work of Weisbuch et al. (1995) which, 
in turn, serves as a platform for the fully developed model of Section 1.3. 
Results and a discussion are presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1 .2  T ra d e  r e la t io n s  in  e x c h a n g e  e c o n o m ie s
A model intending to study how individual and market characteristics influ­
ence the development of relations between buyers and sellers should exhibit 
a number of features. First, the setting must be a dynamic one so that the 
same pair of agents - a buyer and a seller - are allowed to meet repeatedly. 
Second, buyers and/or sellers must be distinguishable amongst themselves 
in the eyes of the individuals of the opposite set. Third, agents must be 
able to learn so that they react to past experience and alter their behaviour 
accordingly.
Due to the imagery of a search equilibrium as one of active interactions 
(Kirman, 1994), search theory might seem, at first sight, a promising area in 
which to find such a framework. The models developed in this field aim at 
characterizing the equilibrium of an economy where a cost must be incurred 
by those wishing to have an opportunity to trade and where agents are ex- 
ante imperfectly informed of the returns from such a trade (see for example 
Stigler 1961, Lippman and McCall 1976, Cross 1983 and Diamond 1989). As 
a setting in which to discuss the development of trade relations, however, 
these models are not appropriate. Firstly, the equilibrium is static in that it 
is defined by the optimal stopping-rules of consumers and the optimal price 
to be set by the sellers. There are no repeated interactions. Secondly, even 
when the models are enriched by allowing both sets of agents - both buyers 
and sellers - to search and, in addition, these are allowed to choose how 
intensely to search, the matching mechanism which draws agents together is 
a ’’two sided random sampling procedure” (Stigler 1961, Benhabib and Bull
1
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1983, Mortensen 1996; quote from Mortenson, p.6). In these models trade is 
amongst non-distinguishable agents in the sense that they are not identifiable 
by those on the opposite side of the trade.
A more recent strand in the literature, that using models of local interac­
tions, on the other hand, sets off precisely by identifying very clearly who is 
allowed to interact with whom. There, the economy is described by a lattice 
where agents are distributed on the nodes and interactions are restricted to 
those between agents on neighbouring nodes. This setting has been used to 
examine the emergence of trade clusters or the diffusion of a technology or of 
a norm across an economy. Ioannides (1990), Albin and Foley (1992), Blume 
(1993), Ellison (1993) and Anderlini and Ianni (1996) are some examples that 
make use of such a set-up. Despite the well defined notion of which agents 
(are allowed to) interact with whom, these set-ups do not lend themselves to 
a discussion on pair-wise trade relations given that an agent’s neighbours are 
implicitly assumed to be indistinguishable between themselves. In each time 
period, either an agent interacts with all his neighbours or he interacts with 
only one of them randomly. The question of how the strength of a relation 
between two neighbours develops is hijacked by this exogenous structure.
W ithin the context of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), various 
studies have examined how the strength of the relations between players 
evolve over time (Smucker et al., 1994, Stanley et al., 1994 and Tesfastion, 
1995).6 In these models, players use their record of past interactions to choose 
whom to play with and from whom to refuse a proposal to play. Similarly to 
what is proposed here, the strength of the relations between the individuals 
playing the IPD evolve over time according to the outcome of past encounters.
The setting in Vriend (1996) is closer to the one studied in this model 
examined in this chapter. The central idea in Vriend (1996) is that consumers 
and shops, initially endowed with little information about their surroundings, 
learn to create and exploit trading opportunities. In particular, consumers 
learn what shopping strategy to follow in order to have a better chance of 
being served and shops learn the level of production and signalling activity 
that they should undertake each period in order to maximize profits.7 Of
6In these papers, players are modelled as automata associated, at each point in time, 
with a particular strategy such as Tit-for-Tat, Always- Cooper at e or Tit-for-2-Tats. When 
playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma with a partner, a player chooses to Cooperate or Defect 
according to their strategy and to his record of past interactions with that partner.
'The behaviour of both consumers and shops is modelled through a Classifier System 
and the learning process takes place using genetic algorithms. Such a setting is intuitively
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particular interest is the result that, on average, consumers return to the 
store last visited on 30% of the occasions and, concealed by this average, 
the finding that some consumers are four times as likely as others to follow 
such a strategy. However, these results are statements on the likelihood that 
consumers shop randomly or follow a strategy of ’returning to the last seller 
’ rather than on the likelihood of addressing a particular seller or the other 
which is the goal of this chapter.
As highlighted in the Introduction, the issues examined in Weisbuch et 
al. (1995) coinicide with those tackled here. Given that the main model 
presented below relies heavily on Weisbuch et al. (1995), I shall move directly 
to describing the model and later, when appropriate, draw out the differences 
between the two settings.
1 .3  M o d e l
A market for an homogenous perishable good is made up of an even number, 
2N, of consumers indexed by z, i = [1,2,..,2A], and by two sellers, shop A 
and shop B. The market operates in each period (day) t, with all agents 
actively participating in it. Consumers hold an inelastic demand for one 
unit of the good in each period and derive a constant net benefit, U, from 
consuming it.
The two identical sellers have a passive role in this model. Each sets an 
identical price in each period and they share the market potential equally,
i.e. each produces N  units of the goods in each period. The passive role of 
the two sellers - producing a constant quantity and setting a constant price 
in each period - implies that the evolution of relations between sellers and 
consumers is fuelled exclusively by the behaviour of the latter.
Consumer i holds a pair of parameters Jijt, j  ~  {A ,B }  which are a 
summary statistic of how well i has fared in trading with shop j  up to period 
t . This is the fidelity parameter described in Weisbuch et al. (1995). The 
value of Jijt is updated as the experience of the consumer unfolds according 
to,
appealing and lends itself to be implemented in simulations - as carried out by Vriend 
though it does not allow for analytic results to be derived..
m rw m rm i RHNPfipiiNIIHIlHI
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Jijo = 0  t =  0
• ^ijt (1 t ) Jijt—\ "I- Uijt~\ t 1,2,...
where 7 , 0 < 7 < 1 and where,
( 1.1)
TT _  ƒ U if i purchased from shop j  at time t — 1 .
l**~l \  0 otherwise  ^ ' '
The parameter 7 reflects the relevance that i attaches to his past record of 
store j. If 7 = 0, the consumer takes full consideration of the fidelity he held 
in the previous period. On the other hand, if 7 =  1, the consumer’s fidelity 
to a shop in period t will be equal to the utility received from that shop in 
period t — 1 alone. An alternative and intuitive way to interpret 7, suggested 
in Weisbuch et al. (1995), is to view it as a proxy for the forgetfulness of 
consumers - the higher the value of 7 the more forgetful consumers are.
In selecting which of the two shops to visit at time i, consumer i attaches 
a probability Pijt of addressing seller j . This probability is given by the 
choice rule,
Pijt —
______ exp (0Jijt)
exp (0JiAt) +  exp {PJist)
fo r j  = {A, B } (1.3)
where ¡3 >  0 reflects the significance attached by consumers to their record 
of market experience. In particular, ¡3 measures the extent to which the 
choice probability is biased towards the store with whom the consumer holds 
a higher fidelity parameter. Note that,
<5
= (A m - (1.4)
The partial derivative is positive if and only if > JiBt. For given values 
of JiAt and J ^ t , the higher the value of (3 the greater the probability of 
addressing the shop with whom the consumer holds a higher fidelity. It is 
interesting to consider the behaviour associated with the extreme values of ¡3. 
If /3 =  0, it is clear from equation (1.3) that the probability of visiting either 
shop is |  whatever the consumers’ past experience in dealing with either shop 
may have been, i.e. independent of the Jyi. On the other hand, if ¡3 =  oc 
then, with probability equal to 1, a consumer addresses the shop with the
■ w uaauuB iuu
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highest Jiju irrespective of how small the difference in the fidelity actually is. 
Such a behaviour mirrors that of a consumer following a best-reply strategy.
The learning rule defined by (1.1) and (1.3) falls under the class of expo­
nential fictitious play and support for this family of rules as ” strong” learning 
rules is found in Fudenburg and Levine (1995) and Marimon (1995). In ad­
dition, Easley and Rustichini (1995) identify this class of rules as satisfying 
the axioms which they believe adaptive rules should possess.8 Furthermore, 
Weisbuch et al. (1997) have provided support to the logit form as a choice 
function by showing that it is the outcome of an optimization exercise in­
volving the trade-off between exploiting a known and well rewarded strategy 
and exploring new strategies with possibly better payoffs.
1.3.1 Solving the model
The model can be solved analytically by approximating the dynamics of the 
model by ordinary differential equations. This approach is in the spirit of 
the mean field theory found in statistical physics and it centres on replacing 
fluctuations around a mean by the expected value.9 The approximation is 
valid provided the changes in the fidelity parameters, are small at each 
time step and that the population is homogeneously mixed, i.e. each buyer 
has equal access to each seller so that each individual behaves as if he dealt 
with the market average.
Recall that the law of motion of Jijt described by equation (1.1) can be 
written as,10
Jijt+T J^t — yJijt Uijt
In line with the assumptions described above, the stochastic equation can 
be approximated by considering the expected value of the random variables
J i j t + T  J i j t  —  J i j t  -f" E j i J J i j t )  ( 1 * 5 )
wdiere, using (1.2), E  (Uijt) is given by,
8These basic axioms are monotonicity, symmetry and independence of irrelevant alter­
natives.
9 See Chapter 8 in Weisbuch (1991).
1(JThis exposition relies partly on Herreiner (1998).
jfWiTiirv
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E (U ijt) = Pijt P ( S ijt) U ( 1.6)
The expression for E  (Uijt) is the product of i ’s probability of addressing 
store j  in period t, Pm, with the probability that store j  has sufficient units 
of the good to satisfy i ’s demand, P  (Sijt) , and the level of utility enjoyed 
if i ’s demand is indeed met, U.
Taking the limit r  —*• 0 in (1.5) yields the deterministic differential equa­
tion,
^  =  - 7  Ji j t  +  E ( U i j t ) (1.7)
The steady-state is defined by the invariance of the fidelity parameters, 
=  0, which, from (1.7), gives the following characterisation of the steady- 
sta te ,11
7  J a  =  E { U i j )  (1.8)
1.3.2 Detour - Comparison with Weisbuch et al. (1995)
When visiting a seller, the expected utility to a consumer depends on the 
probability of being served. This is explicit in (1.6). In turn, the probability 
of being served is a function of the behaviour of all other consumers in the 
market.
In contrast, Weisbuch et al.(1995) make the assumption that consumers 
are certain of being served, P  ( S i j t ) =  1. Furthermore, as is assumed in 
the model presented here, that paper also takes prices as fixed over time 
sind equal across shops. Consumers, therefore, face no uncertainty; they are 
sure of purchasing what they demand and they are aware of the (equal and 
constant) price charged. In such a context, however, what is the rationale 
for consumers to learn? What is there for consumers to learn about?
On the other hand, a rationale for consumers to go through a learning 
process, will exist if, as assumed above, consumers are uncertain of the out­
come when visiting a shop. This uncertainty was introduced in the model 
by allowing for the possibility that a customer is greeted by empty shelves. 
Hence in any given period, whether a consumer is served or not depends on
11 Since the equation describes the steady-state the time sub-scripts are left out.
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(a) the quantity of goods stocked by the visited shop and on (b) what the 
other consumers in the market are doing.12
1.3.3 Symmetric steady-state
The search is limited to the class of symmetric steady-states.13 By symmetric, 
I refer to an equilibrium where half the consumers adopt a diametrically op­
posite behaviour from the other half.
In a symmetric steady-state there are an equal number - N  - of two 
types of consumers. Let G\ and G2 be the two sets within which consumers 
of the same type are grouped. In the steady-state, the probability of a 
consumer i € G\ visiting shop A is equal to the probability of a consumer 
j  e G2 consumer addressing shop B. And coversely, the probability with 
which i € G\ addresses B  is equal to the probability with which j  6 G2 goes 
to A.
Given this, the steady-state behaviour of all consumers can be established 
by looking at the behaviour of one consumer in one of the two groups. This 
will be done with reference to a consumer belonging to G\.
It follows from (1.8) that in the steady-state,
1>Ja = E{Ua) (1.9)
7 J b  =  E ( U b )
where the sub-script i was dropped given consumers within G\ are identical.
The task at hand now is to express E(Ua ) and E(Ub ) in terms of the 
variables Ja and Jb - The expression for E  (Ua ) is tackled first.
Recall from (1.6) that
______________________ E (U a) = Pa P (S a) U (1.10)
12 This feature is also present in the model developed in Herreiner (1998) and largely 
based on Weisbuch et al. (1995). There, however, it is assumed that a buyer does not take 
into account the effect that his own actions will have on the probability of being served 
and it is also assumed that each buyer believes all other buyers search each shop with an 
equal probability.
13To investigate asymmetric steady-states would require solving a system of 2 * 2iV 
equations with as many unknowns, as it would be necessary to establish the steady-state 
of the 2 * 2 N  fidelity parameters J i j , i = {1,2. ...2A:}, j  — { A , B } . Though such a system 
is, in principle, solvable the unwieldy functional forms -as will be clear below - do not 
allow for analytic solutions to be derived.
w»wnm
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where Pa is the probability that i visits shop A  and P  (Sa) is the probability 
that i is served when visiting it. The term P (S a ) depends on the actions of 
the remaining 2N  — 1 consumers present in the market. Recalling that each 
shop brings N  units to the market, it follows that
27V— 1
E  (UA) = U * Pa *[Pt (tia < N  -  1)] + U * PA * Y "
N ■ i ■  —  — ■ ^
E ( VÀ)
k = N
Pr{nA = k)*WTT)  
""«W)
(1.11)
where is the number of consumers, out of the remaining 2N — 1, who 
address shop A.
The first component of (1.11), E  (U\), reflects the event where strictly 
less than N  other consumers visit shop A . In this case all consumers that 
choose to visit A are guaranteed the purchase of a unit of the good. The 
second component, E  (U\ ) , describes the contribution to E{Ua) from the 
event that more than N  consumers visit shop A. In this case, the N  units of 
the good available must be rationed amongst the customers. Given that shops 
are unable to identify individual consumers it is assumed that the rationing 
takes the form of a random allocation of the N  units among these customers. 
In other words, sellers are not allowed to give preferential treatment to some 
buyers.
Recall that Pa is the probability associated with the steady-state values 
of Ja and JB for a consumer in G\ addressing shop A  and, by the symmetry 
assumption, it is equal to the steady-state probability of a consumer in G2 
addressing shop B . On the other hand, PB denotes the probability with which 
i € G 1 addresses shop B  and it equals the probability of j  € G2 of going to 
shop A. It follows that the two components in (1.11) can be written as,
E{U\ )
E { U \)
N - l
V P a T ,
k=0 
2 7V -:
u p * 1 2k=N
k
E £f7V — 1/yJV  p i  p k - l  p N —l —l p N - ( k - l )  
l k-~l A B B  A
. 1=0 
' TV—1
E r>N- l /- yN pZ n k - l  p N —1 - 1  p N -(A c -l)  U Z U fc-Z M  r B r A
J = k - N
N
h -h 1
where , . After substituting out Pa and PB using (1.3), the
previous equations simplify to,
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E,vl ic^'xpSlj^N-k + l + W + JBiN + k-l-n)}]
'  A' (exp/SJ^  +exp/3Js )2A
jrYfcr2 N  ^£fc = JV [ i^ = *r-AT gfV lcfc-t exP>3['f^ (Jv-fc+I + 2l) +Ja{,V + fc-l-2Q]]
' (expiJA+e*pi3JB)aA'
The last two expressions can be plugged into the top equation in (1.9) to 
obtain a first equation in terms of two variables JA and Jq that characterises 
the steady-state.
Following similar steps, an expression E  (Ub ) can also be written in terms 
of JA and Jq. As before decompose E {Ub ) so that
E  (UB) = E (Ub) + E (U%) (1.12)
where the terms E  (UlB) and E (Ug) are defined in an analogous way to 
E (U \)  and E (UA) respecitvely. Following the same reasoning as before the 
expressions for E (Ug) and E  (Ug) can be written as,
\ y r^ ”o1[^ *=oc/v"lcfcf-i'’cpi3k4(^+''-i-2i)+jB(A'-*+1+2')]lr  t/fi =--------1----------- ;--------—------Tin-------------------1' {**P0jA+**P0jb)2
E(u2 4_u£fc=wMg^ fcLNC|W~lc^-l“ PgiJM<"+fc-l‘20+JB(W-fc+l+2l))|1gafT 
 ^ (exp/JJ^ +exp 0Jb)
The above algebraic work allows me to write out the two equations in 
(1.9) in terms of the two unknowns that that must be solved for, JA and J$. 
However, the functional form of the expressions involved do not allow me to 
solve the system analytically. Instead, to best comment on the solutions to 
the system, the bottom equation is subtracted from the top one so that a 
single equation with a single unkown variable A =  JA — Jb is derived. After 
much nettlesome algebra this step gives,
E k [exp/3A (4i+2-2fc))-l
1 = 0 ^ 1  ^ k - l  exp0A (l+2<-fc)
(1.13)
, u  ^ 2 N - 1  [ w v - l  fexp#A (4f+ 2-2fc)1-l N
"t" Z (A ) 2 ^ k = N  [ l ^ l = k - N ^ l  ° k - l  exp/3A (l+2 l - k )  *+1
where Z  (A) is a function of A and is defined as Z  (A) = C]N exp [/?A(j — Ar)]. 
Equation (1.13) can be further simplified by dividing both the numerator and 
the denominator of the fractions inside the square brackets by exp [/3A (1 -f 21 — fc)] 
and making use of the fact that 2 sinh (x) = exp (x) —exp (—x ) , where sinh (x) 
is the hyperbolic sine of x. The simplified equation is then given by,
7A = u E n —1 k=02(A)
22
7 A =  ^ j E « [ E f - o C r - 1CiLl sinhG3A(2i +  l - f c ) ) '
+ i k  Zl=N [ E £ £ j* Cf-'CjL, sinh 0?A(21 +  1 -  k))
(1.14)
Let A* be a (the) solution to (1.14). The steady-state shopping strategy of 
consumers can be expressed in terms of A*. In particular, it follows from (1.3) 
that, in the steady-state, the probability for a consumer in G\ of addressing 
shop A  is FJ = 1 -  1+eXp(^i) while its complement describes the probability 
of selecting shop B.
If A* =  0 is a solution to (1.14), the consumer will have an equally strong 
relation with both shops, J \  =  J*B, and will be equally likely to address either 
shop, PJ = Pg = \ . On the other hand, if the solution to (1.14) is large 
in absolute values then the steady-state will be characterised by consumers 
having established a bias towards addressing one of the two shops. If A* > 0 
and large, then consumers in Gi will have established a strong relation with 
shop A  and a weaker one with shop B. The inverse will be true for consumers 
in G 2 •
1 .4  R e s u lt s
Although I am not able to solve (1.14) and obtain an explicit expression for 
the solution A*, I am able to characterize these solutions and hence describe 
the steady-state behaviour of consumers. The results of this exercise are 
presented below and a discussion of them will be presented in the subsequent 
section.
1.4.1 Results
To make the presentation clearer let g (A) =  L H S  (A) — R H S  (A), where 
L H S  (A) is the term on the left-hand-side of equation (1.14) and R H S  (A) 
the term  on the right-hand-side of this same equation. It follows that solving 
for A in (1.14) is equivalent to finding the value(s) of A such that g (A) = 0.
A series of observations on g (A) can be established- the proofs are left 
to Appendix l.A.
O bservation
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(i) The function g (A) is continuous in A.
(ii) The function g (A) is odd, ¿.e., g (A) = —g (—A ).
(iii) The function 5 (A) is convex for A €
(iv) There exists a A > 0 such that g (A) > 0 and g (-A ) < 0 for A > A.
Note that observations (¿) and (w) together imply that g (0) = 0  for all 
values of the paramaters U, ƒ?, 7 and N. In addition, observations ( i) , («) and 
(iii) together imply that ff(A) is concave for A G
Taken together, the four observations point to the following: g (A) has 
either one or three solutions depending on whether its derivative at A =  0 is 
positive or negative, respectively. In turn ,14
dq<^.) | < jdX [i=0 >'
(1.15)
Tw"
Let ƒ (Ar) denote the right-hand-side of (1.15). Note that f  (N) is a 
function of N  alone. It is shown in Appendix l.B that ƒ (N) has a range 
within the interval (0,0.25) and that, for N  > 2, ƒ (N) is increasing in N> 
The findings established so far are summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary 1.1 If > ƒ (IV) then there is a unique solution to (1.14) given 
by A* = 0. If, on the other hand ^7  < ƒ (N) then there will be three solutions 
of which A* = 0 it is one while the other two are opposite in sign but equal 
in absolute value.
Proof. The proof follows from the four observations listed earlier. ■
Figure 1.1 illustrates Corollary 1.1. The figure plots 5 (A) for different 
values of the ratio For low values of ¡5 such that ^7  > ƒ ( N ) , the 
function g (A) has a positive derivative at A =  0 and it has a unique zero. 
On the other hand, for higher ¡3, the slope of g (A) at A = 0 is negative and 
the curve intersects the horizontal axis thrice.
14 See Appendix l.B
24
Figure 1.1: Plot of g (A) for different values of ¡3. (7 — 0.5, U — 1, TV = 4)
When the parameter values are such that g (A) has three solutions the 
central solution, A* =  0 describes an unstable stationary point. A small 
perturbation will set the consumers’ mixed strategy to evolve to a new steady- 
state. The new steady-state will be associated with one of the other two 
exterior solutions which are stable. However, when A* = 0 is the unique 
solution it corresponds to a  stable steady-state. Appendix l.C  lays out the 
proof of these claims.
When there are two stable steady-states, these are charactized by non­
zero values of A* that are equal in absolute terms and opposite in sign. In the 
steady-state associated with a positive A*, consumers from G\ have a bias 
towards addressing shop A . whilst consumers from G2 will have an equally 
strong bias in favour of shop B. On the other hand, in the steady-state 
associated with the negative root A*, the biases of these two groups towards 
the shops are reversed.
M iN a iiM M iiU
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1 .5  D is c u s s io n
In this section I carry out a comparative statics exercise to examine how the 
parameters (3, 7, U and N  affect the steady-state behaviour of the consumers.
I first consider the parameters which can be interpreted as being character­
istics of consumers - /?, 7, U - and then examine the effect of market size, 
proxied by N.
1.5.1 Characteristics of consumers
As pointed out earlier, condition (1.15) implies that for low values of /? the 
unique solution to (1.14) is A* = 0. This corresponds to the scenario where 
consumers address either store with an equal probability, Pa ~ ^ b ~  0*5* 
On the other hand, high values of f3 lead to one of the two possible stable 
steady-states where consumers have a bias towards visiting one of the two 
stores.
The parameter ¡3 influences not only the nature of the steady-state be­
haviour - whether consumers remain indifferent between the two stores or 
they develop a bias towards one of them - but it also affects the magnitude 
of the bias. Larger values of ¡3 are associated with larger absolute values of 
the solution A*, which implies consumers exhibit a stronger bias towards one 
of the two stores. It is insightful to describe the intuition behind this here 
although the proof is left to Appendix l.D.
By definition, a higher value of ¡3 means that consumers attach a greater 
relevance to the difference in the value of their fidelity parameters with the 
two shops. Consequently, when ¡3 is higher, the difference in the probability 
of visiting one shop over the other is wider in favour of the shop with whom 
the higher fidelity parameter is held.15 In turn, this will increase the gap 
between a consumer’s two fidelity parameters as the consumer expects to 
enjoy a greater expected utility from the store with whom he already has 
a bias towards. Two forces work in this direction. On the one hand, other 
things equal, a store’s contribution to the utility a consumer expects to enjoy 
is greater the higher the probability of the consumer of visiting that store. On 
the other hand, conditional on being at a store, the difference in the utility a 
consumer expects to enjoy - which is to say, the difference in the probability lo
loThis reasoning is captured bv the expression for the derivative presented in (1.4) and
d(£±)
which can be re-written as ? < =  A e 3A > 0 J 4 > J b -
PfTnrPrf^
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Figure 1.2: Plot of steady-state probabilities against ¡3.
(7 =  0.5, U = l.iV — 30)
of being served - at the store for which he has a preference compared to the 
other store is increasing with the size of the bias.16
I am not able to illustrate the previous intuition formally. Instead, resort 
is made to numerical simulations and the output from one such exercise is 
summarized in Figure 1.2. For a given set of values for N, 7 and U, the figure 
draws the steady-state shopping strategies for values of (3 in the interval [0,4]. 
For sufficiently low values of /3, the symmetric solution is unique and the 
consumer will patronise both stores with a probability of Once ¡3 is large 
enough so that ^7  < ƒ (N) then consumers establish a preferential relation 
with one of the two stores. The strength of this relation, mirrored by the 
probability of addressing a store, is increasing in (3 and rapidly approaches 
the limit values of 0 and 1.
The effects of the parameters 7 and U on the solutions A* are as expected 
intuitively and match those established by Weisbuch et al. (1995). Condition
(1.15) implies that high values of U and low values of 7 are associated with 10*
10 As consumers’ bias approaches the limiting case of visiting one store with certainty
and the other with zero probability, the difference in the conditional expected utility
approaches > 0.
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consumers developing a preferential relation towards one of the stores. On 
the other hand, if U is low or 7 large enough, consumers will be indifferent 
to puchasing from either store. In addition, if the values of U and 7 are 
such that consumers5 behaviour is characterized by a bias towards a given 
store, then for higher values of U and/or lower values of 7, the bias will be 
even stronger (see Appendix 1.D). The intuition for this is as follows. For 
a high i/, a small sequence of succesful visits to the same store is sufficient 
to create a significant gap between the fidelity parameters a consumer holds 
with respect to the two stores. In turn, this gap will bias future choices 
towards the store just visited and future succesful visits to the same shop 
will widen this gap further. In addition, if 7 is small, the gap will narrow 
only slightly in the event that a visit to the preferred shop does not reward 
the consumer with the good.
1.5.2 Market Size
In this section I will examine how the steady-state behaviour of consumers 
is affected by the number of consumers in the market.
Recall that the function ƒ (N ) in (1.15) is increasing in N  and that de­
pending on whether the ratio ^7  is smaller or greater than ƒ (N ), consumers 
will be, respectively, indifferent between the stores or have a  bias towards
one.17 This leads to the following corollary.
C orollary 1.2 The parameter space for /3,7 and U such that consumers 
develop a bias towards one of the shops is weakly greater as the number of 
consumers in the market increases.
Proof. The proof follows from the previous discussion on the properties of
/(AO- ■
Corollary 1.2 states that consumers are more likely to become loyal to 
one of the shops as the market size increases. This does not imply, however, 
that if N  is sufficiently high consumers will become loyal to a store or that 
if N  is low enough, consumers will be indifferent between stores. Indeed, if
the ratio is sufficiently low consumers will establish a mixing behaviour
between stores for any N . On the other hand, for sufficiently high values of
17This statement should be qualified as, ’ƒ ( N )  is increasing in N  for N  > 2 ’. This is 
overlooked in the text in Older to make the presentation more fluid.
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consumers will always develop a bias towards a store independently of 
market size.
However, if the parameter values are such tha t consumers exhibit a bias 
towards one store in the steady-state, then the magnitude of this bias is 
increasing with N .
The intuition for the role of N  on the steady-state behaviour of consumers 
is the following.
In the steady-state of the model presented below, the shopping strategies 
across the population of consumers are such that all consumers are expected 
to be served - the expected number of customers addressing each shop is equal 
to the number of units of the good available for sale, N. However, the choice 
of store to visit by an individual consumer is the realization of a random 
variable - as made explicit by the choice rule (1.3). In terms of the market 
as a whole, the realized division of the patronage between the two shops is 
the result of 2N such realizations. It follows that the realized outcome is not 
necessarily equal to the expected outcome. In particular, it is likely that the 
realized division of consumers between the two stores on a given purchase 
opportunity is such that more than N  will go to the same store. When this 
occurs, rationing will take place. By the law of large numbers, it follows 
that as N  increases the deviation of the realized outcome from the expected 
outcome is likely to fall. In other words, as N  increases, it will be less likely 
that rationing will have to take place and hence the higher the utility a 
consumer can expect to enjoy. In the limit, as N  goes to infinity, the realized 
outcome will equal the expected outcome and consumers will be certain of 
being served by the store they address. This limiting point is equivalent to 
the setting described by Weisbuch et al. (1995) where consumers are always 
assured service.
It is timely to contrast the above results with those established by Weis­
buch et al. (1995). In the latter paper, consumers exhibit a mixing behaviour 
in the steady-state if ^7  >0.25 and they will have a bias towards one of the 
two shops otherwise.18 Given that ƒ (N) < 0.25 it follows that if ^7  > 0.25 
then it will also be the case that ^7  > ƒ {N}.
This discussion can be summarized by the following corollaries.
C oro llary  1.3 I f p, 7 and U are such that in the model of Weisbuch et
lsSee equation (12) in Weisbuch et al. (1995). The term II in that paper is equivalent 
to the term U in the model presented here.
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al. (1995) consumers have mixing behaviour then it will be the case that 
this same behaviour will be displayed by consumers in the steady-state of the 
model presented above. The reverse, however, is not true.
C orollary 1.4 The lower the number of consumers in the market, the more 
likely it is that the results of Weisbuch et al. (1995) and those of the model of 
Section 1.3 diverge. Only when the number of consumers approaches infinity 
do the results‘of the two models coincide.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 1.3 follows from the discussion set-out above. 
Corollary 1.4, on the other hand, follows directly from the fact that ƒ (N) is 
increasing in N  and that lim ƒ (N) — 0.25. ■iV —►co
The divergence between the two models mentioned in Corollary 1.4 refers 
to the differences in the nature of consumer behaviour - whether a bias in 
favour of a store is developed or not. Loyal behaviour by consumers is more 
likely to emerge in Weisbuch et al. (1995) than in the model presented above.
Relative scarcity
By construction, the number of units of the good stocked by the two shops 
changes one-to-one with the number of consumers: both are set equal to 2N. 
Therefore, altering N  does not change the relative scarcity of the good in 
the market. The goal of this section is to examine how the relative scarcity 
of the good in the market affects the consumers’ steady-state behaviour. To 
carry this out it is necessary to separate the number of consumers from the 
number of units of the good in the market. This is done by assuming that 
each of the two stores stock M  units in each period while there continue to 
exist 2N  consumers in the market. M  can be smaller, equal or greater than 
N.
The steps to tackle this modified model are the same as those taken to 
solve the original model of Section 1.4. While Appendix l.E  details how this 
modified model is solved, only a very brief account is presented here. The 
superscript mwill be added to the notation used in Section 1.3 when referring 
to the modified model.
As before, a system of two equations with the two unknowns J^and JB is 
derived and from this a single equation -analogous to (1.14)- with the single 
unknown Am is obtained. The observations (¿) through (iv) made in Section 
1.4.1 in relation to (1.14) also hold with respect to the analogous equation
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Figure 1.3: Boundaries in the M  x TV space between the twp types of steady- 
state beaviour for different values of the ratio r  =
derived from the modified model. It follows that, as before, it is possible to 
derive a condition which determines whether the modified model will have 
the unique stable solution Am* = 0 or three solutions of which Am* = 0 
is one but is unstable and the other two are equal in absolute value. The 
condition determining whether there will be one or three solutions is derived 
in an analogous way to that used to obtain (1.15). There will be a unique 
solution if 2^ 7 > and three solutions when 7^7 <
The function / m (Af, TV) is described in Appendix l.F.
Note that if M  > 2TV each store is able to satisfy the demand of all 
consumers single-handed which implies that customers are always certain 
of being served. Indeed, for M  > 2A, f m (A/, TV) =  0.25 and hence the 
condition determining the characterisation of the steady-state boils down to 
This agrees with the condition established in Weisbuch et al. 
(1995) where, by assumption, consumers are always assured service.
The function ƒ771 (M } TV) has a range in the interval (0,0.25) and it can 
be shown numerically that the function is increasing in M  and decreasing
S i
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in iV.19 This implies that for a given set of parameters U, ¡3 and 7 the 
condition ^  < f m (Af, N) is more likely to be satisfied for smaller A ƒand 
larger N. Other things equal, therefore, consumers are more likely to develop 
a preference towards one of the shops for higher values of M  and for lower 
values of N. Conversely, consumers are more likely to develop a mixing 
behaviour for low values of Mand high values of N. This result is illustrated 
in Figure 1.3. For given values of the ratio 2^ 7, the figure draws the boundary 
in the N  x M  space separating the type of behaviour consumers exhibit in 
the steady-state. In the area above a line, the values of N  and M  are such 
that consumers have a mixing behaviour and address either store with an 
equal probability. On the other hand, the area below the line marks the 
region where consumers develop a bias towards patronising one of the shops. 
For a given value of 7^7 and fixing the number of consumers - fixing N  - 
increasing the number of units of the good stocked by each store, one moves 
from the region where consumers are indiffernt between stores to that where 
consumers have a preference towards one. The opposite is true if for a given 
A/, the value of N  is increased.
As Figure 1.3 illustrates, the smaller the ratio ^ 77, the larger the area 
in the M  x N  space where consumers will have a bias towards shopping 
at one of the stores. It is not the case, however, that there will always be 
two distinct regions. In particular, the region where consumers exhibit a 
preference towards a store might be empty. This follows directly from the 
fact that the function f m (A/, N ) is contained within the interval (0,0.25) and 
that if the parameter values are such that 7^7 > 0.25, then the condition 
2^ 77 > f m (A/, N) is satisfied for all N  and M. In turn, this means that in 
the entire N  x M  space the steady-state behaviour will be characterized by 
consumers being indifferent towards either store.
When the relative values of M  and N  are such that consumers develop a 
bias towards a given store, the magnitude of the bias itself is also influenced 
by M  and N. Although I am not able to show analytically how this bias varies 
with N  and M, numerical simulations can be carried out. Doing so, points 
towards the following result. Consumers’ bias towards a shop is increasing 
in M  and decreasing in N . For a given value of Ai, Figure 1.4shows how the 
steady-state probabilities of consumers addressing both shops change with 
N. For low values of N, consumers have a strong preference towards one of 
the shops, patronising it on more than 90% of the occasions. As N  increases,
19 See Appendix l.F.
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Figure 1.4: Steady-state behaviour as a function of the number of consumers 
in the market. (M — 30, U =  1,7 =  1, /3 =  1)
the bias towards the shop falls, first gradually and then rapidly, until it does 
not exist any longer.
At first, the relation established above between the relative scarcity of 
the good in the market and the existence of preferential relations between a 
seller and a shop might appear to be counter-intuitive. It could be expected 
that the greater the scarcity, the more likely it would be that a consumer 
returns to a familiar shop in order to ensure that he gets served. While 
this reasoning could be valid in a more general context, it cannot hold in the 
model discussed here where sellers treat all consumers equally. Consequently, 
being loyal to a shop is no guarantee of being served. Instead, the relation 
between relative scarcity and loyalty is better, and more simply, explained 
by the fact that the greater the scarcity - the louver the ratio the lower 
is the utility that a consumer expects to gain from each visit. This in turn, 
lowers the tendency to create strong relations as it has an effect analogous 
to that of lowering U. The opposite is true when ^increases so that there 
are less consumers for each unit of the good placed in the market.
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1 .6  C o n c lu s io n
The starting point of the analysis in this chapteris the view that the relations 
between sellers and buyers are the result of an on-going process where agents 
learn from their experience whom to trade with in the future. The model 
presented here simplifies this view by assuming that buyers alone have the 
ability to learn and that sellers play a passive role. In doing so, it follows 
closely the work of Weisbuch et al. (1995). In the latter paper, however, 
consumers are assured of having their demand met whichever seller they 
choose to address and so there is no rationale for why they should learn 
in the first place. The above analysis addresses this by allowing for the 
possibility that a consumer is faced with empty shelves when visiting a store.
In comparison with the setting where such uncertainty does not exist, 
buyers are more likely to adopt a mixing behaviour rather than become loyal 
to a particular store. The size of the market - given by the number of buyers 
- influences the behaviour of buyers in the steady-state. As the number of 
buyers in the market grows, the more likely it is that buyers become loyal to 
a particular store.
msssm
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A p p e n d ic e s
l.A  Proof of observations (z) — (zv)
i) The function g (A) can be decomposed as the sum, difference, product and 
quotient of contunuos functions. It follows that g (A) itself will be continuous.
ii) Express the function g (A) as g (A) =  7A — R H S  (A) where R H S  (A) 
is the right-hand-side expression in (1.14). It follows that g (—A) =  —-7 A — 
R H S(—A). Taking care to  explicitly write Z  as a function of A, a  typical 
term, RHSik, within the summation signs of R H S  (—A) is given by,
RHSllc{ - A) =  sinh (-/3A (1 + 21 -  k))
Note that sinh (-x )  =  — sinh (x) and that Z(—A) =  Z (A). Hence, the term 
RHSik(—A) can be expressed as
RHS,k{ -  A) =  —C f '^ C ^ ^ - s i n h  (/?A (1 +  2i -  fc))
=  -R H S lk( A)
The above relation holds for each individual summand of R H S  (A) and there­
fore g(—A) = - 7A +  i?ifS(A ) =  -p(A ). This proves that the function g (A) 
is odd.
iii) It is proved that g (A) is convex for A € 9i+, by showing that > 0
for A > 0. Note that g (A) can be expressed as,
g(  A) =  l J A - E ( U A) - ( y J B - E ( U B))
=  ^ A - ( E ( U a ) - E ( U b ))
which is the equation in the background of (1.14).
First, consider the term E (U A). Recall from (1.11) that E  (Ua ) = E  (U\)+ 
E (U \)  where,
E {U \)
N - 1
k=0
r fc
P‘a P t ‘ rjN—l—l pN—(ft—/) r B  r A (1.16)
2 JV—1
E (U 2a) =  U P a Y ,
N - l
Eft=iV U=k~N /~iN— 1/~*N °ft-/ PlA P f
pAf—1—/ pAf —(ft—i) 
r B  r A
N
k + I
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Therefore, the first derivative is given by
dg(A)
dA
dE(UA) dE(UB) 
dA  + dA
d£l( 'iThe expressions for -  ^ ¿J ^ , c = {1,2}, j  — {A, B} can be obtained using
straight-forwardly from (1.16).
For the sake of presentation I do not present either and only note that
H (Pa, Pb ) = (TxPA -  T2PBf  ( i f  i f  ) -  (T2PA -  r,PB)2 (P f  P f )  
+ 2N  ( P f P f  -  i f F f )
T\ = N  +  2 l - k  +  l 
T2 = N — 21 + k — 1
r 3 = N  + 2 l - k  + 2 
T4 =  N - 2 l  + k
The challenge now is to show that this expression is non-negative for all 
A > 0. Note that when A > 0 then PA G (0.5,1). In addition, given that 
both j3 and U are positive by assumption, the sign of the expression for 
depends on PA and N  alone. It follows that the convexity of g (A) in the
both dE^ A^  and dE9irB^  are functions of PA and P#.
The second derivative is given by,
d2g (A) =  <PE(Ua) <PE(Ub) 
dA2 dA2 dA2
which simplifies to
where,
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Figure 1.5: Plot of curvature of g (A ).
positive quadrant can be proved by showing that > 0 for PA € (0.5, 1)
for all JV. To show this I resorted to numerical analysis and plotted ^ i n  
the range Pa € (0.5,1) and for all values of N  up to 100. Figure 1.5 illustrates 
the typical plot obtained from this exercise. For all values of N  used, the 
curve was above the horizontal axis which implies that the curvature of g (A) 
is positive and hence that the function is convex for A > 0. This completes 
the proof.
iv) The function g (A) can be re-written as,
g (A) =  7A -  U [PA * P  (SA) - P b * P  (Sb)] (U 7)
where PA is the probablity of consumer i € Gi addressing shop A  and P  (5a) 
is the probability of being served at A. Pb and P  (Sq) are similarly defined 
in relation to shop B.
It follows from the choice rule (1.3) that lim PA — 1 and that lim P  (B) =
A —»oo A —►co
0. In turn, from (1.6), this implies that lim P (S A) =  1 and lim P (S b ) =
A —*oc A —‘oo
Trjv. Putting these results together, it follows from (1.17) that lim g (A) =
A —*oo
lim 7A — U > 0. In turn, this result coupled with the fact that g (A) is 
A —»co
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continuous, odd and convex for A G implies that there exists a A > 0 
such that g (A) > 0, for A > A . Lastly, given g (A) is an odd function, it 
follows that g (—A) < 0 for A > A.
l.B  Deriving condition (1.15) and the properties of ƒ (N)
Note that =  cosh (A) and that cosh(0) = 1, sinh(0) =  0 and
Z |A=0 =  CjN =  22Ar- is then straight-forward to derive that,
&|A=0 ELo (2l+l- k ) + ^ l^  Z?=~kl N (21+l-k)^)
Condition (1.15) in the text follows directly.
The proof that ƒ (N) e  (0,0.25) is post-poned to Appendix l.E  where it 
will be shown that the function f m (M, N) - of which ƒ (N } is a special case 
- is contained within the interval (0,0.25).
I have not been able to show analytically that ƒ (N) is increasing in N. 
However, the plot of this function shows that for N  > 2, ƒ (jV) is increasing.
l.C Stability of steady-states
It follows from (1.7) that,
§  -  Y - T - W . ' - W I - l '4  (1.18)
=  -9 (A )
The stability of the stationary points can be shown by using the properties 
of g (A) described in Section 1.5.1
It is straight-forward to show that if A* = 0 is the unique solution then 
it is a stable stationary point. As established in Section 1.5.1, if A* =  0 is 
the unique solution when the slope of g (A) is positive at A — 0. When this 
is the case, it follows that g(s) > 0, and that g (—e) < 0, where £ > 0 and 
small. Hence, the direction of change in the neighbourhood of A* = 0, given 
by 7^  — ~9 (A), is towards the point A* =  0. The steady-state is therefore 
stable.
Now consider the case where there are 3 solutions.
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It was shown in the text that g (A) = 0 has 3 solutions when ^|A=0 < 0. 
When this is the case, g(e) < 0  and g (—e) > 0 for e > 0 and small. 
Therefore, it follows that A* =  0 is not a stable stationary point.
It remains to examine the steady-states associated with the two non­
zero solutions. Consider first the steady-state associated with the positive 
solution, denoted by A+. Given that for such a solution to exist it must be 
the case that ^|A=0 < 0 and given #(A) is convex in 9t+ and that that 
for a sufficiently high value of A the function g (A) is positive, it follows 
that at A+ the function g (A) intersects the horizontal axis from below. 
Furthermore, given the convexity of g (A) it follows that g (A+ +  e) > 0 and 
g (A+ — e) < 0 . Together with (1.18), this ensures that around A+ the 
movement is towards A+ and hence the steady-state associated with A+ is 
stable. An analogous reasoning can be made to show that the steady-state 
associated with the the symmetric solution — A+ is also stable.
l.D  Effect of /?, 7 and U on solution A*
l .D . l  P a ram e te r ¡3
Let A* ^  0 be the absolute value of the non-zero solutions to (1.14) for ¡3 =  0 
and A*7 be the absolute value of the non-zero solutions for ¡3 = 0*. It is shown 
that i i 0 '> 0  then A*' > A*.
To simplify the presentation I restrict the attention in the rest of the proof 
to the positive quadrant where A > 0. Analogous steps could be repeated 
to tackle the solution lying in the negative quadrant.
Recall that (1.14) is obtained from expanding the equation, 7A =  E  (UA)— 
E  (Ub ) - Note also that E  (Ua ) — E (U b ) — 0 for A =  0 and, from observation 
(iii) in Section 1.5.1, that E (U A) -  E(UB) is concave in A for A > 0. It 
follows that the curve which plots E  {UA) - E ( U B) will cut the curve for 7A 
from above and that the intersection point corresponds to the solution A*. 
Therefore, to show that if / ? '> /?  then A*' > A* one has to show that the 
curve for E  (UA) -  E (Ub ) shifts upwards as ¡3 increases.
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d(E (U A) - E ( U B)) =  d(E (U A) - E ( U B) ) dPA d(E (U A) - E { U B))dPB 
dp dPA dp dPB dP
This derivative can be signed by recalling that &e (Ua)~e{ub)) > q, > 0
and that < 0 and < 0. Therefore, > 0 This
completes the proof.
1.D.1 P a ram ete rs  7 and  U
It is clear from (1.14) that 7 and U only affect the solution to that equation 
if their ratio £  changes.
Define the function h (A) =  ^A -  hf (A) where h! (A) =  - Hjj^  and 
R H S  (A) is the term on the right-hand-side of (1.14). Note that the term U 
cancels out so that h* (A) is a function of N  and A alone. In addition, note 
that, like the function g (A) defined in 1.4.1, k (A) is convex in the positive 
quadrant and concave in the negative quadrant.
The steady-state solutions A* are given by solving h (A) =  0, or graph­
ically, by the intersection of the curve h (A) with the horizontal axis. It 
follows from the definition of h (A) that higher values of ^  would shift h (A) 
upwards in the region A > 0 and downwards in the region A < 0. Given the 
convexity of h (A) in the region where A > 0 and its concavity when A < 0, 
it follows that the intersection of the curve h (A) with the horizontal axis will 
occur at lower absolute values of A for higher values of This completes 
the proof.
l.E  Deriving and solving the modified model of Section
1 .5 .2 .1
The steps taken to set-up and solve the modified model follow very closely 
those taken in Section 1.4. Accordingly, I shall not describe all the steps 
involved to solve this modified model and instead will only highlight the key 
stepping-stones.
As in Section 1.4,1.1 the first step is to derive an expression for the ex­
pected utility enjoyed at each store. For store A,
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2JV-1
E  {Ua ) — U * Pa * [Pr {nA < N  -  1)] + U * Pa * 
e{v¿) '-------- k - N
Pl{nA = k ) * J k T T )
(1.19)
where, as before, the first component E  (U\) reflects the case where less 
than M  consumers visit store A  and hence are assured to have their demand 
met. On the other hand, E  (C/J) is the contribution to the expected utility 
from the event that at least M  other consumers visit store A  so that rationing 
must take place. The two components can be expressed in terms of Pa and
P b  as,
For M  < N
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The terms Pa and Pb can be substituted out so that the two components 
E {U \)  and E  {U\) are expressed as functions of Ja and Jq- This allows us 
to write out an equation analogous to (1.8) where the unkown variables are 
Ja and Jb -
Repeating the same reasoning as above with respect to the utility ex­
pected to be enjoyed at store B  one derives an expression for E(Ub ) and 
from this obtain a second equation in terms of the two unknowns Ja and J#.
Subtracting the second equation from the first, yields after much algebra 
a single equation where the unknown variable is A =  Ja -  J B,
45
For M  < N
r M - i  /  k \
7 A = M )  £  (£C^Cr_|Sinh(/JA(2/ + l - fc) ) )V ' k=0 \Z=0 /
E* ( £  C f - 'C t i  sinh (/JA(2i +1 - k ) )  & )
k=M \/=0 /
+
N - 1
1
—
2 N -
+
IN - 1 /  N - 1
E  ( E
k - N  \ l - k - l
,sinh (/5A(2m  -  *)) m
N
For M  > N
=  -M-Z(A)
+
+
Z  ( £  Cf-'CjE sinh (/JA(21 + 1 -  k))]
.*=o \i=o /
W - l  /  k \
E  ( E  sinh (/3A(2i + 1 -  fc)))
2JV -1  /  AT-1 \
E  ( E  C r lC^sinh(PA(2l + 1 -  k ) ) ^ )
k=M \l=k-N  /
(1.20)
As before, Z  (A) =  £ ,2=o C f  exp [/JA (ƒ -  JV)].
Whether A/ < N  or M  > N } the relevant equation is of the same form as
the one obtained for the original model in Section 1.4. The four observations 
made in Section 1.4.1 with respect to equation (1.14) of the original model 
are also applicable to (1.2.0) and their proof follows the same steps as those 
shown in Appendix 1 .A and will not be repeated here.
Similarly, the steps taken to derive the function f m (A/, N)  are identical to 
those taken to obtain the function ƒ (N) in the original model. The function
BIWIWWI!WWWI!WW!l)8M IIM « m ^
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ƒ”* (M, N)  is given by,
I f  M  < N  
ƒ (M, N )
ƒ (M, N)
I f  M  > N  
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( 1-21)
1-F Properties of ƒ  (M , TV)
It remains to show that f m (M, N)  lies in the interval (0,0.25) and that it is 
increasing in M  and decreasing in N.
l . F . l  P ro o f  tha t f m (M, TV) < 0.25
Take the case where M  < N.  Then
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where the first step is obtained by noting that the term ^  < 1. A similar 
reasoning also carries through for the case where M  > N.  Hence, f m (M, N)  
< 0.25, V N t M  > 0.
1.F.2 P ro o f th a t f m (M, N)  > 0.
Equation (1.21) shows that the function f m (MyN)  can be decomposed as 
the sum of three elements, each one involving a double summation: first 
summing over the index l and then over the index k. The typical summand 
in each of these elements is given by C/v_1C^ii(2i +  1 — k) where f, k >  0.
I will show that for a given fc, the sum over the index l is positive. It will 
then follow that when summing over fc, the result will also be positive.
If k < 1, then the term (2/ + 1 — k) > 0  and hence the sum over l must 
also be greater than or equal to 0.
Consider now the case where k = k >  2. Consider the contribution to the 
summation when l =  /, where l  is such that 21 + 1 — k < 0. This condition
is satisfied when l < For every l there exists a f  =  k — l — l such 
that 21 +  1 -  k = — ^2? +  1 — k^ . In other words, when, for a given k, one
sums over the index l, for each value of the index l such that (21 4- 1 — k) is 
negative, there is a corresponding value of l for which (21 +  1 — k) is positive 
and equal in absolute value. It follows that, for a given k, the sum over the 
index l will be positive if,
< v  ( 2 L ' + l - k )
< c ? - ' c t v
•  c r c h < cr .-;c i'+f
__i _ 
fc-i
i
i . l+j
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By definition of l the last condition is true.
Therefore, for a given fc, the result of summing over the index l is positive. 
It follows that the subsequent summing over all k will also be positive. Hence, 
the function f m (M, N)  > 0.
Note finally that since the function f  (N)  defined in Section 1.5.1 is a 
special case of f m (Af, N)  - obtained when M  =  N  - it follows that the range 
of ƒ (N)  must also be contained in the interval (0,0.25).
1 .F .3  P ro o f th a t f m ( M, N)  is increasing in  M  and decreasing in N
for M  < 2 N.
It remains to show that f m (M, N)  is increasing in M  and decreasing in N. It 
did not prove possible to show analytically and resort was made to numerical 
methods. The value of f m (M, N)  was found for each pair of M  and TV in a 
100*100 grid and it was checked that given a value of M, f m (A/, N)  fell as N  
increased and conversely, that for a given value of N  the function increased 
as M  increased. For M  > 27V, however, the function f m (Af, N) — 0.25. 
Figure 6 summarizes the results of this numerical exercise.


Chapter 2
A study into loyalty-inducing 
programmes which do not 
induce loyalty
2 .1  I n t r o d u c t io n
Keeping up with its reputation as a pioneer in the airline industry, in May 
1981 American Airlines launched AAdvantage, the first frequent-flyer pro­
gramme (F F P ). Within a week, United Airlines countered by introducing 
a similar programme and in the next few months all of the main American 
carriers followed.1 The response outside the United States was slower though 
today all of the more important players in the industry have their own F F P .
The concept behind these programmes is that of rewarding passenger loy­
alty to a carrier. Rewards come in the shape of free flights, gifts or upgrades 
and loyalty is measured in air miles, which are calculated as a combination 
of money spent and distance travelled, so that business and first-class tickets 
generate more air miles than economy tickets on the same route. Membership 
in a F F P  is, almost always, free.
The popularity of F F P s  is considerable. Today, AAdvantage can boast 
over 30 million members whilst its main American competitors, United Air­
lines and Delta, have in their loyalty programmes around 23 million members
1 Chapter 1 in NaJko (1992) provides a detailed description of the early developments of 
F F P s  in the United States.
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each.2 In Europe, British Airways has enrolled in its Air Miles scheme over 
four million people and in 1996 half a million of these had made use of their 
rewards and flown for free.3
Throughout this chapter I will refer to airlines, passengers and to frequent- 
flyers. It should be understood, however, that the analysis aims to be perti­
nent to the class of loyalty-inducing programmes as a whole and hence to go 
beyond the air transport industry. As with airlines, the proliferation of these 
schemes across supermarkets, fuel retailers, hotel chains, car rental compa­
nies and other retailers has been phenomenal. In 1995, according to Andersen 
Consulting a quarter of American consumers had access to frequent-shopping 
programmes at their local supermarket. In Britain, by the end of 1997, the 
three largest supermarkets, Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway, had 25 million 
card holders between them, which accounted for more than two thirds of 
their customers.4
How can the proliferation of FFPs be accounted for? Why have.they 
become an industry standard and why are they so popular with travellers? 
At first sight the answers to these questions appear straight-forward.
The airlines’ rationale to implement a loyalty-scheme, as announced by 
the carriers themselves, is to increase the repeat purchase rate of its cus­
tomers. The mechanism by which FFP s  achieve this is the following. Due 
to the equity customers build in the programmes via the collection of air 
miles, a customer faces the opportunity cost of foregone miles when he de­
cides to patronise a second airline. In order to avoid this cost, travellers stick 
to one airline. On the other hand, the prospect of a free trip to Paris or an 
upgrade to Executive Class provides a clear motivation for travellers to join 
an airline’s programme.
As it stands, the above explanation is backed by strong intuition. Upon 
scrutiny, however, the intuition wobbles. Firstly, the causal relation between 
loyalty inducing schemes and locked-in consumers does not perform well when 
confronted with empirical evidence. Secondly, it is not clear that the possi­
bility of receiving an award in the future is the best way through which to 
raise the value of an airline in the eyes of travellers. I now turn to these two
2 Frequent Flier Newsletter available on the Internet address, 
http:/ /www. frequentflier.com.
3Skypala, P. (1997). How taking o ff  is taking off: A ir  Miles. Financial Times, 18th 
October, p. 3, London Edition.
4Brown-Humes, C. (1997), P oin ts have a blunt edge, Financial Times (p.24), 25th 
October, London Edition.
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points.
While advertising, improved distribution or sales promotion aim, through 
different routes, to raise a company’s market penetration, loyalty programmes 
have the precise goal of increasing the purchase frequency of customers. As 
such an evaluation of a F F P  should hinge on its success on this front.
To the best of my knowledge, the only such appraisal of a loyalty-programme 
carried out within academic circles is that conducted by Sharpe and Sharpe 
(1997). These authors investigate the success of the Australian Fly Buy pro­
gramme in raising the loyalty of customers of the participating brands to 
levels that are in excess of what would be expected.5 Their findings leave 
little room for enthusiasm: the results show that although there is a weak 
level of excess loyalty the expected deviation is not consistently observed 
for all the participating brands.6 The findings of Sharpe and Sharpe (1997) 
second a 1997 report from the Mintel research group which finds that con­
sumers do not become more loyal to a retailer despite being a member of its 
loyalty-scheme.7
An informal confirmation of the lukewarm performance of F F P  can be 
read from what is not said by the industry practitioners in comments and 
interviews to the press. Indeed, while they are keen to herald the launch of 
loyalty schemes as a means to obtain a loyal clientele, they are suspiciously 
silent on the actual outcome of such programmes. It is also notable that 
in Reichheld’s (1996) extensive examination of companies that have imple­
mented (successful) policies to induce loyalty no mention is made of FFPs.
The few empirical studies and the silence of airline executives are far 
from being watertight evidence of the shortcomings of F FP s  in fulfilling 
the proclaimed objective of raising repeat purchase rates. However, they do 
cast doubts. These doubts are reinforced by noting that the strength of the 
intuitive link between FFPs and high repeat purchase rate is eroded in light 
of the following observations.
1. All of the main airlines have their own FFP.
2. An individual is able to join more than one programme. Furthermore,
5The Fly Buy programme is a multi-collection scheme whereby points can be collected 
for the same reward scheme from any of the participating suppliers.
6The excess is in relation to the degree of loyalty predicted by the Dirichlet and by the 
Negative Binomial Distribution models of repeat buying as set out in Ehrenberg (1988) 
and applied widely in the marketing literature.
"Loyalty cards fail to impress, Financial Tim es, 7th January, p.7, London edition.
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membership is generally free and the time cost involved in filling in 
forms is negligible. Not surprisingly, individuals join the programmes 
of more than one airline. A survey carried out by Toh and Hu (1988) 
reported that the average number of multiple membership among fre­
quent flyers was 2.3. A 1999 survey amongst business travelers found 
that on average travelers belonged to three separate loyalty-programs 
and suggested that this figure was rising.8
3. Holding multiple F F P  membership cards implies that a traveller may 
vary his choice of airline without necessarily losing out on air miles. 
The opportunity costs which F F P  seek to induce onto consumers are, 
in this way, mitigated, although the non-linearity of most schemes and 
the existence of a mileage expiration date in most programmes ensure 
that they are not totally lost.
The above exposition casts doubts on the effectiveness of loyalty-programmes 
in fulfilling the objective announced by their implementers - raising the re­
peat purchase rate of customers. There remains the suggestion that FFPs 
are tools through which to raise the general value of the airline in the eyes 
of travellers and so contribute to an airline’s market penetration. After all, 
travellers are attracted by discounts and gifts and their demand can be com­
peted for via the generosity of FFPs. However, it is questionable whether 
loyalty programmes are the most effective tools with which to lever customer 
value. Are there no better policies with which to motivate consumers to 
select a  given airline?
Surveys carried out amongst travellers consistently report that price lev­
els, punctuality and on-board service are the three criteria to wdiich passen­
gers pay more attention to in their choice of airline.9
In addition, loyalty-schemes are costly. A recent estimate placed the costs 
of running a FFP  between 3 and 6% of an airline’s revenue.10 Furthermore, 
airlines should cost the lost revenue that comes about from the award of 
free flights. On the one hand, some passengers use the collected air miles 
to go on a flight they would otherwise have been walling to pay for. On the
8OAG Business Trawl Lifestyle Survey, quoted in Insidefiyer  January 1999.
9Survey carried out by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) referred to 
in Roger Bray, When W ork G ets the Perks, in The Financial Times, 9th February 1998, 
p.14, London Edition. The survey of Toh and Hu (1988) arrives at the same conclusions.
10’Extra Lift for Airlines”, A sia n  Business, August 1993, pp.44-46, quoted in Dowling 
and Uncles (1997).
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other hand, passengers flying on their awards might displace regularly paying 
travellers. Admittedly, this problem is limited by the general excess capacity 
in the airline industry as well as by the restrictions imposed by airlines on 
the flights against which an award may be claimed.11
The discussion presented so far has aimed at dismembering the frequently 
heralded view of F F P s  as win-win arrangements between airlines and trav­
ellers. As was sketched above, it is not clear that these schemes succeed in 
providing airlines with a portfolio of loyal customers nor are they the most 
direct means of raising the value proposition to customers and, through this, 
an airline’s market share.
Banerjee and Summers (1987) and Caminal and Matutes (1990) offer an 
alternative and insightful explanation for the ubiquity of loyalty schemes. 
Their central idea is that F F P s  are a tool for airlines to transfer some of 
the consumer surplus to themselves - they are win-lose arrangements where 
airlines are on the winning side. In both papers, the ability of airlines to reap 
the surplus arises from the switching costs that such programmes induce on 
consumers. In turn, the switching costs emerge due to the following reason. 
The models analysed in both of these papers consider a two-period time 
horizon so that travellers must patronise, by construction, the same airline 
in the second period as they did in the first period in order to collect the 
discount offered to repeat buyers. A traveller who switches airline, on the 
other hand, foregoes the entitlement to the discount. It follows that in the 
second period travellers are induced to stick to their first period choice. In 
the second period, therefore, airlines compete less aggressively as it becomes 
harder to attract passengers who chose the rival in the past. In addition, 
there is an incentive to be less aggressive in the first period as well. It is in 
an airline’s interest to ensure that the competitor has a sufficient share of 
’old customers’ to induce it not to behave aggressively in the second period. 
To ensure this, an airline will resist lowering prices in the first period and 
take over the entire market.12 Hence, the benefit of FFPs to airlines accrues 
from the higher prices which the segmentation of the market allows carriers 
to set, rather than from the rewards of holding a portfolio of loyal customers 
per se.
While some travellers will choose their airline according to the balance
11A general rule offered by the Frequent Flier Newsletter is that b% of an airline’s seats 
are allocated for use by F F P  members making use of a reward.
12This intuition for the less aggressive first period behaviour is valid in the setting of 
Banerjee and Summers (1987) although it does not apply in Caminal and Matutes (1990).
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on their air miles account, the arguments presented earlier suggest that the 
behaviour of others runs against the behaviour hypothesized by the two pa­
pers. As mentioned earlier, travellers are generally enrolled in more than one 
loyalty scheme and tend to distribute their purchases over several airlines. 
This conduct suggests that even if FFPs give rise to switching costs, trav­
ellers do not seem to be greatly limited by them. Given this, the mechanism 
identified by Banerjee and Summers (1987) and Caminal and Matutes (1990) 
which allows airlines to charge higher prices is no longer present. An appro­
priate question which follows is whether airlines still find F F P s  appealing 
if these schemes are not successful in imposing switching costs on travellers. 
Are airlines still able to extract consumer welfare through such programmes?
In this chapter I examine the role of loyalty-programmes in a setting 
where the schemes do not induce a switching-cost on consumers. This will 
be carried out by analysing a model which extends the two-period horizon of 
the papers mentioned above to a three-period setting. The relevance to the 
analysis, however, is not in the number of periods per se, but rather in the 
notion that to benefit from the discount offered by the FFP  a traveller does 
not have to choose the same airline in all periods.13
Running parallel with the above inquiry, the analysis in this chapter also 
attem pts to shed some light on the welfare of travellers who participate in the 
market rarely vis-à-vis those who fly frequently. How do these two groups 
fare when FFPs are launched? The interest in this question is grounded on 
the idea that FFPs are targeted at rewarding frequent customers. It follows 
that one would expect this group to benefit from these programmes. Here, 
I will show that these two groups of consumers do benefit differently from 
the implementation of a loyalty-scheme. The results obtained point out that 
the group of occasional travellers, those that fly rarely, invariably lose. On 
the other hand, whether frequent-flyers benefit or not from the introduction 
of a F F P  will be shown to depend on the weight that this group has in the 
population of consumers as a whole.
The following questions, reflecting the above discussion, summarize the 
points which I will seek to address in the chapter.
1. Can a FFP  which does not lock in customers be the outcome of com­
petitive practice?
13 Banerjee and Summers (1987) on p. 16 extend their model to T  periods. They 
maintain, however, the restriction that consumers must have patronised the airline in all 
T  — 1 periods before the coupons can be used.
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2. How do prices compare between the scenario in which firms launch 
a F F P  and one where firms are unable to discriminate between cus­
tomers (have no record of their past behaviour) and are therefore unable 
to offer special treatment to loyal customers?
3. Do travellers benefit or lose from the implementation of a F F P  ? Do 
occasional and frequent traveller benefit or lose differently?
4. How does the composition of the consumer population - the ratio of 
frequent to occasional travellers- influence the prices set and the coupon 
values set by airlines?
The role of discount coupons as a means to discriminate between con­
sumers involved in repeat buying has been studied in contexts outside loyalty 
programmes.14 Fudenburg and Tirole (1997) and Chen (1997) turn loyalty 
programmes on their head and study the behaviour of firms poaching cus­
tomers of competitors by offering a discount to these if they swatch. As 
expected, the ability to poach affects the degree to which customers switch 
between firms. Whether poaching leads to too much or too little switching in 
comparison to the socially efficient level is shown to depend on the nature of 
consumers’ relative preferences for the tw'o brands - whether these are con­
stant or independent over time - and on whether the firm is able to commit 
in the first period to its behaviour in second period.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2,1 describe 
the model with which I intend to tackle the questions laid out above. Section 
2.3 solves this model under the special case where airlines are unable to 
discriminate passengers by their past choices. The results derived there will 
serve as an appropriate benchmark for the findings obtained in Section 2.4 
where, in contrast, airlines are allowed to discriminate in favour of repeat 
travellers. Section 2.5 ties the results obtained with those of the relevant 
literature and Section 2.6 concludes.
14 There is also an interesting literature examining those coupons generally distributed 
through newspaper or mail and unrelated to repeat buying. Such coupons have been 
regarded as a means to price discriminate, both in settings where the coupons are tar- 
getted at a particular group (Bester and Petrakis, 1994) and where they are untargetted 
(Narasimhan, 1984 and Caminal , 1996).
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2 .2  M o d e l
The model borrows its basic structure from von Weizsacker (1984) and Klem­
perer (1987) who, to my knowledge, first grafted inter-temporally changing 
tastes onto a Hotelling-like model of product differentiation.
There are two competing airlines to be denoted by A  and B  who of­
fer services at a constant marginal cost c. The services offered by airline A 
differ from those of airline B  along dimensions such as the menu of travel 
schedules offered and the available connecting flights.15 Following Hotelling 
(1929), these differences are captured by picturing the two airlines as if lo­
cated at the end-points of the interval I  =  [0,1]. Let airline A  be located 
at point 0 and airline B  at point 1. Consumers are distributed along I. The 
location of a consumer at time t is given by it € I . The location it reflects a 
consumer’s ideal point, and the distance from it to the end-points measures 
the disutility from purchasing a less preferred ticket. A consumer who pur­
chases a ticket from airline A  in Period t enjoys a utility R — p f  — it, where 
R  is the reservation price, p f  is the effective price charged by A  and it is 
the distance that separates the consumer from A. Similarly, if he buys the 
service from B, the benefit will be given by R  — p f  — 1 +  i t. In line with the 
terminology of models employing the Hotelling (1929) setting, though at the 
risk of causing some confusion, I shall refer to the disutility associated with 
buying a less preferred ticket as the transportation cost.
The model considers a 3-period setting. If present in the market in period 
t, a consumer will demand one unit of the service offered by A  or one unit of 
the service offered by B.
There are two types of consumers. The frequent travellers take part in 
the market in each of the three periods. It is assumed that these consumers 
are uniformly distributed along I  in each period and that their location in 
one period is independent of that in the previous period. As in Caminal 
and Matutes (1990) the change in the location of these travellers can be 
interpreted as ” a change in travel plans: connecting flights and time schedules 
are more or less appropriate in one airline or the other depending on the origin 
and destination of the plane” (Caminal and Matutes 1990, p. 356). Hence, 
ceteris paribus, which of the two airlines is more attractive may vary from 
one period to the other. lo
loW hat I wish to exclude are differences in services which give rise to vertical product 
differentiation.
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The occasional travellers are the second type of consumers, and these 
take part in the market for one period only. It is assumed that this group of 
consumers is also uniformly distributed along I. At the end of each period, 
however, they exit the market and are replaced by a new mass of occasional 
travellers whose locations are independent of the consumers they replace. To 
ease computation, I assume that the market serves a constant unit mass of 
consumers over time which requires that the density of consumers joining 
the market equals the density of consumers leaving the market at the end 
of a period. The share of regular and occasional travellers in the market is, 
therefore fixed. Let be the proportion of frequent travellers so that X — //is  
the proportion of occasional ones. The value of the parameter ¡1  is common 
knowledge. Lastly, I assume that a consumer knows which type of traveller 
he is: whether he will leave after one period or whether he will be in the 
market for all 3 periods.
The two categories of travellers described above are not an exhaustive 
description of the types of travellers one might wish to consider. The absence 
of travellers who are present in the market over the three periods and have a 
fixed location throughout seems particularly critical. Such a set of consumers 
corresponds to those who need to take the same trip - at the same hour, to 
and from the same airports- and hence are likely to hold a constant relative 
preference between the two airlines. I have not made room for them in order 
to keep the analysis tractable.16 17
In addition, there are dimensions other than that of frequency of con­
sumption and location on the interval I  along which passengers can be dis­
tinguished. An obvious one is that between business class and economy class 
passengers. In the framework of the model, making this distinction would 
call for the modelling of consumers with different reservation prices and het­
erogeneous unit transportation costs.1' A second, closely related, distinction 
is that between travellers whose tickets are paid for by their employer and 
those who have to cover the cost themselves. Characterizing travellers along 
either or both of these lines appears natural in the context of a study on
16 On the other hand, the model purposefully rules out travellers who are present in 
the market for two out of the three periods. Their presence would have attributed to the 
F F P s  the ability to create switching costs which would run against the premise of the 
model.
17Different reservation prces could be easily incoorporated into the above model. Pro­
vided these prices were such that they guranteed that consumers alwyas purchased a unit 
of the good, the analysis carries through unaltered.
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F F P s.1& Doing so, however, would burden the analysis and put at risk the 
ability to yield any clear answers to the questions laid out at the end of 
Section 1.
Having added the above parenthesis, I now return to the description of 
the model The two airlines recognise past customers and are, accordingly, 
able to discriminate between travellers on the basis of the revenue that they 
have generated to the airline in the past. In other words, airlines are able to 
launch FFPs. Here, the structure of the F F P s  which airlines are allowed to 
implement is restricted to the following class: customers receive a discount 
- a coupon - on patronising an airline for the second time. In restricting 
the class of admissible F F P s  to this I have aimed at finding a compromise 
between parsimony and the need to portray the most salient features of a 
FFP. Hence, and in line with the discussion in Section 1, the class of F FP s  
that I consider does not impose switching costs as it allows consumers to 
collect a discount from an airline even if he has addressed the rival in the 
past. Furthermore, the F F P s  considered are such that they ensure that 
frequent travellers collect a discount over the three periods.
The timing of the decision taken by the players in the model is as follows. 
Prior to Period 1, airline A  selects its price p f  and the (absolute) value of 
the coupon a  it offers to repeat buyers. Simultaneously, airline B  selects its 
price p f  and its coupon ¡3. Whilst the value of the coupons remain unaltered 
throughout the 3 periods, the price levels are reviewed at the start of both 
Period 2 and Period 3 before the redistribution of consumers along I  takes 
place. Let be the price selected by A  in the second period and p£ that 
chosen by this same airline in Period 3. The analogous prices chosen by airline 
B  will be denoted by p f  and p f  respectively. Consumers, on the other hand, 
must decide at the beginning of each period which airline to patronise. Their 
choices are made once they have been distributed along I  and, hence, once 
their location it is known. It follows that consumers base their choice on 
their relative distance to the end-points as well as on the relative prices and 
coupons offered by the two airlines.
In selecting its price and coupon airlines aim to maximise expected profits 
over the three periods. Travellers, on the other hand, intend to maximise the 
sum of the expected utility gained during their stay in the market. Future 
income and utility are not discounted. 10*
10 See Cairns and Galbraith (1990) for a study of F F P s  which pivots on the existence
of travellers whose fare is partially covered by a third party.
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2 .3  B e n c h m a r k :  n o  d is c r im in a t io n
An appropriate benchmark for the analysis that follows is to consider the 
above model in a setting where airlines are unable monitor consumers’ past 
decisions. In such a scenario, airlines cannot identify repeat customers and, 
hence, are unable to offer them coupons. The absence of a reward for repeat- 
buyers breaks the inter-temporal link in the (frequent)travellers’ decision 
rules thereby making consumers’ decision in one period independent of that 
in the others. The independence of consumers’ behaviour over time implies 
that the policy which maximises airlines’ profits over the 3 periods coincides 
with that which maximises profits over a single period.
Consider then the behaviour of consumers and airlines in Period 1, say. 
A consumer present in the market in this period collects a utility level of 
R — p f  — ii if he patronises airline A and a level R  — p f  — 1 + i\ if he 
chooses airline B. Comparing the two expressions, it follows that the optimal 
behaviour is to address A  if ii G (0, , where ^  s  -1+P)2~Pl- and address B
otherwise. Given this behaviour, it is simple to show that price competition 
between the two airlines gives rise to the unique equilibrium prices p f * =  
p f * — 1 +  c. The excess of price over marginal cost arises from the local 
monopoly power that airlines possess due to the spatial setting of the model.19 
In turn, the symmetric solution implies that ^ in equilibrium. Travellers 
located in the first half of I  address A and the remaining address B. Given 
this, airlines expect to collect a revenue of ^  in each period and thereby 
expect to make profits over the three periods equal to | .
2 .4  S o lv in g  t h e  g e n e r a l  m o d e l
I now turn to the case where airlines are able to discriminate between con­
sumers on the basis of their past purchases.
The model is solved by working backwards from Period 3. For each of the 
periods, the analysis establishes the consumers’ set of optimal decision rules. 
For a frequent traveller, an example of a typical rule within this set takes the 
form: ”In Period 2, given that prices and the coupon levels offered by airlines 
are p f, p f , ce and ¡3 , and given that in Period 1,1 addressed airline A and that
iyMore generally, equilibiurm prices are given by t + c, where t is the unit cost of 
transport. The higher the cost of transport faced by travellers the greater is the ability of 
the two airlines to extract consumer surplus.
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in the following period I expect to be located at ¿3 and expect to face prices 
P3 and p f  then I will return to A  if i2 < i* and go to B  otherwise.” The set 
of rules are optimal in the sense that they ensure consumers maximise their 
expected future utility at each point in time. It is assumed that travellers 
have completely rational expectations. Given that consumers abide by these 
optimal rules, I then calculate the prices and coupon levels that airlines set 
in order to maximise the sum of their expected profits over the three periods.
To make the presentation as fluid as possible I leave to Appendix 2.A 
many of the algebraic stepping-stones involved.
2.4.1 Period 3
Consider the behaviour of an occasional traveller who takes part in the market 
in Period 3. Given prices p$ and p f , an occasional traveller located at ¿3 will
address airline A if ¿3 < l+P\  p3 Otherwise he will purchase from airline B.
The behaviour of a'frequent traveller, on the other hand, depends on the 
history of his past purchases. By Period 3, a frequent traveller will have 
either bought a ticket once from each airline or he will have bought twice 
from the same. If the latter, he will have received the discount offered to 
repeat buyers already and, by construction, will not be able to benefit from 
a further coupon. Accordingly, the decision of such a consumer will depend 
only on his location is and on the relative prices of tickets. It follows that1 ±n® y-jA
he will address airline A  if ¿3 < — 2" i  anc  ^ air^ne B  otherwise. On 
the other hand, if the consumer has addressed different airlines in the past, 
then his choice in Period 3 determines the airline from which the discount 
is to be received. Consequently, his decision takes into account the relative 
generosity of the two coupons. Patronising airline A  yields him a utility level 
of R — P3 +  a — is while the utility from choosing B  is R — p f +  ¡3 -  1 +  ¿3. 
Comparing the two utility levels, it is straight-forward to see that he will 
address A  if is < 1+p3 ~^~pg +Q and address B  otherwise. In sum, the optimal 
decision rule for a frequent traveller in Period 3 can be written as,
1 UWWHM?
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Period 3
f
have received discount in Period 2 and
If
l3 < 1+Pi~ P‘ =  fi,
¿3> fi]
have not yet received discount and i3< i± £ lz |^ ± “= n 2
t*3> i^2
then go to A. 
then go to B.
(2.1)
then go to A. 
then go to B.
Using the above decision rules it is possible to construct the expressions 
for the airlines’ profits in Period 3. For airline A this will be given by,
=  (p£ -  c) ( ( 1  -  f j )  +  p ( l  -  5 ) )  f t i  +  ( P 3 -  ol -  c )  fisQ i ( 2 . 2 )
where s is the share of frequent travellers who have switched between the 
two airlines in the first two periods. The first component of (2.2) reflects 
the contribution to A ’s profits from those travellers who will not collect the 
discount a  in the third period: that is to say, the occasional travellers and 
the share of frequent travellers who have already received the discount in the 
past. The second component, on the other hand, picks up the portion of A ’s 
third period profits generated from those who are yet to receive the discount.
Airline A  chooses p$ to maximise II3. Solving this optimization problem 
it is possible to derive A  ’s reaction function as,
Pz =  \  ( i +  c +  p f 4-/¿s (2a - /? ) ) .  (2.3)
An analogous expression cam be derived for airline B. Solving the two reaction 
functions simultaneously it is then possible to derive the equilibrium prices. 
These are described in Proposition 2.1.
P roposition  2.1 The unique equilibrium in Period 3 is for airline A to set 
a price p£* =  1 + c +  Otps and airline B a price p f * = 1 4* c +  ftps.
Proof. The result is obtained by solving the two reaction functions simul­
taneously. The necessary second-order conditions are also met. ■
Proposition 2.1 establishes that the third-period equilibrium prices lie 
above the benchmark level. The intuition behind this result can be explained 
with reference to the airlines’ reaction functions.
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Figure 2.1: Shift of airlines’ reaction functions due to F F P s
First, note from A  ’s best-reply (2.3) that airlines’ prices are strategic 
complements - if airline B  raises its price, airline A ’s optimal policy requires 
that it raises p£ as well. Second, offering a discount affects an airline’s 
behaviour in Period 3 through two distinct routes. On the one hand, the 
coupon acts as a second tool through which to compete for the demand 
of frequent travellers. Consequently, the higher the value of the discount 
offered, the less aggressive will an airline be in its price competition. On 
the other hand, the commitment to pay out a coupon raises the costs that 
airlines face compared to the benchmark case. Graphically, both of these 
effects - the less aggressive behaviour and the need to cover committed costs 
- lead to  an outward shift of the airlines’ reaction functions. For airline A y 
say, each of the two effects is responsible for a shift of size ses (for airline £ , 
the expression would be ^  ). Third, given the value of airline A ’s discount, 
a higher value ¡3 leads to a more aggressive competition over base price by
....... .............................................. ........
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A. Graphically, this is represented by an inward shift of the best-reply curve 
by for airline A  and by for airline B.
The net effect of introducing FFP  on the reaction functions depends 
on the relative values of a  and P as seen in (2.3) . If an airline’s discount 
is greater than half of that of the rival’s then its reaction curve will shift 
outwards. Otherwise, the shift will be inwards. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
former case by the shift of the best-reply curves from the benchmark case 
(Rq,R q) to . The pair of curves [R%,R%) , on the other hand,
depicts the case where a  < | .
Note that an airline’s discount shifts that airline’s best-reply curve out­
wards by twice the amount that it shifts the rival’s inwards. Hence, and 
independent of whether the pair (Rf,  R f )  or (R£i R§) is the appropriate 
one, the resulting equilibrium prices will be greater than those of the bench­
mark case.
The higher equilibrium prices do not imply that the profits earned by 
the two airlines are necessarily higher than those derived in the benchmark 
case since discounts must now be handed out. To see this, note that at the 
equilibrium prices, the third period profit of the two airlines are given by,
n i '  = i  (1 + ovm(1 -  #*») CS — «)) (2-4)
nf* = l(l+ j0/i«(l-i»)(a-0))
It follows, that an airline’s expected profit increases with the value of 
the discount offered by its rival. Furthermore, they will be higher, equal to 
or lower than the benchmark level - \  - depending on whether the coupon 
it offers is lower, equal to or higher than that of its rival. The intuition 
behind this is the following. Say P > a. For travellers who will benefit 
from a discount in Period 3, the effective price will be lower at airline B  
since p f * — P — 1 +  c — /? (1 — fis) < 1 +  c — a  (1 — ps) = p£* — a. Given 
this, a greater proportion of these travellers will opt to address airline B. 
This airline must increase its base price, p f , to cover the costs of handing 
out discounts and, at the same time, to curtail the demand by this set of 
travellers. However, raising base price also induces a greater share of those 
consumers who will not benefit from the discount in Period 3 to choose airline 
A. While the former set of travellers pay an effective price lower than 1 +  c, 
the effective price paid by the latter is above the competitive level. To sum
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up, offering a more generous coupon attracts those who pay a lower effective 
price and repels those who pay the higher price.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that at the start of Period 3, the airline 
burdened with the more geneorus discount would have the incentive to review 
the value of the discount it had chosen in Period 1 and set it equal to 0. In 
the context of this model, such an action is assumed to be not possible. In 
turn, the assumption can be supported on the grounds of reputation effects 
and on the fact that it would damage the airline’s ability to set up a new 
F F P  in the future.20
2.4.2 Period 2
Using the equilibrium prices of Period 3 ,1 now work backwards to determine 
the optimal choice rules of consumers in Period 2 which, in turn, will allow 
me to solve the optimization problem of the two airlines at the start of Period
2.
Like his Period 3 counterpart, an occasional traveller in Period 2 will 
be unaffected by the generosity of the discounts offered. Therefore, he will 
patronise airline A if ¿2 < 1—P^ P2 and airline B  otherwise.
Now consider the behaviour of a frequent traveller in Period 2. It is nec­
essary to distinguish these travellers by their choice in Period 1.
Consider first a frequent traveller who purchased from A  in Period I. If he 
returns to airline A in the second period he will receive the discount offered 
by A  to repeat buyers. The expected utility of a consumer returning to A  in 
Period 2 is therefore given by R  — p$ + ct — + E  (U3|xx ), where E  ( i/3|xx)
is the expected utility enjoyed in Period 3 by a consumer who has in the 
previous two periods visited the same airline. Similarly, the expected utility 
of a consumer addressing airline B  in Period 2, conditional on having bought 
a ticket from A  in Period 1, is equal to R  — p f  — (1 — ¿2) +  E  (U3|xy ). The 
term  E (U z\xy) reflects the utility a consumer can expect in Period 3 given 
th a t he has addressed different airlines in the first two periods. Therefore, a 
consumer who has addressed A  in Period 1 will return to it in Period 2 if 
¿2 <  1 +- 2- —■+-+^ / -|x- ) — and will address B  otherwise.
20Interestingly, airlines are typically within their rights to review the discounts offered 
in their schemes. In the conditions laid out by F F P s  that I have come across, airlines 
reserve the right to change the awards, the rules for earning mileage credit and, with a few 
month’s notice, to end the programme (see for example A Advantage 2000 and Qualiflyer 
2000 ).
67
Following an analogous reasoning, the decision rule for a consumer who
addressed B  in Period 1 will be given by: patronise A  if ¿2<1+P2  ^ P*+E(v fo) 
and B  otherwise.
The expressions E (U3 \xx) and E (U3 \xy) are given by,21
where, recall, Qi =  1+Pa2~P3 and Q2 = 1+p3- |~ p3+"- Note that a consumer 
who addresses the same airline in the first two periods, benefits from the 
discount offered by the F F P  in the second period and hence cannot expect 
to benefit further in Period 3. Consequently, the expression for E (U 3 \xx) 
does not include either of the terms a and /?. On the other hand, a consumer 
who has chosen different airlines in the first two periods can still expect 
to receive the coupon offered by the FFPs. It follows that E (U 3 \xy), is a 
function of the coupon values.
Making use of the expressions derived for E  (I/3|xx) and E  (f/3|xy), the 
second period optimal decision rules can be written as,
E  (U3 |xx) =  ƒ (R  — P3 — i) di + /  [R — p f  — 1 + i) di
E (U 3 \xy) =  /  (R - p f + a - i ) d i +  ( R - p f + 0 -
0 Ju 2
Period 2
went to A  in t = land then go to A. 
then go to B.
(2.5)
21 It is assumed that the values of Qj and of fb  lie in the unit interval. In equilibrium 
this condition is assured.
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Both Q3 and Q4 are functions of the prices in the third period and hence 
a function of s, the share of frequent travellers who address different airlines 
in the first two periods. By construction,
where a is the share of frequent travellers who addressed airline A  in 
Period 1. Using (2.5), equation (2.6) can be written as,
The problem facing the two airlines at the start of Period 2 -to maximize 
profits over Periods 2 and 3 - can now be written out. For airline A  this 
problem is given by,
The first three terms on the right hand side of (2.8) pick up the contribu­
tion to A ’s profits respectively from: the occasional travellers, the frequent 
travellers who addressed B  in Period 1 and the frequent travellers who ad-
airline B  and the equilibrium second period prices are given by solving the 
two maximization problems simultaneously.
equilibrium to the second period pricing game. 
P roo f. See Appendix 2. A. ■
The expressions defining the equilibrium prices assured by Proposition 2.2 
are, however, unwieldy and offer little insight. Instead, I will draw attention 
to two special cases.
s =  <r (1 — ^ 3) +  (1 — cr) n 4 (2.6)
s =
3 +  4 (1 -  2<j) (pf -  p£) +  (1 +  a  — + 4a {13- q)
2(4 + p ( a -  P)2)
(2.7)
W } ' V 2
+  (P2 — Ct — c) ¿¿£7^3 +  IT3
■4
dressed A  in Period 1. An analogous expression can be written down for
P ro p o s itio n  2.2. There is a unique pair of p£* and pf* which forms the
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C orollary  2.1. a) I f  the demand generated by the frequent travellers in Pe­
riod 1 is divided equally between the two airlines, a — then the equilibrium 
second period prices are given by p§* = 1 +  c + and p%* = 1 +  c + ^ .  
b) If the value of the discounts set by the two airlines is equal, say A, then 
the equilibrium second period prices are given by p$* =  1 + c +  /¿ A ^  and 
P2 * = 1 +  c +  A^~.
Proof. See Appendix 2 .A. ■
As is clear in the two special cases considered in Corollary 2.1, equilibrium 
prices are set above the competitive level. The intuition for this result is 
identical to the one presented in Section 2.4.1 for the third period equilibrium 
prices. Here, as was the case in Period 3, the best-reply curves of the two 
airlines are also shifted out due to the FFPs. The forces behind these shifts 
are the same as those identified earlier. Recall that an airline’s own discount 
lessens its competitive aggressiveness in prices and raises its costs. Both 
effects lead to an outward shift of its best-reply curve. On the other hand, 
the discount offered by the rival leads to an inward movement of an airline’s 
best-reply curve, representing the incentive to price more aggressively. A 
graphical representation of the effect of FFPs  on the second period best- 
reply curves of the two airlines is similar, therefore, to those drawn in Figure 
2.1.
The second special case offers an added insight to the model as it illus­
trates that the price set by an airline in Period 2 increases with a, its first 
period market share of frequent travellers. Althought, this feature is shared 
with the model of Caminal and Matutes (1990), the intuition behind it is 
markedly different. In the latter paper, a higher market share in the first 
period increases the incentive of an airline to exploit their repeat-buyers and 
lowers that of attracting first time buyers so that price competition is less 
aggressive. In the model considered here, on the other hand, the relation 
between second period prices and first period market share comes about be­
cause the mass of repeat buyers, and therefore the mass of travellers entitled 
to a discount in Period 2 is increasing in an airline’s first period share of 
frequent travellers. The higher this share is, the greater the total value of 
discounts to be handed out in Period 2. Faced with this burden, the optimal 
response of an airline is to raise its price.
2.4.3 Period 1
I now examine the choices of travellers and airlines in Period X.
An occasional traveller in Period 1 will base his choice on the relative 
prices of the two airlines. In particular, he will address airline A  in Period 1 
if his location i\ < 1+P^ ~Pj> and will address airline B  otherwise.
A frequent traveller, on the other hand, will take into account the effect of 
his decision on expected future utility. Let E (U2 \A) be the expected surplus 
a traveller expects to collect in Periods 2 and 3 given that he addresses 
airline A  in Period 1 and let E  (U2 \B) be the analogous term for a passenger 
who addresses airline B  in Period 1. It follows that a frequent traveller will 
patronise airline A  in Period 1 if and only if,
R -  pf -  ii +  E  (U2 \A) > R - p f  -  (1  — ii) + E  (U2 \B) (2.8)
The terms E {U2 \A) and E  (U2\B) can be explicitly worked out as,22
E(U 2\A) = ¡ ? * (R - i4 + a - i+ E ( y * \ z x ) ) d i+ J ^ ( R - p i - ( l - i ) + E ( u 3 \x y ) ) d i
— R+fi%-pf — ^ +£(t/3|iy)
and
E (U 2\B) =  / 0n 4 ( i J ~ p ^ - t+ £ : ( i / 3|2:y))<i i+ /^ 4 ( H - p f - f / ? - ( l - i ) + £ ( t / 3|xar))£ii
Substituting these expressions into (2.8) yields after some simplification 
the following first period optimal decision rule for frequent travellers,
Period 1 (2.9)
If f i} < s  ^  then gQ tQ A .................
 ^ U > then go to B.
Recall that the terms ^3 and Q4 are a function of E  (a) . However,
by construction, is equal to a. It follows that an expression for a can be 
computed through the implicit function J,
22 Again it is implictlv assumed that both ^3 and Q4 lie in the unit interval.
and then substituted into the definition of H5.
The rule defined in (2.9) completes the description of the optimal behav­
iour of frequent travellers at each point in time. Using the full set of optimal 
rules, it is straight-forward to derive the expected demand facing the two 
airlines over the 3 periods and hence to formulate the optimization problem 
of the two airlines. For airline A, this problem is given by,
M a x n ?  =  (pf -  c) ((1  -  n) ( — ^ - - - ^ )  +  /xn5)  + n ?  (2.11)
while an analogous problem can be constructed for airline B.
Given that I restrict the search for an equilibrium to the class of sym­
metric equilibria, it will be sufficient to limit the work to the optimization 
problem of one of the airlines. Appendix 2.A presents a full description of 
the work involved. Here, only the result is presented.
P roposition  2.3. In the unique symmetric equilibrium airlines set first 
period prices p f * = p f  * =  1 4- c +  and issue coupons with a value of
a* =  /?* =  igj ^ . It then follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 that in the
second and third period p f * =  p f  * =  pf'* =  pf * =  1 +  c +  .
P roof. The first step is to derive the candidate symmetric equilibrium 
by solving the first order conditions of the maximization problem once the 
symmetry conditions are imposed. To then show that the pair of prices and 
discounts thus obtained constitute an equilibrium it is necessary to show 
that neither airline has an incentive to deviate from them. To carry out this 
second step, I resort to numerical simulations and show that the equilibrium 
is indeed robust to small deviations as well as to the deviation of an airline 
opting to offer no discount. Appendix 2 .A presents the details of the work 
involved. ■
2
It follows from Proposition 2.3 that at equilibrium, airlines will earn the 
benchmark profit of |  in Period 2 and in Period 3. Although prices are 
above 1 +  c in both of these periods, profits are kept down to the competitive
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Figure 2.2: Expected profit of airline A  at the start of each of the 3 
periods, (c =  1, fj, =  0.5, a  =  /? =  0.75, p f  =  2.25).
level due to the discounts that are handed out. In Period 1, however, this 
reasoning does not apply. There, prices are above the competitive level and, 
by construction, no discounts are given. It follows that airlines yield non­
competitive levels of profits in this period. To see how this can be sustained 
consider the effects of an airline deviating from the equilibrium.
Other things equal, a reduction from the equilibrium level of, say, airline 
A s price would increase the share of travellers - both occasional and frequent 
- that this airline would attract in Period 1. However, this would imply that in 
Period 2, airline B  would be facing a smaller mass of frequent travellers that 
would qualify for its discount. Accordingly, B  would be willing to compete 
more aggressively in price, which would have negative effects on A s  Period 2 
profits. First, airline A  would be unable to compete as aggressively as airline 
B, as it faces a greater mass of travellers qualifying for discounts and would 
therefore attract a lower share of travellers. Second, of the mass of frequent 
travellers that do address A  in Period 2 a greater proportion of these will 
qualify for A ’s discount thereby reducing A ’s profits from its non-deviation 
level.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the previous discussion. The figure draws, for fi =
iffffffminiMimiuwmimnMi
t
0.5, the profit that airline A  can expect at the start of each period as a 
function of the price it sets at the start of Period 1, given that its rival sets 
the equilibrium strategy. As shown in the graph for — 0.5 and c =  1, the 
equilibrium discount is 0.75 and the first period price is 2.25. A deviation to 
a price below this level, but above 2, the benchmark price, allows airline A  to 
collect a higher profit in the first period - the vertical distance between the 
two upper curves - though a smaller one in Period 2 - given by the distance 
between the two Ipwer curves. The profit over the 3 periods, given by the 
upper curve, falls.
In sum, prices are sustained above the competitive benchmark level in 
Period 1 as it is in the airlines’ interest to ensure that the rival attracts a 
sufficiently large market share in that period, so that the incentive to compete 
aggressively in the subsequent period is reduced.
Note that the ability to charge prices above 1 +  c in the first period 
hinges on the coupon having a non-zero value. If this was not the case, ¿.e. 
a  =  ¡3 =  0, a firm which deviates by undercutting its rival in the first period 
would go unpunished in Period 2 since it would not suffer from serving a 
higher mass of repeat buyers. It is in the interest of both airlines, therefore, 
to set non-zero coupons.
2 .5  D is c u s s io n
In this section I will discuss the results obtained above. Particular attention 
is paid to the effect of population mix ie the proportion of travellers in a 
period which are frequent travellers, on the equlibrium prices, discounts and 
airline profits. Lastly, the impact of the F F P  on the welfare of each type of 
traveller and on social welfare as a whole is considered.
2.5.1 Effect of population mix on equilibrium prices 
and discounts
Equilibrium prices are the same in both Period 2 and Period 3 and they are 
above the benchmark prices. This result can be understood by noting that 
in equilibrium, as far as an individual airline is concerned, the proportion 
of different types of travellers is the same in both periods. In particular, 
there are 1 — p occasional travellers, |  frequent travellers that qualify for 
that airline’s discount and |  that do not qualify.
i>
Is
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium prices and discounts as a function of the share of 
frequent travellers.
it
It is immediate from Proposition 2.3 that the equilibrium price levels 
and the value of the discount are positively related to the share of frequent 
travellers in the market. This is graphed in Figure 2.3. Note that the curve 
describing the discounted price is not defined at /x =  0 as the notion of a 
discount does not exist in such a setting. For this value of \x equilibrium 
prices are at their lowest and are equal to the benchmark level, c + 1. On the 
other hand, when the entire mass of consumers are frequent travellers, fi =  1, 
the equilibrium prices are at their highest. In Period 1, the price equals to 
c+2^ while in the last two period it is equal to c+2. The equilibrium discount 
level also reaches its maximum value, 2, when pt =  1. Note that the effective 
price paid by a repeat buyer, base price minus discount is given by c-f 
and is decreasing in (jl.
As a percentage of the price mark-up, the discount is equal to 13f 7 which 
is increasing in p. For very low values of p this percentage is below' 50% but 
it rises with p  until it reaches 100% when p — 1. Hence, wrhen the market 
is made up exclusively of frequent travellers, the effective price paid by a 
consumer benefiting from the discount is equal to an airline’s marginal cost.
The intuition for the positive relation between p with both equilibrium
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prices and coupon levels is the following. Low values of ¡jl imply that, over 
the 3 periods, a greater proportion of purchases is carried out by occasional 
rather than by frequent travellers. Accordingly, airlines place a greater weight 
in competing for the former set of travellers. Given that the behaviour of an 
occasional traveller is not influenced by the discount offered, airlines can only 
compete for their business by offering low base prices. At the same time, 
airlines do not wish to offer higher discounts since these would raise base 
prices, as noted in Proposition 2.1,and hence drive away a share of the more 
numerous, by assumption, occasional travellers. On the other hand, when 
the share of frequent travellers is high, airlines are able to compete for their 
patronage through the generosity of their coupons and are less concerned 
with the adverse effect that higher prices have in the demand generated by 
the (small) group of occasional travellers.
2.5.2 Airline profits and travellers’ welfare
The previous section noted that both equilibrium prices and discounts are 
positively related to the share of frequent travellers in the market. Other 
things equal, higher prices across the two airlines raise their profits and higher 
discounts lower them. The reverse is true with respect to travellers’ welfare. 
What then is the net effect of // on airline profits and travellers’ welfare?
T ravellers’ welfare
When airlines are allowed to introduce F F P s , their equilibrium profits are 
above the benchmark level. It follows that the set of travellers, taken as a 
whole, are worse off when these loyalty schmes are introduced.23 However, 
this does not imply that each individual fares badly from the introduction of 
the programmes. To see this consider the welfare of the two sets of travellers 
separately.
Occasional travellers are in the market for one period only. Given that 
they cannot receive a coupon and that the price paid by them is alw’ays above 
the benchmark level it follows that all occasional travellers are worse off if
2 a Provided the prices and discounts set by the two airlines are equal - so that the 
equilibrium is symmetric -the total surplus to be divided between travellers and airlines 
is equal to 3 (R  -  c -  £) and is independent of the prices and discounts offered. The 
constant level of total surplus follows from the assumption that travellers hold an inelastic 
demand for one unit of the good in each period.
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the F FP s  are launched. Furthermore, given that prices increase with p, 
the higher the share of frequent travellers the worse off will the occasional 
travellers be. This set of travellers will always prefer the benchmark scenario 
in which airlines are unable to launch FFPs.
To see the effect of the F F P s  on the welfare of a frequent traveller it is 
necessary to calculate his expected life-time utility. This expression is given 
by 3 (i? — c — !) -  which is a decreasing function of p. It follows that 
a  frequent traveller does better when he is one of the few frequent travellers. 
Compared to the expected lifetime surplus in the benchmark model, given by 
3 (f? — c — J) — 3, it is quickly established that frequent travellers are better 
off in a market which offers F F P s  if and only if p  < When the share of 
frequent travellers is above this level, the higher coupon value received from 
being a repeat buyer does not make up for the higher prices faced.
Corollary 2,2 summarizes the previous discussion.
C orollary  2.2. Provided the set of frequent travellers is not empty, air­
lines are able to collect higher profits if they are allowed to launch 
F F P s. Introducing these programmes makes an occasional consumer 
necessarily worse off while frequent travellers benefit if and only i f  they 
account for less than -h of the passengers.
A irline profits
In equilibrium, the airlines’ profits over the 3 periods can be derived as,
ni = 39 — 26/i2(13-10/0’ 3 =  A, B. (2.12)
and it follows directly from Proposition 2.3. Note that the profit earned over 
the three periods is increasing in p. When p = 0 profits are equal to the 
benchmark level of |  as one would expect. On the other hand, profits are 
at their highest, nj =  2| ,  when the entire market is composed of frequent 
travellers.
The positive relation between p  and profits suggests that airlines would 
find it appealing to divide the market into two segments as described below 
in Corollary 2.3.
C oro llary  2.3. Consider the following policy. •*
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i) Split the market into two such that occasional travellers patronise one
segment whilst frequent travellers patronise the other segment;
ii) Set equilibrium prices and discounts in each segment according to Propo­
sition 2.3:
Segment p{* pi* pj* a* = ƒ?*
Occasional 1 +  c 1 +  c 1 +  c —
Frequent 2^ + c 2 +  c 2 -fc  2
In a symmetric equilibrium where both carriers adopt this policy, airline 
profits are given by —p*. Airlines will find it attractive to split the market 
in the way described by the above policy.
Proof. By construction p = 0 n the segment of the market patronised 
by occasional travellers and p =  1 in the segment patronised en­
tirely by frequent travellers. Given this, the equilibrium prices and 
discount set out in the Corollary follow immediately from Proposition 
2.3. Using (2.12), the profits to an airline when it segments the mar­
ket as described in the Corollary is given by, P2(i3-io(i)) +  (1 — p) § = 
— To see that this profit level is higher than that which would be 
achieved if the market was not divided note that = 9^V(i3-io^)°^' ~
^  which is th e  Profit level of the air-
lines when the market is not split. ■
Corollary 2.3 assumes that airlines are able to segment the market be­
tween frequent and occasional travellers. The menu of price and discounts 
laid out in the Corollary will not, by themselves, achieve such a segmentation 
- frequent travellers would prefer to pay the price charged occasional trav­
ellers and forefeit the chance of benefitting from a discount.24 However, in the 
air transport industry, as indeed with passenger transportation in general, an 
imperfect segmentation is obtained through the offer of First/Business Class 
and Economy Class seats. The former tend to be occupied exclusively by 
frequent travellers who place greater value on comfor and flexibility whilst 
the latter are typically taken up by occasional passengers. Clearly, factors 
other than those related to F F P  lead airlines to offer Business Class and
24 In other words, the menu of prices and discounts are not a separating equilibrium.
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Economy Class seats and to charge a higher price for the former. Never­
theless, Corollary 2.3 provides an addition reason why, in conjunction with 
launching a FFP, an airline find this segmentation profitable.
Social welfare
Given that consumers hold an inelastic demand for one unit of the good 
in each period, maximizing social welfare is tantamount to minimising total 
consumer transportation costs. In turn, the latter are minimised if, in each 
period, consumers address the airline closest to them: those located in the 
first half of I  patronise A  whilst those in the second half of the unit interval 
address airline B.
In the absence of FFPs  total transportation costs are minimized since 
consumers’ optimal policy is to address the closest airline in each period. 
Introducing the FFPs  described by Proposition 2.3 does not alter this result.
It can be checked that when the prices and coupons offered by the two airlines 
are equal, as they are in the symmetric equilibrium described above, then 
consumers will also patronise the closest airline in each period. Social welfare 
is, therefore, maximized.25
This result contrasts with that of Caminal and Matutes (1990). These 
authors report that the launch of FFPs  lead consumers to incur higher 
transportation costs than they would otherwise. Their result is driven by 
the fact that some consumers will be willing to travel further in order to 
address the same airline that they had done in the past and so be eligible 
for the coupon offered to repeat buyers. In the model presented here, on 
the other hand, consumers can always address the closest airline, minimising 
travelling costs and be sure that at some point in time - if not in the second 
period then in the third- they will be entitled to a discount. This result 
hinges on the assumption that airlines are symmetric and that travellers do 
not discount future gains.
To close this section, I should note - as do Caminal and Matutes (1990, p.361) 
- that in a  more general model where consumers are endowed with an elastic 
demand function, the increase in the prices that results from the introduc­
tion of F F P s  will have negative welfare effects. In this light, the benchmark 
case which does not allows for discrimination between first-time and repeat 
buyers would be superior in terms of total social welfare.
2 5 If the prices and discount offered by airlines are equal then it can be checked that 
Qj — \  for j  — 1,2,3,4,5.
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T o  lo c k - in  o r  n o t ? 26
The previous sections have argued that a FFP  need not create switching 
costs to allows an airline to collect supra-competitive profits. Given this, 
one might expect that an airline can do even better if it implements a pro­
gramme which does induce switching costs on travellers as this would add one 
other force driving airlines towards an outcome away from the competitive 
benchmark setting. In this section I ask whether such reasoning is valid.
To approach this question it is necessary to first recast the model of 
Section 2.2 so that it features FFPs  which induce switching-costs. The 
modified model is then solved and the equilibrium prices and profits of airlines 
compared wfith those that were derived in the original model.
There are two simple alternative ways of altering the model so that the 
FFPs  considered induce switching costs on travellers. Firstly, the generosity 
of the schemes may be tightened so that a discount is handed out to a traveller 
when he patronises the same airline for the third time. A second possibility is 
to reduce the time horizon of the model to two periods. Either modification 
would give rise to a setting where frequent travellers must patronise the same 
airline at every purchasing opportunity in order to benefit from the discount 
offered.
However, it should be noted that neither of these alternatives is ideal. 
In both cases, the locking-in feature is introduced at the cost of altering 
other aspects of the model. If the first route is followed, then the number of 
purchases required for a traveller to earn the discount increases from two to 
three. On the other hand, if the second suggestion is taken, the time horizon 
over which airlines compete is shortened to two periods. In either case, the 
structure of the model is altered. Therefore, these structural differences must 
be kept in mind when the results of the modified model are compared with 
those of the original one, as it would be wTong to attribute the differences in 
the outcome of the models entirely to the presence or absence of a locking-in 
feature.
The above problem cannot, however, be overcome. Introducing FFPs  
which induce switching costs will necessarily alter other features of the model.27
26To be rigorous, the term lock-in should be replaced by induce switching costs since 
travellers'1 choices are never forcefully tied to their past actions. With this in mind, I will 
use in this section the term lock-in as it makes the exposition easier.
27 A third alternative is to alter the original model in the following way. Let the popula­
tion of frequent travellers be composed of three groups, -label them F, G, H  - which take
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Of the two possibilities described above, the second one is chosen - shorten­
ing the time horizon of the model to two periods - as it corresponds to the 
setting described in Banerjee and Summers (1987) and Caminal and Matutes 
(1990).
2.5.3 Modified model
The modified model differs from the one described in Section 2.2 due to the 
shortening of the time horizon from 3 to 2 periods. Hence, airlines set prices 
at the start of both periods while the coupon value is decided at the start 
of Period 1. The occasional travellers are in the market for only one of the 
periods while the frequent travellers participate in both. Lastly, note that - 
as before - a frequent traveller who patronises an airline for the second time 
receives that airline’s discount.28
The steps involved in solving the modified model are analogous to those 
taken in solving the 3-period model which were presented in Section 2.3. 
To avoid repeating the presentation of similar reasoning most of the work 
involved in solving the model is left to the Appendix 2.B.
As before, the model is solved by working backwards. By solving the 
optimization problems of the two airlines in Period 2, their reaction functions 
can be derived. For airline A, this is given by,
s
~ 2 i} C ^  (1 ” a*)}
where the notation is equivalent to the one used in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 and 
the suffix ' is used to denote the modified model. An analogous expression 
can be derived as B ’s reaction function. Solving the two equations simulta­
neously yields the second period equilibrium prices,
P2 =  l + c  +  / /a V  (2-13)
P2 =  1 4- c 4- pffl (1 — <7/)
turns in participating in the market: in Period 1. groups F  and G  take part, in Period 2 
groups G  and H  and in the last period groups F  and H. This alternative has the merit 
of not altering the time horizon nor the generosity of the F F P s .  This alternative was 
explored but it proved hard to derive any results from it.
28 When all travellers are frequent travellers, p ~  1, this model is identical to one of the 
models examined by Caminal and Matutes (1990).
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This result points out that an airline’s second period price is above the bench­
mark level and increases both with the size of the discounts set in the first 
period and with the mass of travellers eligible to receive the discount in Pe­
riod 2 - given by the product of p and the airline’s share of the demand 
generated by frequent travellers in Period 1.
Using the above equilibrium prices, it is instructive to construct the ex­
pressions which describes the airlines’ profits in the second period. For airline 
A, this will be given by,
= \  i1 +  (va' -  1) (1 +  0P)) (2*14)
and a similar expression holds for airline B. Given that pa' < 1, it follows 
that n f  < which is competitive benchmark level..
Now consider the airlines’ problems in Period 1. Here, the airlines’ ob­
jective is to maximise the sum of its first period profits and those expected 
in the second period - given by (2.14)for airline A. The equilibrium prices 
and disounts will be given by solving the reaction function of each airline 
simultaneously. It is shown in Appendix 2.A, that equilibrium prices and 
discounts ds exist though it is not possible to derive an explicit expression 
for them. Instead, for a given value of the parameter p their values can be 
worked out numerically. Figure 2.4 summarizes the results by plotting the 
base prices as well as the discounted price paid by repeat buyers in Period 
2. Note that the curve drawing the discounted price is not defined at p =  0.
It is clear from Figure 2.4 that equilibrium prices increase with the share 
of frequent travellers and that they are above the competitive level, c +  1, 
for all p > 0. The discount offered to repeat buyers also increases with p 
although only just slightly. For p — e - a share just above 0 - the discount is 
equal to 0.65 while for p =  1, its value is 0.67. Other readings of the results 
summarized in Figure 2.4, and an interpretation of them, are left to the next 
section where a comparison with the results derived in Section 2.3 for the 
three-period model is carried out.
2.5.4 Comparing the two models
In order to contrast the outcome of the two models more easily and given that 
the symmetric equilibrium of the modified model can only be characterized 
numerically, it is appropriate to compare the prices, discounts and profits 
resulting from the two models for a given value of p.
iliJLfl
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Figure 2.4: Two period model equilibrium prices as a function of the share 
of frequent travellers.
Table 2.1 below characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the games de­
scribed in the two models for ¡jl —  1. The figures presented in the table would 
be different if other values of \x had been chosen, although the qualitative 
comparison which follows would still be valid. The first three columns report 
the equilibrium mark-up of the airlines in each of the periods. The absolute 
value of the discount as well as the percentage of the mark-up which it repre­
sents are given in the subsequent two columns. The remaining four columns 
show the equilibrium profits earned by the airlines over the time horizon of 
the model and the average profit per period. To make the following discus­
sion simpler, the original three-period model is referred to as Model I  while 
the modified, two-period model will be labelled as Model II .
Table 2.1: Com parison of th e  th ree  m odels for fi — 1.
Model Price mark 
Pd. 1 Pd. 2
-up 
Pd. 3
Discount 
Abs. %
Profit per Period 
Pd. 1 Pd. 2 Pd. 3 Avg.
Benchmark 1 1 1 — — 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Model I 2.33 2 2 2 100 1.17 0.50 0.50 0.72
Model I I 1.44 1.33 — 0.67 50 0.72 0.39 — 0.56
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As had been noted earlier, the second period price in Model 77 is above 
the benchmark level. The intuition for this was described in Section 1 and 
it stems from the airlines’ ability to exploit the switching costs which their 
FFP$  induce on travellers.
The second period price in Model I I  is considerably lower than the price 
level in Period 2 and 3 in Model 7. Thisdifference reflects the more generous 
discounts offered in Model I. Give equal discounts, both settings would give 
rise to equal second period prices.
To see how airlines are able to sustain higher equilibrium prices in the 
first period in Model I  than in Model II , recall equation (2.14) describing 
the second period profits of airline A in Model II ,
n£‘' = ^ (1 + OL\iaf Out/ -  1) (1 + 0 aO) (2.15)
In the symmetric equilibrium & — Any deviation in the first period 
prices away from the symmetric equilibrium will shift & away from |  and, 
given (2.14), will increase airline A ’s second period profits. If the symmetric 
equilibrium is to be sustained it is necessary that a downward deviation price 
from the equilibrium level harms an airline’s first-period profits. In other 
words, the symmetric equilibrium prices must be such that the increase in 
the first-period market share of such a deviant does not make up for the 
lower price charged. In turn, this implies that prices cannot be sustained at 
high values.
On the other hand, as was discussed in Section 2.3.4, in Model I ,the 
temptation of an airline to cut its first-period price from the equilibrium 
value is checked by the negative effects that this has on its second-period 
profits. This allows for higher prices to be sustained in Period 1 than those 
of Model I I .
The figures provided in Table 2.1 show that average profits per period are 
higher in Model I  than in Model 11 for ¿x -  1. This is in fact a general result 
as be read from Figure 2.5 which contrasts the average profit per period 
earned by an airline in the benchmark case, under Model 7 and under Model 
I I .  The relative ranking of the models in terms of average profit per period 
is largely accounted by the fact that airlines are able to sustain higher prices 
in Model 7 than in Model 77. In addition in Model 77, a large proportion, § 
, of the frequent travellers addressing an airline in Period 2 are repeat buyers
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Figure 2.5: Average profit per period in three settings: the two-, the three- 
period and the benchmark model.
who qualify for a discount and accordingly, pay a  low effective price.29 On 
the other hand, in Model / ,  in each of the Periods 2 and 3, only half of the 
frequent travellers qualify for the discount and the revenue foregone due to 
these discounts is made up by those paying the high full price. The net result 
is that, both in Period 2 and in Period 3, airlines’ profits do not fall below 
the benchmark level as occurs in the Period 2 of Model I I .
Before closing this section, it is appropriate to consider a setting where 
airlines compete over three periods, as in Model / ,  and frequent travellers 
qualify for a discount only if they patronise the same airline throughout. 
This was an alternative modification discussed at the start of this section 
and it reflects the setting discussed briefly in Banerjee and Summers (1997). 
While the formal treatement of this model proved unworkable, it is possible, 
through intuition, to characterise the outcome in such a setting. It is in 
the interest of an airline to ensure that the rival attracts a mass of frequent 
travellers that will qualify for a discount in the third period. If this were 
not the case, the airline with no loyal travelllers would have the incentive to
29 The share of repeat buyers in Period 2 is given by the sum of the terms Ai + (1 — A2) 
which are defined in Appendix 2.B For fi =  1 , this sum is equal to
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undercut and prices would be driven to the benchmark level Compared to 
the two period setting of Model / / ,  price competition would be less aggressive 
and lower discounts would be necessary to sustain the cooperation between 
the airlines. This intuition points to the result that the airlines fare better 
when the number of periods during which customers must be loyal increases. 
It does not, however, establish a comparison with the profit level earned in 
the setting described in the original model described in Section 2.4 where the 
F F P  induced no switching costs.
So how can the heading of Section 2.5 be answered? Are airlines better 
off with a FFP  which imposes switching-costs on its travellers or not? The 
above discussion does not allow this question to be answered. However, one 
- trivial - point is apparent: the structure of the F FP s  plays a significant 
impact on the profitability of the scheme.
2 .6  C o n c lu s io n
This chapter aimed at exploring some issues surrounding customer loyalty 
schemes. Its main concern vras to examine whether loyalty-schemes need to 
induce switching costs on travellers in order to have a raison d ’être. The 
answer is in the negative. It was shown that even when FFPs do not induce 
such costs, they are a tool which facilitate tacit-collusion amongst airlines.
The composition" of the population was seen to influence equilibrium 
prices and the level of the coupons awarded to repeat buyers. Both increased 
with the share of frequent travellers in the population.
The analysis also pointed out that, typically, travellers have little to be 
enthusiast about FFPs. Those who participate in the market rarely, and 
hence cannot hope to benefit from any coupon, lose out due to the high 
prices. On the other hand, for frequent travellers to benefit from the launch 
of a F F P  it is necessary that the share of travellers which they account for is 
not very high so that the coupon received offsets the higher prices practised.
qi
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A p p e n d ic e s
2.A Solving the Three Period Model
The proof is divided into two parts. Part 1 sets out the candidate symmetric 
equilibrium. Part 2 then shows that this candidate equilibrium is robust to 
deviations and so does indeed form an equilibrium.
In the process of going through the solution to the model Propositions 
2.2 and 2.3 and Corollary 2.1 will be proved.
2.A.1 P a r t  1 - Finding th e  candidate sym m etric equilibrium
The optimal decision rules of travellers and airlines are traced backwards in 
time, as presented in the main body of the text.
P eriod  3 Recall that the equilibrium prices in Period 3 were shown in 
Section 2.4.1 to be,
p % *  -  1 +  c  +  a f i s  
p f  * =  1 + c 4- Pps
This was proven in the main text and is not repeated here.
Given the third period equilibrium prices, it will be useful to re-write the 
terms Qj and as,
Hi I + P t - P i *  = 1 + p s ( 0 - a )2 2
1 +  P3 ’* — 0  -  p f* + a  _  1 + (ps -  1) (ƒ? -  a)
2 ”  2
(2.16)
P eriod  2 Section 2.4.2 defined the terms f13 and fU as,
1 +  P 2 — P2 +  Q +  ~  ^ 2  ~~ P
2
1 +  P2 -  P2 1^ ~  2^
(2.17)
BMinnn n " 1 i iiiii iiiii iim i niii'iii iiiiiimiiii'iiiiiiiiiii i irrM,it
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These terms will be useful for later.
Following the presentation in Section 2.4.2, the maximization problems 
of the two airlines at the start of Period 2 are given by,
MaxIlf  = (pf -  c) (1 -  fj) +  (p f -  c) p ( l  -  a) +
(p2 — Ct — c) fiaQ$ +  II3
A /axnf =  (pf -  c) (1 -  p) — p22  +  -  j  +  (p f -  c) /Xg (1 -  n 4) ^
(pf -  0  -  c) n  (1 -  a) (1 -  n 3) +  n f
The second period equilibrium prices are found by solving the two prob­
lems simultaneously. By solving the two first order conditions, it can be 
shown that the reaction functions of the two airlines are given by the follow­
ing algebraically cumbersome expressions:
p^ =  ~ ( A  +  B c  +  C p f )
p f  =  ~ ( E  +  B c  +  F p f )
(2.18)
where,
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A= 2a (a -  1) pi3 ((a -  0)3 + a  (a -  /3)4) +8a2/i2 ((a -  0)3 + 3q (a -  0)2) +
/  (pi2 -  pi3) (a -  B)A -  V  (0 - a ) ( 0 -  3a) + \
\  2pi2 (2(0 -  a)3 -  7 a (a -  0)2) + 4pi((0 -  a) (0 -3 a )  - 2 a )  )
(a -  0 )4 (pi3 -  2 pi2) +2pi2 ((0 -  a) (02 - a 2) + 2 ( 0 -  a) (0 -  3a)) + 
4pi (2 (0 — a) — (a — 0) (5a -  3/3)) —16
B= 4a (a -  l)pi2 (pi (a — /3)4 + 4 (a -  0)2) + (a -  0)4 (pi3 -  pi2) +
4pi (pi — 2) (a — 0)2 —16
C= 4a (a — 1) pi2 (pi (a — 0 )4 + 4(0 — 3a) (0 — a)) + (a — 0 )4 (pi3 — pi2) +
4pi(pi — 2) (a — 0)2 —16
D= 8a (a -  1) pi2 (pi (a -  0)4 + 4 (2a -  0) (a -  0)) +2 (a -  0 )4 (pi3 -  pi2) + 
8pi2 (0 -  2a) (a -  0 ) -16/i (a -  0)2 -32
E= 2a (a -  1) pi3 ((0 -  a )5 + 0 (a -  0 )4) +8a2pi2 ((0 -  a )3 + 30 ( a -  0)2) + 
2a (pi3 -  pi2) (a -  0)4 + 2 api2 (4 (a -  30) ( a - 0 )  + 4 ( a -  0)3) -  
2api (10 (a -  0)2 -  4pi ((a -  3/3) (a -  0) -  20)) -  
pi3 (a -  0)4 +2pi2 ((a - 0 ) 3- 2  (30 -  a) (0 -  a)) +
4pi (2a — a2+ 0 2 — 60) —16
F= 4a (a -  1) pi2 (pi (a — 0)4 + 4 ( a -  30) (a — 0)) + ( a -  0)4 (pi3 — pi2) +
4pi2 (a -  30) (a -  0) -8pi (a -  0)2 -16
G= 8a (a -  1) pi2 (pi (a - 0 ) 4 + 4 (20 - a ) ( 0 -  a)) + 2  (a -  0)4 (pi3 -  pi2) + 
8pi2 (a -  20) (a -  0) -16pi (a -  0)2 -32
The equilibrium prices axe found by solving the system of equations given 
by the two reaction functions, (2.18). It follows that the second period equi- 
liobrium prices are given by,
_Am AG + C E + (C  + G )B c DE  + F A  + (F + D )B c
P2 ~ D G - F C  ' P2 D G - F C
(2.19)
It was checked that at this equilibrium point the necessary second-order 
conditions are met.
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The expressions for p2* and p2* in terms of the model’s parameters are 
too unwieldy to provide any insight. However, two special cases can be 
considered.
First, when a — ¡3 = A it can be shown that A = —16crpA — 16, B = C — 
F  = —16, D =  G = —32 and E  — IGo-pX — 16pA — 16. Substituting these 
terms into (2.19), the equilibrium second prices simplify to p2* = 1 +  c+ 
pA ^~^ and p2* = 1+  c+
Second, when cr = 0.5 it can be shown that A  = , B  =, C = , D = , F  =, 
F  =  and G =  . Substituting these terms into (2.19), the equilibrium second 
prices simplify to p£* =  1 + c +  ^  and p2* =  1 +  c +
This proves Corollary 2.1.
P e rio d  1 The maximization problem facing airline A  at the start of Period 
1 is given by,
n f = ipi -  c) ( p .t + (i -  /j) ( —+- ‘— —  ^j  +n£
=  {pf -  c) (/KT +  (1 -  ft) ~ 2 —— )  )  +
(?2 ~ c ) ( ^  (1 -  cr) fi4 -+- (1 -  ( 1;!~P22 ~ ~2 ) )  +
(^ 2 — a  — c)
(ps -  a  -  c) psQ2
An analogous expression can be written for airline’s B  maximization prob­
lem. However, given that the I will be searching for a symmetric equilibrium 
it will be sufficient to work with (2.20).
The two first order conditions of A ’s optimisation problem are given by,
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dpi
da
^ { l . r ) ( i ± j p L y ( r i ^
'1+ p? - pA \
+
p (1 — cr) Qi +  (1 — p) dpi 0 dpi
(Pi-C )  ( - / A | *  +  ** (1 ■- '»> § )  +** ( P i" “  -  C) ( * | j  +  ^
« - ' )  (t *) ( S  -  S ) + W - )  (-" “4 + " - § ) 1
p (1 — s) Qj+ (1 — p) I+ P f -P s dp* n dp*-pL+pSn 2 f ±
dpi dp1
= (p i“ C) / ¿ ^  +  (^1 “  <*) ^4P+ (1 ~ p) ^ 2 ) )  da
w-*) ( - n- " l + <* -  '> " S +V 1 ( f  -  © ) +
‘’n,,‘ ( & T 1)  + " c)" ( " • S + " § )  +
dpj
da
(rf-c)» ( -n ,£ +  (1 - « ) * )  + ( & - 1)  <n»+
I now set out to evaluate the derivatives of \arious terms with respect to 
the two choice variable which build up the two first order conditions
To derive and ^  recall the implicit equation (2.10) described in Sec­
tion 2.4.3 ,
_  i + p f  -  p? +  nf -  n |  +  rg -  n?
2
(2.20)
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where the terms and fi4 are functions of a ,p f  and a . Based on
(2.20) , it is possible to use the implicit function theorem to calculate and
The partial derivatives of J  - after imposing the symmetry conditions,
i.e. a  =  0.5, a  =  0, p f  = p? - are given by ^  f 2 =  ± and §£ =  -1 .
Therefore, given the symmetry,
da
d p i
da
da
dJ  . d J  = 1 
dpf * da 2 
_  i
da ' da 4
To derive the expressions for ^ r ,  —fc- note th a t j^  =  |jj£ 4- and
, d<r d p $
d p f  ’ dpf ¿ P i d p f  d<r
dj% =  ^  R ° m (2-19) ;t foll°*'s that =  0.
Obtaining the expressions for and requires a bit more work as it 
requires to look at the terms A ,B ,C ,D ,E ^F  and G which definep£ a n d p f • 
Under symmetry ^  =  -16pa , =  16pa  a n d ^ -  =  ^  = ^  = ^  =
Jp- =  0. In addition it is straight-forward to calculate that under symmetry, 
A ~ E ~  —Spa — 16, B  =  C  =  F  =  —16 and D = G = —32. It then follows
from (2.19) that |jj£
_ £ £ £  1 
3 •
( D G - F C )
(j
^  ^  and that ^ (D G - F C )
Putting these previous results together, it follows that,
dpi
dpi
dp i
dpi
pa
Y
pa
T
An analogous procedre can be followed to obtain the following expressions
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dp~ j  dp?
811(1-S '.
dl4 dpf da dpf 
da da da
_  t  +  1
2 + 4 3da
_  p pot 
2 12
dpf d p f t da dpf 
da da da — r ?da
_  — p a  
12
After imposing the symmetry conditions it can be shown that =  
^  =  0> ^  =  ^  =  ir  811,1 ^  =  ^  =  =  Similarly, it can be
shown that « h  =  - f , < £  =  2=b, ©  =  ^  =  } -  § -  *?, g  =  « =  0
6
dO? _  2-ju dfh _  dn4 _  I  _  I f _i±2L “Pa ___ a
doe 4 ’ da  4 * da da 4 4 12 ’ da 2 ’ da
and g  =  0. Lastly, it is easy to see that under symmetry ^  = 52 =  1,2,3,4 
and
da5==1 
5  2
Substituting the various expressions obtained into the two first-order con­
ditions yields after some simplifcation the following system of equations,
dXlf _  1 Pi c pot
dpf = 2 _ T  + 2 + T (2.21)
dlli1 _ (pi “  c) p lZpa p2a
~da ~ 4 24~ +  ~ 4 ‘
The equilibrium price and coupon level is obtained by equating the two 
conditions to 0 and solving the system. Carrying this out yields, for p ^  0,
P ie* =  i + c +
4m
13 -  10m
a = 13 -  10m
(2.22)
Given the symmetry, it follows pf* =  1 + c+  an<* 0* = 13- log- Substi­
tuting these values into the previously derived expressions for the equilibrium 
prices in Period 2 and in Period 3, gives the equilibrium prices described in 
Proposition 2.3.
The second-order have been seen to be satisfied locally. It is necessary to 
check that the candidate symmetric equilibrium described in (2.22) is robust 
to deviations. This is set out below, in Part 2 of the proof.
' * * * * *-
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2.A .2 Part 2 - Robustness of candidate equilibrium
With no loss of generality, it is assumed that the deviating airline in Period 
1 is A whilst airline B  selects the candidate equilibrium’s price and discount,
& ~  13— 10/1 a n i^ P ?  “  f  +  c  +  liJ iQ ft ■
In Part 1 of this proof, it was implicitly assumed that the terms Q j, j  =
1, ...,5 lied within the unit interval. At the proposed equilibrium point, such 
conditions are indeed met. However, when testing for the robustness of the 
candidate equilibrium, it is necessary to consider the possibility that following 
A ’s initial deviation, the optimal behaviour of airlines in subsequent periods 
will be such that, Qj lies outside the unit interval. This alters the functional 
form of the airlines’ profit function and therefore requires that the reaction 
function be re-examined.
Following on from this consideration, the rest of this section is structured 
as follows. First, it is shown numerically that there is no profitable first- 
period deviation by airline A provided airlines’ choices of prices and discount 
are such that 0 < fij- < 1, j  — 1, ...,5 .This restriction is then set aside at 
the cost, however, of confining the space of A ’s potential deviations to those 
where a — 0. As before, it will be shown that under the new equilibrium 
prices following A ’s deviation, airline A  earns a lower profit level than if it 
followed the strategies described by the (candidate) symmetric equilibrium.
2. A .2.1 R estric t flj to  th e  u n it interval, j  =  1,2..., 5. When the choice 
of A  ’s first period deviation and the choice of ensuing equilibrium prices in 
Periods 2 and 3 are limited such that 0 < Qj < 1, then the airlines’ profit 
functions described above are correct. It follows, that it is then possible to 
use the reaction functions derived above to establish the equilibrium prices 
in the last two periods for a given deviation by A. Due to the cumbersome 
expressions involved I carried out this task numerically using the following 
algorithm:
1. Let \x =  0.
2. In 0.1 fine grid, consider all pairs of a  and p f, and for each pair use the 
expressions derived in Part 1 of the proof to work out the equilibrium 
prices in Periods 2 and 3.
3. If the equilibrium prices derived are such that any of the terms Qj, 
j  =  1, 2,...,5 lie outside the unit interval, then discard the relevant
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pair {a,??!1} as a possible deviation.
4. For each admissible deviation, use the respective equilibrium prices to 
construct the expected profit of airline A  over the 3 period and check 
whether this is higher or lower than the expected profits earned at the 
candidate symmetric equilibrium.
5. Let fj, — fj, A 0.05.
6. Repeat steps 2 - 5 ,  until p  =  1.
The results from this programme show that there is no admissible devia­
tion, where admissible has the peculiar definition described above, from the 
candidate symmetric equilibrium which is profitable to airline A .
2.A .2.2 Allowing QjJ  = 1,2, ...,5 to lie outside the unit interval
As mentioned previously the space of A ’s deviations will be restricted to 
those where it chooses to offer no discount, ie a = 0..
To derive the new equilibrium strategies following A ’s deviation in the 
first period, it is necessary to work backwards from Period 3.
P eriod  3 Given that a — 0, the objective functions of the twro airlines 
in Period 3 can be written as,
The objective functions of the two airlines are piece-wise functions in third 
period prices. This complicates matters as it becomes necessary to consider 
3*3  = 9 cases and solve the maximization problem of each airline. Note,
II3 = (p£ — c) (1 — fis) fil + psÜ2
nf = (pf -  c) (1 -  ps) (l -  fil) + (pf -  P* “  c) ^ 2
(2.23)
where,
0 if Ti< 0
fi,•= T,- if Tt€ [0, 1] ,2 =  1,2 where Ti —
1 if Tt> 1
(2.24)
however, that < fii so that the cases to be considered are reduced to 6 
as tabled below,
Range
n 2
Case A3 0 0
Case B3 G I 0
Case C3 1 0
Case D3 G I G /
Case E3 1 G I
Case F3 1 1
(2.25)
The Period 3 equilibrium prices are found by carrying out the following steps.
First, calculate for each of the six cases the constrained reaction functions 
of the two airlines. The constrained reaction function gives an airline’s best 
response to its rival’s price conditional on the values of Qi and remaining 
within the range defining the relevant case.
Second, use the six constrained reaction functions to construct the overall 
best reply function for each airline. This is done by comparing the profit level 
obtained by following the constrained reaction function across each of the six 
cases and selecting the price response which yields the highest profit.
Third, the equilibrium to the pricing game is given by the intersection of 
the two overall best reply functions
The work involved in constructing the six constrained reaction functions 
will not be presented here. However, to act as an illustration case D3 is 
considered in detail.
Case D 3
It follows from (2.24) and from (2.25) that the conditions which define 
Case D3 are given by 0 <  — < 1 and 0 < 1+p-^ r2p^ ~— < 1. These 
conditions can be re-written as,
Pt + 8’ ~ l < p ! < l + p î (2.26)
Solving the first-order conditions of the airlines’ optimization problem 
(2.23) gives,
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d n j
dp* ca.se.D3
dn£
dpi ca.se.D3
Ì  (1 +  c + p i  -  2 p$ -  p > s )  =  0
P3 = | ( 1 +  c +  p f -P *ps)
^ ( l  + c + p$ - 2 p% + 2/?>s) =  0
P3 = ^ ( l  + c +  P3+2/3*/is) (2.27)
The system of equations (2.27) together with the conditions (2.26) and 
the fact that the third period profit functions of the airlines are concave 
in own prices allow me to describe the optimal behaviour of the two airlines 
conditional on Qi and Q2 being in the unit interval, ie remain within case D3. 
For a  given p f , airline A  will set its price according to its reaction function 
given in (2.27). However, if this choice of p$ is below the smallest value of 
P3 necessary to satisfy (2.26) then A  will set the lowest price consistent with 
(2.26). On the other hand, if the price is above the maximum price consistent 
with(2.26), then it will set the highest admissible price. Airline B  follows a 
similar behaviour. Figure 2.5 below illustrates this discussion. The kinked 
solid curves graph the reaction functions of the two airlines and they are 
constructed from the 4 dotted lines which describe the two conditions (2.26) 
and the two equations in (2.27).
An analogous procedure can be followed for the other five cases. The 
following tables summarize the results for all 6 cases by reporting the best- 
reply of each airline to a rival’s price. The tables should be read as follows. 
If the price of the rival is below the critical value exit. 1, then the best-reply 
of an airline is to the set its price as given in BRiw. On the other hand, if 
the rival sets a price above the critical value crit. 2, then the airline should 
reply according to BRhigh. Lastly, if the price of the competitor lies between 
the two critical \alues, the best response id given by BRmid- Note that while 
in cases A3 and F3 only one of the airlines is active, in case C3, the best-reply 
of the airlines is invariant to the rival’s strategy.
Case A 3 Airline A Airline B
B R P i -  1
Price of airiirte A. p_A
Figure 2.6: Airlines’ reaction functions under case D .
Case B3 Airline A AirlineB
crit.l c — 1 c + 3  —2/3* +  ^
c n i .2 c + 2/3* -  1 c +  3 + ^ j
p f +  1 P3 +  /?' -  1
BRmid \ { p i  +  c +  l) 5 + c  +  1 +
B R high P% + 1-/8* 1 P Í - 1
Case C3 Airline A Airline B
B R P3Ö- 1 P3 +  1 +  ß*
C ase D3 Airline A Airline B
crii. 1 c — 1 4- 6 * (2 — ¿¿s) c — 1 +  2 ß*ps
cr¿¿.2 c 4- 3 -  ß*ps c + Z - 2 0 ' { l -  ßs)
BRiov pZ + i - f P3 +  1
BRmid k (P3 +C + 1 - ß*ßs) è (p^ + c +  1 + 2/3* /zs)
BRhigh ^ p i  - i + r
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C ase E3 Airline A Airline B
crit. 1 c +  l +  £ - / ? * c -  1
crit . 2 c + 1 +  A  +  0 * c -  1  + 2 0 '
B R io w Pi - 1 p f+ T + W
B R m id \ { p i  + c -  i - / r  + £ ) 2 (pi +  c + 1 + 2/?*)
R R h ig h pI  - 1  -  0 ’ P3 +1
Case F3 Airline A Airline B
B R  p f - 1 - 0 ’ —
Equipped with the 6 constrained reaction functions it is possible to con­
struct the overall reaction curve for each airline and therfore solve for the 
equilibrium prices. This is a particularly cumbersome task in terms of the 
algebra involved and, for the sake of exposition, the working is not shown 
here. Nevertheless, it can be shown that for ¡3* < 1 p < ^  an equilibrium 
exists and it is given by * = 1 +  c and pf =  1 + c +  ¡3*ps. At these prices, 
the relevant case is Case For p > no equilibrium exists.
P eriod  2 Henceforth, I assume that the solutions to the Period 3 sub­
game are given by p£* — 1 +  c and p f  * =  1 +  c +  (3* ps. In other words, I will 
restrict my attention to the case where p < jq as this allows me to proceed 
analytically with the proof.
Recall, that A ’s objective function at the start of Period 2 is,
n2 =  (pi -  c) (( i -  n) S'! + +  ti (i -  a) n 4) + n f
^ o n g /0
ou.iCL
%<>
u
1 c
, W
0/^ Vj.lS^
i<g
no­
where T3 
T4
and 1^
0 if T, < 0
T 13 if T j6 [0 , l ]  , ¿ =  3,4 (2.28)
1 if T> > 1
1 +  P2 "  P2 +  E (U3 \xx) -  £  (U3|xy)
2
1 +  P2 -  P2 ~ /?* -  E  (Uz\xx) +  E  (Uz\xy) 
2
f 0 if < 0
I ,f  i±e£=^. € [0, 1]
[ 1 if l±v3f &  > 1
Using the Period 3 equilibrium prices established above, it follows that fii =  
i±|I££t q 2 = and consequently that E (U 3 \xx) -  E ( U 3 \xy) =
— — 1^  . In turn, it is straightforward to establish that T 3 < T 4
if and only if ys  < J . Below I will assume that the latter condition is 
satisfied. In equilibrium this will indeed be the case. Lastly, note that j is 
always greater than both fi3 and S74.
The procedure followed to solve the pricing game in this period is similar 
to that adopted for Period 3.
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the cases where the airlines’ objective 
functions change due to the discontinuities that arise from (2.28).There are 
five possible cases that must be analysed as tabled below.
O3 il4 Constraint 1 Constraint 2
Case A2 0 0 6 I r 3 < o i+rf-Pi >  0
Case B2 0 € / G I r 3 < o T 4 > 0
Case C2 € / € I G I t 3 > o
Case D2 € / G I 1 r 4 < 1 i±£L^ > 1
Case E2 G / 1 1 T3 < 1 f 4 > l
The constraints 1 and 2 described in the table are those constraints which 
define the relevant case.
Secondly, for each of the 5 cases, it is necessary to work out the constrained 
reaction functions. To do so, the following procedure must be carried out for
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each of the 5 cases. Using the equality $ = d r i l - Q 3J + ( l - i 7) f24, and the
relevant expressions for Q3 and ILj, derive an expression for s in terms ofpf ,  
p f , fi and a . This expression is then substituted in for s in the definitions 
of il3, Q4 and In a similar way to what was done above, the constrained 
reaction functions of each airline are obtained by maximizing the relevant 
Period 2 profit function with respect to their second-period price subject 
to the two constraints defining the case at hand. The expressions describing 
these functions are too cumbersome and will not be present here. Graphically, 
however, the constrained reaction functions of the two airlines are similar to 
those presented in Figure 2,5.
Lastly, to obtain the global reaction function, it is necessary to i) calculate 
the best reply to a rival’s price under the five different cases and ii) select 
the reply which yields the highest profit. The solution to the game is then 
given by the intersection of the two overall reaction functions.
As it was not feasible to carry out these steps algebraically, I did so by 
resorting to numerical simulations. The result obtained is the following. For 
fj, < the region being considered, an equilibrium to the second period 
sub-game is given by the set of prices described in Proposition 2.2 and in 
(2.19) once the substitutions a  =  0 and 0  = 0 * are made.
P eriod  1 By assumption, p f  =  p f \  0 = 0* and a = 0. It is sufficient 
to the consider the optimisation problem facing airline A. The objective 
function of this airline is,
Max  II?
W J
where ^2 
and a
(vt
<
-  c) {pa + (1
0 if
2 ^  1 
otherwise
1
1
2
if
if
if
l + p f  ‘■ -Vi + E { U ‘2\ A ) - E ( U 2\B)
2
l+pf--r>t+E(u2\A)-E(u2\B) _
2 ^  1
otherwise
As before, the piece-wise nature of the objective function, forces me to 
resort to numerical calculations. The price p f  was allowed to take values
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Figure 2.7: Expected profits of airline A as a function of its first period 
price, (c =  1, p =  0.5)
between c 4* 1 and c +  4 at intervals of 0.05. For each level of pf,  I derived 
the respective value of a and consequently the profits of A  over the three 
periods. The results derived show that A ’s profits are everywhere below 
what it would receive if it did not deviate from the candidate symmetric 
equilibrium. This is illustrated by Figures 2.6 and 2.7. For p = 0.5, Figure 
2.6 graphs A ’s profit level as a function of its first period price, pf ,  when this 
airline offers no discount and follows in subsequent periods the equilibrium 
pricing strategies that were derived above. There is an optimal price to be 
charged by A, though it is clear that its profits are below those that it would 
receive had it not deviated - this profit level is given by the horizontal line. 
Figure 2.7 summarizes the numerical simulations carried out by showing how 
the equilibrium profits of airline A  varies with p. For the sake of comparison, 
the figure also draws out the profits that this airline would earn had it not 
deviated. It is clear that A  is better off if it does not deviate from the 
candidate symmetric equilibrium. This completes the proof.
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Figure 2.8: Profits of airline A  in the symmetric equilibrium and under its 
optimal deviating behaviour given a = 0, as a function of //.
2.B Solving the Two Period Model
The steps involved in solving the two-period model follow closely the presen­
tation in Caminal and Matutes (1990,p.370). The same notation is used as 
in the three-period model, though the suffix/ (prime) is added to distinguish 
the two. The model is solved by working backwards starting in Period 2.
2.B .1 P eriod  2
1  . b ' _  a ’
An occasional traveller will patronise airline A  if and only if i2 < —Pz  ^~'2~ =  
Ai- Otherwise he will address B.  A frequent traveller conditional on hav­
ing address A  in Period 1 will return to it in Period 2 if and only if ¿2 <
±gs ~p-2-+?- =  A2. On the other hand, if he addressed B  in the first period,
he will purchase from A  in Period 2 if and only if i2 < — 2 =  A3. Let
o' be the share of frequent travellers who selected A  in Period 1. The profit 
of airline A  in the second period is given by,
II2' = ( p f  -  c) ((! -  ¡1) Ai +  /x (1 -  cr') A3) + (p2 “ 7 -  c) p (a' * A2)
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After substituting out the terms Ai ,A2 and A3 in the above and upon sim­
plification, one can write the profit function of A  in the second period as,
n ?  =  i  (p2 - c j  ( l + p f  - P 2 -  1) + a ' ) ) - ^ 2 - ( l  +  o' +  p f  - p f )
An analogous expression can be derived for airline B. Differentiating the two 
profit functions with respect to the choice variables, and p f yields the 
following first order conditions,
=  1 -  2 p ^  +  p f  ’ +  c -  p/?' +  per'/? +  2per'a'
=  1 +  P2 — 2pf + c 4- 2p/?' — 2pcr'/?/ — per'a
Setting the two first order conditions to 0 and solving the ensuing system 
gives the equilibrium second period prices,
d U f
dp2
d T if
d p f
^2 = 1 +  c +  per'a
P2 = 1 +  c +  p ( l  — <t')/?'
It is
¿P*
straight-forward to see that the second-order conditions are met since
2.B.2 P e rio d  1
An occasional traveller patronises A  in Period 1 if and only if i Y < i+p ' a '-Pi
On the other hand a frequent traveller will address A if i\ < 
A4 and will address B  otherwise. The term E  (U2\ J) , J  
expected utility gained by a frequent traveller in Period 2 
dressed J  in Period 1. The value of these expected utilities
1'+*>?''■- p ? ' + e ( v * \a  ) -  e ( u 2 10)  '2
= {A, B} , is the 
given that he ad- 
can be calculated
as,
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E (U 2 \A) =  ƒ 2 ( r - p ?  + a ' - i ) d i +  f ( R - p f - 1  +  t)
v O J À2
dt
R - p f  -  -z +
E ( U 2 \B) =  ( R - p f - i ) d i  + J *  ( R - p f + 0 1 -  l  +  i) di
=  i2 -  p f  +  0  -  -  + A3
Using these results it is possible to express A4 as
1
Ad — 1 +  P\ —p\ — 0  +  A2 — A3 (2.29)
The profit earned by airline A over the two periods is given by,
n f = (p f  - c) (/«/ + (i-/x) ( *+Pl2— ^ -))  + n2a
where, by construction, a' =  A4.
Maximizing with respect to p f  and ol and then imposing the sym­
metry conditions p f  =  p f , 0  =  a ' and & — \  yields,
Using (2.29) and recalling that A4 =  <f, it is straight-forward to compute 
-p - and ~  at the symmetric point as,
der' 1
d p f = “ 2(1 + ¿¿a'2)
. dc/ _ 1 + a' (1 — p )
da!  4 (1 +  p a * 2)
Substituting these expressions into (2.30) and solving the first order condi­
tions gives the following system of equations,
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0
0
2 4- fia '2 (3 — /¿)
2 4- 2fiat2 (1 -V )
c) +  a  (1 -  aO (2p f
(2.31)
2c — a') 4- fia -  4a — a '3 (2ai 4-1)
8 (1 4- fia '2)
The candidate symmetric equilibrium prices and coupon levels are given 
by the solution to this system of equations. This systemn can not be solved 
analytically and it is necessary to resort to numerical computations to derive 
the equilibrium price and discount levels.
The equilibrium values are those plotted in Figure 2.4 in Section 2.5.1.
The equilibrium prices and discount are a function of (x. It was checked 
numerically that for each \x in a 0.02 grid in the [0, 1] interval, the second- 
order conditions were met at the symmetric equilibrium point.
As with the three-period model, it is necessary to check that the solutions 
to (2.31) actually form an equilibrium. In other words, it is necessary to check 
that neither airline has the incentive to deviate. The steps involved to carry 
this out were similar to those presented in Part 2 of Appendix 2.A. For the 
sake of exposition, that work is not presented here. It is noted, however, that 
the analysis concluded that the symmetric equilibrium is robust to deviations 
to corner solutions, ie. to deviations by a firm not to offer no discount. This 
completes the proof.
Chapter 3
An empirical study of the 
effects of F F P  alliances
3 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
One hundred and twenty nine scheduled flights take off every week from Salt 
Lake City, Utah to Boston, Massachussets. Of these, 68 are operated by 
United Airlines and both Delta and Southwest Airlines both fly 21. United 
Airlines flies to 29 other destinations from Salt Lake City, whilst Delta and 
Southwest Airlines serve 67 and 22 other cities respectively. 1 Delta’s network 
of flights across America as a whole is considerably greater than that of the 
other two airlines. 2
All three airlines offer their passengers the opportunity to enrol in their 
own frequent-flyer programmes (FFP s ).
FF P s  influence a traveller’s choice of airline by creating a link between 
all of an airline’s flights. Independent of when the journey is made or where 
to or from, air miles are earned by those participating in the scheme. 3
The convex structure of F FP 's reward schedule gives the incentive for a
1 These figuers are based on the airlines* schedule in the week between the 8 and the 14 
May 1999, as reported in the OAG Pocket Flight Guide to North America. Only flights to 
US destinations have been included, though these cover both direct as well as connecting 
flights.
2 See Table 3.3 further below
a Cairns and Galbraith (1990) refer to this Link created by the F F P s  as an artificial 
compatiblity between the different routes serviced by the same airline.
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traveller to concentrate her flights on a few number of airlines, one or two.4 
Other things equal, a traveller is likely to choose the airline with which she 
expects to fly the most in the future - the one with the most service on 
the route she flies more often and the one that flies the most routes from 
her home airport. In Salt Lake City, travellers keen on FFPs  and flying 
most frequently to Boston will lean towards United Airlines whilst those 
whose destination varies will be attracted to Delta. In addition, the value 
a traveller attaches to a free flight in the future increases with the size of 
the menu of destinations amongst which she can choose to fly to. Given 
its wider domestic, and indeed international network, Delta would come out 
better than its rivals on this count too.5
The above reasoning suggests that the effectiveness of an airline’s FFP  
in influencing a traveller’s choice is closely related to the size of that airline 
-bo th  its share of activity on the route and at the nearby airport as well as 
the size of its overall network of routes.6
For those concerned with the competitiveness of the airline industry this 
is worrying as it implies that the larger players are (further) insulated from 
competition and allowed to price less aggressively than they would otherwise. 
In addition, the entry of a new airline into the air transport industry, or that 
of an airline into an airport dominated by an incumbent is made that much 
harder. Either entry takes place on a large enough scale so that the entrant 
places itself on the same level as the incumbent, or the entrant faces the 
prospect of competing at a disadvantage.
The sub-committees of the American Senate and Congress supervising 
aviation, competition, anti-trust and business rights have had the above is­
sue repeatedly brought to their attention, most recently in the GAO-99-37 
report by the US General Accounting Office.7 An underlying theme in these
4 In 1999, members of Delta’s Sky Miles program for example, required 40,000 air 
miles to redeem one free First Class round ticket within or between the continental US 
(including Alaska) and Canada whilst 20,000 miles would not be sufficient to earn one 
Coach/Economy Class ticket for the same trip ( 25,000 miles would have been necessary).
°The attractiveness of a F F P  also depends on the generosity with which air miles 
are handed out. There is considerable homogeneity in the rate at which airlines reward 
travellers though periodic special offers - when twice or thrice as many air miles are 
distributed for the same length of travel - make it hard to establish a clear comparison 
between programmes.
6Borenstein (1996) notes that hotels with facilities in many cities have used loyalty- 
programmes more extensively than those with a more limited number of outlets.
7See also GAO-90-147, GAO-97-120, GAO-98-112 and GAO-98-176
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reports is that certain marketing schemes, of which FFPs  are the most 
prominent, have added to the existent operating barriers to entry - namely 
the control over airport slots and gate leases by the major airlines and the ex­
istence of perimeter rules at some busy airports - and thereby made effective 
competition by new entrants harder.*
The concerns over the anti-competitive effects of FFPs  found in the 
GAO reports echo those laid out in the reviews in Levine (1987), Bailey and 
Williams (1988), Clifford and Whinston (1989) and Borenstein (1992) of the 
effects of deregulation on the American airline industry.
This chapter addresses this concern. It explores the extent to which 
FFPs  contribute further to the market power of larger airlines. It will 
do so by exploiting a natural experiment occurring over 1998 involving six 
of the American major carriers. In the course of that year, three sets of 
pairwise agreements were established: between Continental with Northwest, 
between American with US Airways and between Delta and United. With 
the exception of the alliance between Continental and Northwest, the three 
sets of agreements were exclusively of a marketing nature and centred on each 
airline treating its partner’s F FP  as if it were its own. This F F P  reciprocity 
implied that a member of one airline’s loyalty scheme could also clock up air 
miles when travelling with the partnering airline and could redeem prizes on 
either airline.
Overnight, the opportunities to earn air miles and redeem prizes for a 
member of one of the six airlines’ F FP  doubled.
Consider once again the traveller based at Salt Lake City and assume that 
she is a member of Delta’s Sky Miles program. Following Delta’s alliance 
with United she can now collect air miles on her Sky Miles account whenever 
she flies with United including its 68 weekily flights to Dallas. In addition, 
once enough air miles are accumulated, she has the option of redeeming a 
free flight on either United’s or Delta’s routes. The alliance between the two 
airlines has in effect increased the benefit of being a Sky Miles member. More 
generally, members of the loyalty-programs of any of the other five airlines 
involved in these agreements will benefit similarly.
If, as argued, FFPs  contribute to an airline’s market power, benefitting 
those airlines with the greater network of routes, then the boost received by 8
8Perimeter rules prohibit flights from an airport that exceed certain distances. The 
existence of such rules at the airports La Guardia, New York and National,Washington DC, 
limits the ability of airlines based in the west to compete at these airports (GAO/RCED- 
98-176).
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an airline’s loyalty-program by allying itself with that of another - particu­
larly when both carriers involved are major carriers - should have noticeable 
effects on fares. The analysis of this chapter attempts to establish whether 
such an effect did take place, and, in so doing, explores the routes through 
which F FPs  contribute to the market power of an airline. In carrying this 
out, it will also be addressing the question left open in the 1999 report by 
the US General Accounting Office asking for a value to be put on the anti­
competitive effects of the three alliances due to the expanded F F P s .9
The chapter is structured as follows. In the following section, I review 
other studies that have quantified the market power enjoyed by carriers due 
to their F F P s . In Section 3.3, I present a brief description of the three 
pairwise alliances among the six US major carriers. Section 3.4 lays out the 
background to the econometric analysis, the results and interpretation of 
which are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 closes the chapter.
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3 .2  E s t im a t e s  o f  t h e  v a lu e  o f  fr e q u e n t- f ly e r  
p r o g r a m m e s
Passenger surveys reveal that following concerns over security, price, punctu­
ality and service, FFPs  are a  factor travellers pay attention to when choos­
ing with which airline to travel ( Toh and Hu, 1988 and GAO/RCED-90-147, 
1990).
Nako (1992) and Morrison and Whinston (1995) tackle the problem of 
placing a money value on the importance travellers attach to an airline’s 
FFP.  In both papers, travellers’ choice of airline is formulated as a logit 
choice model where price, frequency of flights and membership in FF P s  are 
included in the set of explanatory variables. Morrison and Whinston (1995) 
estimate that the marginal value to a traveller of clocking an extra air mile 
is 8.2 cents. The paper qualifies this finding in two respects. First, it shows 
that the value placed on an air mile depends on the air miles a traveller has 
already accumulated. Second, it is also shown that the value is greater for 
those travellers who are likely to travel often enough to clock up enough air 
miles to redeem a prize but not enough that they are certain to do so. Nako 
(1992) uses data on business travellers and shows that the value a traveller 
attributes to a F FP  varies from airline to airline though the reasons for these
9GAO/RCED-99-37, p.3
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differences are not wholly accounted for. However, Nako (1992) does obtain 
the interesting result that the value of an airline’s FFP  is raised by $4.16 
for every 10% increase in its airport market share.
In this chapter, I propose to look at the opposite side of the coin studied by 
Nako (1992) and Morrison and Whinston (1995). I will attempt to quantify 
the premium an airline enjoyes due to its FFP. Clearly, the two issues are 
related - a premium can only come about if travellers attach a value to these 
loyalty programmes and realign their preferences accordingly.
I have not come across a study that has attempted to put a figure on the 
impact of FFPs on the level of fares. However, pinning together the results 
of two separate strands of research, there is evidence that offering a F F P  
does allow an airline to set a premium on its fares.
Levine (1987) and Borenstein (1989) suggest that an airline with a domi­
nant presence at an airport has a significant advantage in attracting travellers 
setting off from that airport, regardless of the specific route flown.1 This is 
best understood through an example. Consider an airline with a significantly 
higher presence in airport A  than in airport B. Levine and Borenstein note 
that on the route between A  and B , such a carrier is likely to transport 
a greater share of the passengers setting off from A  and travelling on the 
round-trip A — B  — A  than the share of passengers setting off from B  and 
travelling on the B — A — B  round-trip. Borenstein (1991) sets out to explain 
the mechanisms through which airlines with a high presence at an airport 
enjoy this advantage. After controlling for factors such as cost and quality 
levels that are likely to favour the larger airlines, Borenstein (1991) suggests 
that the advantage of the dominating airline is likely to be due to marketing 
devices such as F F P s  and Travel Agency Commission Override (TACOs), 
rather than due to factors such as reputation or information spillovers.10
There is a second strand in the literature concerned with explaining the 
level of fares across airlines and across routes using a series of explanatory 
variables to reflect the costs of the airlines and the structure of the market. 
Borenstein (1989,1990), Evans and Kessides (1993) and Abramowitz and 
Brown (1993) find that a carrier’s share of traffic at the airports on the end­
points of a route and the share of passengers transported by the airline on 
the observed route are two of the variables with a significant positive effect
ldT A C O s  are the travel-agency equivalent of F F P s . Through such programmes, travel 
agencies are rewarded by the airline company according to the number of tickets the agency 
sells on that airline’s flights.
114
on the level of fares.11 Borenstein (1989) estimates that an airline with 50% 
of the originations at both ends of a route is estimated to charge for tickets 
likely to be purchased by business travellers 6% more than those of an airline 
with a smaller presence at both ends. Evans and Kessides (1993) suggests 
that the effect is in fact twice as high.
The empirical studies cited above suggest that FFP s  are one channel 
through which airlines with a significant presence at the airport level have 
an advantage in attracting travellers on any route from that airport and that 
in turn, an airline with a significant share of the activity at an airport is able 
to charge a premium on flights to/from that airport. Put together, the two 
strands of the literature suggest that F F P s  axe a vehicle through which the 
larger airlines exercise their market power and are able to set higher fares.
There is a small body of literature12 that has explored the competitive 
effects of airline alliances. The alliances explored by these studies, however, 
are more far-reaching than F F P  reciprocity as they typically cover code- 
sharing agreements.13 Within such studies it is then difficult to attribute an 
observed price change to the expansion of an airline’s F F P  rather than due 
to the advantages of having a  code-sharing partner. On the other hand, by 
looking at alliances that have centred exclusively on marketing arrangement, 
the analysis presented below is able to circumvent this difficulty.
3 ,3  R e v ie w  o f  t h e  a l l ia n c e s
In this section, the alliances formed amongst the six major American airlines 
during the course of 1998 are briefly reviewed. In doing so, care is taken to 
note the chronology of the alliances’ milestones and to highlight what the 
agreements cover and what they do not cover. This section will also paint a 
brief picture of how the alliances expand the network of routes on which air 
miles can be earned and prizes redeemed for each of the loyalty programmes.
11 Evans and Kessides (1993) do not, however, find the route market share to be statis­
tically significant.
12 See for example Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Bamberger et al (2001)
13 Two airlines are said to code-share when each of the airlines uses its own designator 
code to market flights operated by the second airline as its own. For example, a flight on 
a Continental operated plane will be listed in the computer reservation systems used by 
travel agencies (and on the flight information screens at airports) with both a Continental 
and a Northwest code.
3.3.1 Timing and nature of agreements
Over the course of 1998, six of the major American airlines formed pair-wise 
agreements. The more significant steps in setting up these agreements are 
reported in Table 3.1 and a more detailed description is given in Appendix 
3.A.14
In essence, the alliances between United and Delta and between American 
and US Airways were exclusively of a marketing nature. Passengers flying 
with one of the airlines were allowed to use the aiport lounges of the partner 
and. more importantly, members of an airline’s loyalty-scheme were allowed 
to clock up air miles when flying with the partner and allowed to redeem 
prices with the partner.
The alliance between Continental and Northwest, on the other hand, went 
beyond a marketing agreement. Northwest proposed and was successful in 
purchasing a controlling interest in Continental. The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Department of Transport (DOT) challenged this plan on the 
grounds that Continental-Northwest would jointly have a dominant presence 
in a number of airports and on certain routes. Northwest did go ahead with 
its purchase of equity stock in Continetal, though it gave assurances that it 
would not exercise its voting rights in Continental for six years and that the 
two airlines would be run separately. Contrary to the other two alliances, 
the agreement between Continental and Northwest extended beyond the reci­
procity of their F F P  and also included the decision for the two airlines to 
code-share on some domestic and international flights.
14 The information used in this section was collected from the press releases of the airlines 
as well as from various issues of the Frequent F lier and the 1998 company accounts of the 
six airlines. These sources are detailed in Appendix 3.A.
i
I
116
Table 3.1: Milestones in setting-up the three alliances
U n ited  - Delta
30-4-1998 Announce a global alliance under which airlines plan to engage 
in code- sharing agreements, reciprocal FFP  and co-operation in 
other marketing areas. Agreement will be put to play first in 
US market. Airlines foresee FFP  reciprocity within the year and 
code-sharing by early 1999.
31-8-1998 Announce that, as of 1st September, members of either FFP  can 
earn air miles on partner’s flights within the US, Puerto Rico and 
US Virgin Islands. Starting from the 15th October, air miles can 
be redeemed for flights with partner. Due to opposition from
Delta’s pilots, plans to code-share are discontinued. 
A m erican- US Airways ______________
23-4-1998 Announce agreement on broad marketing relation, including FFP  
reciprocity, to be implemented by late summer.
27-7-1998 Announce that as of 1st August F F P  members can redeem air 
miles on each other’s flights and benefit from each other’s lounge 
facilities.
24-8-1998 Announce that members of both programmes can combine miles 
to redeem an award on either, provided a minimum of 1000 miles
are used from each account. 
C ontinen tal-N orthw est
26-1-1998 Announce strategic global alliance including code-sharing arrange­
ments and FFP  reciprocity. Subject to DOJ and DOT review 
Northwest is to buy a controlling interest in Continental.
29-10-1998 DOJ launches suit challenging Northewest’s proposed purchase. 
Notwithstanding, the two airlines announce that they will proceed 
with the stock transaction and the marketing alliance.
20-11-1998 Announce the completion of Northwest’s equity stake in Continen­
tal and the agreement for Northwest to restrict its ability to vote 
its stock.
6-12-1998 Reciprocity in mileage earning takes effect and announce that, 
subject to regulatory review, members of one FFP  may apply 
for reward from the other programme starting 1-2-1999 for travel
28-12-1998
beginning 1-3-1999.
Announce that, starting on the 29th December, the two partners 
will code-share on flights between US and Japan and beyond.
6-12-1998 Announce that, starting on the 7th January, the two partners 
will begin code-sharing on domestic and international flights to 95 
destinations.
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Table 3.2: Size o f airlines and alliances, 1997
Airline or alliance Enplaned Passengers 
(m) Share (%)
Delta 97.3 17.6
United 72.9 13.2
D elta-U nited 170.2 30.8
American 66.1 12.0
US-Airways 57.4 10.4
A m erican-U S Airways 123.5 22.3
Northwest 47.1 8.5
Continental 34.2 6.2
N orthw est-C ontinental 81.3 14.7
Alliance su b to ta l 375.0 67.8
Note: Figures refer to US domestic travel. 
Source: GAO/RCED 99-37, Appendix 1.
3.3.2 Domestic relevance of the alliances
The six carriers involved in the marketing agreements are among the largest 
seven American carriers.15 In 1997, they transported 375 million passengers 
within the United States accounting for 67.8% of all domestic travelling. As 
reported in Table 3.2, the Delta-United partnership is the largest - accounting 
for 30.8% of the market - and is more than twice as large as the Northwest 
and Continental alliance who account for 14.9% of the market between the 
two.
The size of an airline’s partner provides a rough idea of the added at­
tractiveness that the airline’s loyalty programme is likely to enjoy from the 
alliance. However, a finer picture can be drawn by looking at how the al­
liances increase the share of flights from a given airport on which a member 
of an airline’s F F P  can earn air miles and by examining how the network 
of routes and airports of an airline’s partner augments that airline’s own
i¡¡:
i .
network.
These issues turn on a discussion of the size and of the complementarity
15 In terms of enplaned passengers on domestic flights, Southwest airlines is the fifth 
largest with a market share in 1997 of 10-1%
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Table 3.3: Complementarity of partners’ domestic network
Airline Routes Cities Region of Influence
Delta 314 18 Central, Atlantic
Overlap 72 74
United 229 10 Pacific, Midwest, Mideast
American 240 32 Pacific, Midwest, Eastern
Overlap 27 50
US-Airways 210. 11 Northeast, Middle Atlantic, South-
east
Northwest 134 6 Mideast, Northern
Overlap 10 53 ■
Continental 171 26 Eastern, Southern
Source: Calculations based on Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report for the 
four quarters of 1998. The areas of influence were read off the maps included 
in the airlines’ 1998 annual reports.
of the networks of each pair of partners. Bob Crandall, chairman and CEO of 
American Airlines noted tha t his airline’s match with US-Airways was a good 
one "because the two airlines’ network complement each other very well” .16 
Other airlines voiced similar views with respect to their choice of partner. 
Emphasizing the complementarity of networks has two purposes. On the one 
hand, it aims to mitigate concerns the compeition authority might have that 
a marekting alliance might feed into a slack in competition on those routes 
where the two partnering airlines operate. A significant overlap between 
the airlines’ activities would heighten this concern.17 On the other hand, 
by emphasizing the complementarity of networks, the airlines publicize the 
expanded network from which its FFP  members stand to gain.
Table 3.3 and Figures 3.1-3.3 illustrate the degree to which the activities 
of partnering airlines complement each other and the extent to which they 
overlap.
Table 3.3 illustrates that there is considerable overlap between an airline
lfiAMR Press Release, 23rd April 1998.
1' This concern is highlighted throughout GAO/RCED-98-215.
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Figure 3.1: US-Airways and American Airline’s share of activity across US 
cities.
and its partner in terms of the number of cities covered by their operations. 
This is not surprising as the data on routes, and thereby cities, are drawn 
from the Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report and cover the top 1,000 
city-pair routes within the US and one would expect the main airlines to 
have some activity in the more important cities. Figures 3.1-3.3 provides a 
better idea how much overlap between partnering airlines there is at the city 
level. For each alliance, the share of passengers transported by each partner 
to/from each of the cities in which at least one of them competes. In each of 
the three graphs, the cities have been ordered in terms of increasing share of 
one of the partners.
Together, Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 suggest that members of US-Airways’ 
F F P  will benefit substantially from the alliance with American Airlines’ 
loyalty-scheme. These members will be able to earn air miles on a further 240 
domestic routes, up from US Airways’ existent 237, and will cover 32 addi­
tional cities. Of the three alliances, that between Continental and Northwest 
appears as the one with the lowest degree of overlap. Continental operates 
in less than 8 % of those routes where Northwest flies, while the converse per­
centage is even smaller. In contrast, there appears to be a significant overalp
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Figure 3.2: Northwest and Continental’s share of activity across US cities.
Figure 3.3: Delta and United’s share of activity across US cities.
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in the activities of United and Delta. Prior to forming the alliance, United 
already flew to just under a fifth of the routes flown by Delta while Delta 
flew in just under a fourth of those flown by United. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
that the overlap in activity of these two airlines in the cities they operate in 
is also considerable.
The brief discussion over the operations of the six carriers had the aim of 
underlining the sizeable impact that the pair-wise alliances have on expanding 
the network of flights and routes across which a member of an airline’s F F P  
will be able to earn and redeem air miles.
3 .4  E s t im a t in g  t h e  im p a c t  o f  th e  m a r k e t in g  
a l l ia n c e s
In light of the discussion presented earlier, I specify a price equation which 
will allow" to test whether:
• An airline that has formed a F F P  alliance with a second airline is able 
to exploit this through higher fares. The premium will be greater the 
greater the size of the partnering airline at the route, airport and at 
the national level; and
• An airline facing competition on a route from a rival that has formed 
a F FP  alliance is at a competitive disadvantage. The disadvantage is 
greater the more significant is the presence of the rival and its partner 
at the route, airport and national level.
3.4.1 Price equation
The effect of the alliances on carriers’ prices is estimated by regressing the 
route fare level on a vector of airline and route characteristics and on variables 
reflecting the existence and size of these alliances.
The strategy is to estimate a price equation of the form,
i = 1,2, . . . , /j
Fareijt = {3Xijt +  7A ijt +  rTt + Vj + Eijt, for j  = 1,2,..., n
i  =  1,2, . . . ,T
(3.1)
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Table 3.4: Variables reflecting market structure
V ariable D escription E xpected
Sign
Passengers^ Logarithm of the total number of passengers 
flying on route j.
( - )
Route S hares Share of passengers travelling on route j  that 
fly with airline i.
(+)
City Shareijt Weighted average of airline i ’s share of pas­
sengers on routes that start from or end at 
either-point of route j .  The weights are given 
by the proportion of traffic at the two end­
points.
(+)
National Sharen Airline z’s share of US domestic market. (+)
Hubij Dummy variable is equal to 1 if at least one 
of the end-points of route i is a hub of airline 
j  and is equal to 0 otherwise.
(+)
Low CostAirlinei Dummy variable equal to 1 if airline i is a low 
cost carrier and is equal to 0 otherwise.
( - )
where Fareijt is the natural logarithm of the average fare of airline i on 
route j  at time f, X{jt is a vector of market structure characteristics that 
vary with the firm’s identity within the route and over time, A ijt is a vector 
of characteristics to reflect the alliance arrangements, Tt is a vector of time 
dummy variables and Vj is a route fixed effect. The random error is 
assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and variance o\ .
The structure of (3.1) follows closely that estimated by Evans and Kes- 
sides (1993) and Morrison and Whinston (1995) though the set of explana­
tory variables in these two papers does not include variables reflecting the 
existence of airline alliances.
M arke t s tru c tu re  variables
Table 3.4 summarizes the variables included in the vector Xijt reflecting the 
market structure and suggests their expected effect on the fare level.
fl H pi h j|?»IMlwwiffWWWwwwiiw w jiJi||gjfggiiuij
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The variables described in Table 3.4 are common to various studies that 
estimate a fare equation and a fuller discussion of them is left to Appendix 
3.B.18
Tourism  in terac tion  variables
FFP s  tend to benefit frequent flyers rather than occasional passengers flying 
for leisure or tourism. Consequently, the impact of FFPs is likely to be lower 
in popular tourist routes than on routes with a higher proportion of business 
travellers.
To explore this the variables reflecting an airline’s presence at the route, 
airport and national level, Route Sbarest, City Shareijt and National Share^u 
are interacted with an index measuring the extent to which the observed route 
is flown by tourist travellers to yield the variables Tourism* Route Shareijt, 
Tourism * City Share^t and Tourism * National Shardjt respectively.
The tourism index was constructed based on the income per capita gen­
erated from hotels and other accomodation in the metropolitan areas where 
the endpoint cities of a route are located.19 If the advantages to an airline 
of having a significant presence at the route, airport or national level are 
driven by FFP  effects, then it is expected that the sign of the interaction 
variables is negative. On the other hand, the intuition that airlines with a 
greater share of the market at the route, airport or national level benefit 
particularly from F F P s  would be questioned if these interaction variables 
are not significant.20
F F P  alliance variables
Vector Aijt reflects the arrangements of the F F P  alliances and it is appro­
priate to consider in some detail the variables to be included in this vector.
A first strategy is to construct variables to signal whether an airline has 
entered into an alliance and whether it faces competition from an airline that 
has. Accordingly, let Own AUianceu be equal to 1 if in quarter t the observed 
carrier belongs to one of the F FP  alliances and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let
18 In addition to the studies cited in Section 2 see also Morrison and Whinston (1995).
19 Appendix 3.B describes in detail how the tourism index is constructed.
20 Borenstein (1991) discusses togreater length the competing explanations (such as in­
formation spillovers and economies of scale in advertising) for the advantage enjoyed by 
the airline with the strongest presence at an airport and looks at the role of the tourism 
interaction variables in descriminating between these explanations.
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Rival Allianceijt be equal to 1 if in quarter t carrier i faces competition 
on route j  from at least one carrier that has formed a F F P  alliance with 
a third one. Following on from the reasoning laid out earlier, the variable 
Own Allianceit is expected to have a positive effect on the fare level of airline 
i and Rival Allianceijt to have a negative effect.
These two dummy variables reflect the presence or absence of airline al­
liances. On the other hand, it was put forward in Section 3.1 and in Section 
3.2 that the impact of the alliances is likely to be influenced by the size of 
the airlines involved - partnering an airline with a particularly significant 
presence on a route is likely to have a greater impact than if the alliance was 
with a small player. Furthermore, when assessing the size of an alliance, it 
is necessary to consider the three distinct spheres in which the alliance can 
be measured: at the route, at the airport and at the national level.
Given this reasoning, a second strategy to capture the effect of the F FP  
alliances is to include in the vector Aijt the variables Partner's Route Share^t, 
Partner*s City Share^t and Partner's National Shares which measure the 
market share of airline Vs partner at the route, airport and national level 
respectively. Where an airline does not have a partner, these variables take 
the value of 0. Under the hypothesis that an airline’s F F P  is enriched by 
the partnership with a second loyalty programme, it is expected that these 
three variables have a positive effect on the fare level.
Similarly, the increase in the competitive pressure faced by an airline if 
two of its rivals agree to form a FFP  alliance is likely to be dependent on 
the market share of these rivals.
To capture this, the change in the competitive pressure brought about by 
one or more rivals forming an alliance will be measured by the increase in 
concentration which comes about by treating two partnering airlines as one 
entity. A formal description requires some notation. Let njt be the number 
of airlines operating on route j  at time t, let N jt be the number of F F P  
alliances at time t in which the two partnering airlines are both serving route 
j ,  let m  index the airlines from 1 to Ujt such that the last Njt refer to those 
with a partnering airlines among the first njt — N jt airlines. Finally, let smjt 
be the market share of airline m on routej and sm>jt be the market share of 
m ’s partner if airline m  has a partner and it also competes in route j . If 
m does not have a partner or its partner does not compete on route j  then 
$ m 'jt — 0. Using this notation, the variable constructed to reflect the change 
in the competitive pressure due to the formation of alliances by competing 
airlines is given by,
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Table 3.5: Calculating Concentration Increment Route, example
A irline M arket Share Concentration Increment Route
A 30% 0.05
B 35% 0.05
C 10% 0.22
D 15% 0.22
E 10% 0.24
Concentration Increment Routeijt —
Tljt —JVjt
{Smjt  " h  Sm'jt)
njt
z S2m jt
1 4"
The increase in concentration is normalized by the contribution to the 
Herfindahl index of the market share held by the observed airline and that of 
its partner (where one exists). Where no rival airline has formed an alliance 
then Concentration Increment Routeijt is equal to 0.
The value of Concentration Increment Routeijt is increasing in the mar­
ket share of the rival airlines that have formed an alliance. As an example, 
Table 3.5 reports the value of this variable in a scenario where five airlines 
serve a given route and two pairs of alliances are established - between airlines 
A  and B  and another between airlines C and D.
The added competitive pressure faced by the two smaller partnering air­
lines due to the alliance formed by the larger A and B, is considerably 
greater than the change in concentration facing A and B  due to the al­
liance of C  and D. Clearly, the greatest increase in pressure is felt by 
airline E  - rather than facing four distinct competitors, this airline will 
now face two pairs of allied airlines. Note, that by definition the value of 
Concentration Increment Routeijt is the same for two partnering airlines.
In an analogous way, the variable Concentration Increment Cityijt is 
constructed to capture the increase in concentration at the airport level due 
to the formation of F F P  alliances by competing airlines. Similarly, the vari­
able Concentration Increment Nationalit is defined at a nationwide level. 
It is expected that the increase in loyalty scheme concentration amongst
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competitors resulting from the alliances will have a downward impact on the 
observed airline’s fares. It follows that the coefficients of these three variables 
when estimating the price equation (3.1) is expected to be negative.
3.4.2 Econometric Issues
In estimating Equation (3.1), two issues stand out: the use of route fixed 
effects and the endogeneity of variables.
Fixed Effects
Equation (3.1) includes the term Vj which is intended to capture demand and 
cost differences that do not vary across the airlines serving route j  and are 
constant over time. The more clear example of these are the distance of the 
route, the degree to which a route is tourist oriented, the level of congestion 
at each end-point airport and the presence of slot controlled airports or flight 
limitations at either end of the route. The fixed effects capture these differ­
ences without having to explicitly measure them and it is attractive inasmuch 
as most of the variation in price within the sample is due to differences at 
the route level, as will be clear by examining the regression results.
The use of fixed effects, however, is not without criticism. First, the use 
of fixed effects curtails the ability to make out of sample predictions. This 
concern is legitimate if the results of the analysis were intended to be trans­
posed to, say, the European context or if the sample of routes accounted for 
a small fraction of total American market. The former exercise will not be 
done - not least because the airline industry in the two continets is struc­
turally different and operates in a different regulatory framework - and the 
latter concern is unwarranted as the sampled routes account for over 70 per 
cent of all traffic. A second drawback in the use of fixed effects is that no use 
is made of the information in the variability between routes and, related to 
this, efficiency is lost due to fall in the degree of freedom (See Greene 1993, 
Chapter 16 and Ichino, 2000). This criticism stands.
A way out would be to change the framework and model Equation (3.1) 
with random effects whereby the estimation of the parameters fully exploits 
the information in the variability between and within routes. However, the 
random effect estimator is only consistent if the explanatory variables are not 
correlated to the route specific effects. After running each of the specifications 
detailed in Section 5 below, this condition was tested using the Hausmann
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test and consistently rejected. Faced with this, the remedies are either to 
find instruments which are correlated with the explanatory variables but not 
with the route specific effects or to abandon the random effects framework 
and fall back on fixed effects. Given the difficulties in finding appropriate 
instruments I resorted to the latter strategy.
Endogeneity of explanatory variables
It can be expected that Route S  barest is a function of the price charged and 
therefore correlated with the error term Sijt. A carrier whose actual price is 
above the predicted value - a positive Sijt - is expected to lose market share 
to its competitiors. This potential correlation would lead to overestimate the 
true effect of market share on prices.
This problem is tackled by using an instrument for market share. As in 
Evans and Kessides (1993) I use a carrier’s intra-route rank as an instrument 
for its route market share. The variable Rankijt is constructed by equating 
it with the rank in terms of market share of each airline within a given route. 
The rank is defined in descending order, so that the largest carrier takes the 
rank of one.
The variable Rankijt is a valid instrument if it is correlated with market 
share and orthogonal to the error term. The first requirement is met. By 
construction, Rankijt is negatively correlated with market share. The second 
requirement will hold if, for example, a change in a carrier’s price leads to 
a change in its market share but not by enough to alter its rank within 
the route. This is more likely to occur where the difference in the market 
share of the zth and the i +  l t/l ranked firm is large. On the other hand, this 
requirement is less likely to hold within the set of airlines with smaller market 
shares. It can be expected that a price change by one of the smaller airline 
might be sufficient to reverse a market share gap with a similarly small airline 
and thereby alter its own rank. Table 3.6 illustrates the extent to which this 
problem might come about. The table shows the average difference in the 
market share between successively ranked airlines.
One way round the problem, adopted by Evans and Kessides (1993), is to 
set the rank of all airlines ranking third or smallest to be equal to 3. Hence, 
all but the two largest carriers are grouped together into one category and 
the implicit assumption is made that changes in prices for these small carriers
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Table 3.6: Average difference in market share
Rank Difference in Market Share
First-Second 30.3%
Second-Third 8.3%
Third-Fourth 3.51%
Fourth-Fifth 1.89%
Source: Calculations based on Consumer Report, 1998 1st Quarter
are not large enough to move them out of this group. The figures reported 
in Table 3.6 suggest that this is a feasible assumption.
3.4.3 Data
The data on fares and traffic used are from the Domestic Airline Fares Con­
sumer Report (Consumer Report) published by the U.S. Department of 
Transport. The report provides information on passenger data and average 
prices paid by travellers in the 1,000 largest domestic city-pair markets within 
the 48 contiguous states of America.21 The report applies a screen so that for 
each route, data are only supplied for those airlines judged to be competitors 
- these are defined as those transporting at least 10% of the passengers on 
that route. The markets covered by the Consumer Report account for 75% 
of all 48-state passengers and 70% of total domestic passengers. The Con­
sumer Report is elaborated quarterly and I make use of the data in the five 
quarterly reports from the first quarter 1998 up to and including the first 
quarter of 1999.
The data are corrected to take into consideration that two cities are suffi­
ciently close to each other so that their airports compete with each other for 
travellers. This is the case of Oakland, CA which is close to San Francisco, 
CA and of Baltimore, MD which is close to Washington DC.
The average fares were deflated using quarterly data on air carrier jet fuel 
prices from the Aviation Industry Overview for the fiscal years of 1998 and 
1999 issued by the Office of Aviation Policy and Plans.
The indices on the tourism orientation of the cities at the end-points
21 In turn, the information presented in the C onsum er Report is constructed from the 
Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey of Airline Passenger Traffic 
which is a continuous survey of 10% of all the passengers travelling on US certified carriers.
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of the routes were constructed using data from 1997 Economic Census - 
Accomodation and Foodservices and from the State and Metropolitan Areas 
Data Book, 1997-98.
Appendix 3.B provides further details on the data used.
3 .5  R e s u l t s  a n d  d is c u s s io n
The results of estimating Equation (3.1) are reported in Table 3.7. For ease 
of presentation, estimates of the route fixed effects and the quarterly dummy 
variables are not shown.
The bottom two rows of Table 3.7 show the very low correlation between 
the fixed effect variables and the remaining explanatory variables, and the 
result of the Hausmann specification test. Both results suggest that the use 
of fixed rather than random effects is appropriate.
The first two regressions, labelled Regression A  and B , estimate Equa­
tion (3.1) using the two dummy variables Own Alliance and Rival Alliance 
to reflect, respectively, whether the observed airline has formed an alliance 
and whether it is competing on the observed route with an airline that has. 
Regression C , on the other hand, uses the set of variables described earlier 
to reflect the size of an airline’s own alliance and that of competing alliances. 
Lastly, note that Regressions B  and C include the set of three variables that 
interact an airline’s share of activity at the route, airport and national level 
with the tourism index on the observed route.
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Table 3.7: Regression results
Dependent variable Regression
Fare A B C
Passengers -0.151 -0.173 -0.172
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Rank -0.014 -0.018 -0.016(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
C ity  Share 0.147 0.122 0.125
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
National Share 0.720 0.849 0.702
(0.036) (0.050) (0.052)
Hub 0.051 0.052 0.056
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Low Cost Airline -0.177 -0.187 -0.168
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tourism  * Route Share 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.003)
Tourism  * C ity Share 0.041 0.039
(0.016) (0.016)
Tourism  * National Share -0.104 -0.087
0.038 (0.038)
Rival Alliance - 0.020 -0.018
(0.004) (0.004)
Own Alliance 0.011 0.010
(0.004) (0.004)
Concentration Increm ent Route -0.107
(0.054)
Concentration Increment City -1.169
(0.120)
Concentration Increment National 0.583
(0.114)
Partner's Route Share 0.000
Partner's C ity Share
(0.000)
0.038
(0.023)
Partner's National Share 0.302
(0.045)
Observations 13,203 12,388 12,388
Prob >F 0.0 0.0 0.0
Correl.(uj, Xb) 0.092 0.018 0.001
Hausmann: Prob> x 2 0.0 0.0 0.0
n 2 0.370 0.378 0.387
Note: Standard deviations are given in brackets. The Hausmann specification tests
the equivalence of fixed and random effects estimates. The test statistic is distributed 
as chi-squared with 19 degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are given by the 
number of estimable parameters in the fixed effects model which includes the four time 
dummy variables. All variables are significant at the 5% level except for 
P a r tn e r 's  C ity  S h a re  and P a r tn e r 's  R ou te  S h a re  in Regression 
C which are significant at the 10% level.
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3.5.1 Discussion
Influence of m arket s tru c tu re
An interpretation of the negative sign on the variable Passengers is that it 
reflects the more fierce competition one expects to exist on the more busy 
routes.
All three regressions found the variables for an airline’s share of the mar­
ket at the route, airport and at the national level to be significant.
Recall that Rank is negatively related to an airline’s route market share 
and note the significant negative coefficient of coefficients for Rank in Table 
3.7. It follows that route market share has consisently a positive effect on 
average fare levels. An airline’s share of activity at the airport level also has 
a positive effect on an airline’s fares. Based on the results from regression 
A  and evaluated at the sample mean, the elasticity of price with respect to 
City Share is 0.040. 22 A one standard deviation increase in City Share over 
the sample mean will increase the fare level by 2.7 per cent. The results also 
reveal that an airline’s share in the national market will earn it a premium: 
a one standard deviation increase in this share over the sample mean will 
add 7.4 per cent to an average return fare. It is also worth noting that 
airlines flying to or from their hub are in a further advantaged position and, 
on average, are able to set prices 5.2 per cent higher.
F irs t evidence on the  role of FFPs
Borenstein (1991) interpreted the negative sign on Tourism* City Share as 
an indication that the impact of having a large share of traffic at an airport 
was due to the FFPs. While the reported coefficients for regressions B  and 
C  in Table 3.7 do not point in this direction as far as airport dominance is 
concerned, they do so at the route and national level.
The tourism orientation index used in the three regressions on Table 3.7 
has a range from 0.16 to 2.5 and a mean of 0.77. Consider regression B. 
Given the estimated coefficient on Tourism* National Share of —0.104, the 
advantage of having a significant share of the nationwide market falls by 31 
per cent on the most touristic routes compared to what it would be on the 
least touristic.23 This fall in the premium is also mirrored at the route level,
22Focusing on regression A  allows to put aside the effect of the tourism interaction 
variables.
23The tourism index of the most touristic route, 2 .5 , multiplied by the coefficient of
where the advantage of holding a given rank in the most touristic route is 
roughly one fifth of the advantage of holding that rank in the least touristic 
route.24
An interpretation of the reduced impact of route and national dominance 
on touristic route is to attribute it to F F P  effects. As discussed in the 
Introduction, F FP s  are one mechanism through which airline can earn a 
premium from their significant market share. Such schemes, however, are 
likely to be less effective on touristic routes where the propotion of frequent 
flying business travellers is comparatively low and where the remaining pas­
sengers, those flying for tourism or leisure, attach less importance to FFPs.
The above findings do not carry over to the airport level. The regression 
results suggest that the impact of dominance at this level is greater the higher 
the tourist index on a route. This contrasts with Borenstein (1991) where 
the reverse effect was found.
The robustness of these results to the choice of the tourism index was 
tested on two fronts. In computing the tourism index, I followed Borenstein 
(1991) and truncated its value at the upper end in order to correct for some 
accounting inconsistencies in Nevada cities. The data reported in Nevada 
on hotels’ income includes income from gambling and thereby distorts the 
overall data. To correct for this, the index was truncated at the top .25 The 
regression results were found to be robust to the choice of the cut-off level. 
In addition, an alternative tourism index was computed based on the share 
of income generated in the metroplitan area of the routes’ endpoints from 
hotels and other accomodation (Abramowitz and Brown 1993). The results 
of the latter exercise are reported in Appendix 3.C and they are consistent 
with the results presented in Table 3.7.
In te rp re tin g  the alliance variables
The interpretation of the tourism interaction variables is a first suggestion 
that F F P  effects matter. A clearer suggestion of this, however, is had from 
examining the estimated coefficients of those variables reflecting the forma­
tion of the FFP  alliances. Consider first Regressions A and B  which include
T o u r is m  * N ational Share , -0.104, implies that the impact of having an average market 
share at the national level in the most touristic routes falls by 31 per cent (calculated by
2-5*0.104
24 Calculated by —^  J 0.0
20 See Appendix 3.B.
— 0.018+2.5*0.0058 _  A  91 
-0. 18+0.16*0,0058
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Table 3.8: Impact on Fares of F F P  Alliances
Level Change in Concentration 
+  0.0051
Partner’s Share 
+ 10%
Route 0.0 % 0.0 %
Airport -0.6 % 0.4%
National 0.3 % 3.1
the two dummy variables Rival Alliance and Own Alliance in the set of 
explanatory variables.
The coefficient on Rival Alliance suggests that those airlines serving 
routes where no competitor has formed an alliance enjoy a premium of around 
1.9 per cent over those routes where such an alliance has been made. On the 
other hand, the premium an airline earns from having joined an alliance her­
self can be read from the coefficient of Own Alliance and is around 1 per 
cent.
Both of these results are significant and point towards the finding that 
more is lost by facing competitors that have formed an alliance than is gained 
by taking part in one. Further insight is given by Regression C where the 
size of the alliances are considered.
The estimated coefficients in Regression C show that the increase in F F P  
concentration at the route and airport level due to a F F P  alliance involv­
ing one or more of an airline’s rivals has a downward effect on prices. In 
contrast, at the national level the effect is positive though the magintude is 
considerably small. Table 3.8 below illustrates the size of these effects. The 
first column of figures in Table 3.8 reports the estimated effect on the fares 
of an airline due to the formation of a F F P  alliance involving rival airlines. 
The example assumes that the rival partnering airlines each have a 5% at the 
route, city and national level and that the observed carrier’s share at each of 
these levels is 10% so that the increment in concentration (as measured by 
the Herfindahl index) is 0.0051.
The second column of figures in Table 3.8 illustrate the premium earned 
by an airline taking part in a FFP  alliance arising from the share of acitivity 
of its partnering airline. The figures in this column are based on the estimates 
of Regression C and on the assumption that the partner’s share at the route, 
city and national level is 10%.
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The results reported in Table 3.8 suggest that the effect of the alliances on 
fare levels do not come about due to the change in concentration or market 
shares at the route level. Instead, the impact of the alliances come about 
due to the way in which they change the market structure at the airport and 
at the national level.
3 .6  C o n c lu s io n
In the wake of the alliances involving six of the seven largest US airlines, 
the report Aviation Competition- Effects on Consumers from Domestic Air­
line Alliances Vary (GAO/RCED-99-37) was presented before the chairmen 
of the relevant committees of the American Senate. The report sees the 
reciprocity of F F P s  between partnering airlines as beneficial to consumers. 
However, it also raises the concern over the potential role that such market­
ing agreements have on conferring additional market power to those airlines 
with a significant presence in the market. The report notes that it is unable 
to quantify this aspect. In this chapter, I have attempted to take on this 
challenge.
The empirical analysis carried out suggest that the formation of FFP  
alliances have enhanced the market power of partnering airlines. The ability 
to charge higher prices are positively related to the partner’s share of activity 
at the airport and at the national level. On the other hand, the partner’s 
share of activity at the route level does not have a sizeable impact on an 
airline’s average fares. Conversely, the formation of a marketing alliance 
by competing carriers was shown to have a downward effect on an airline’s 
fares. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that F F P s  enhance the 
market power of the larger airlines which are able to offer a greater menu of 
flights and it therefore lends support to the concerns raised by competition 
authorities over the anti-competitive effects of F F P s .
Bibliography
[1] Abramowitz, Amy and Stephen Brown (1993). Market Share and Price 
Determination in the Contemporary Airline Industry, Review of Indus­
trial Organization, 8, 419-433.
[2] Bailey, Elizabeth and Jeffrey Williams (1988). Sources of Economic Rent 
in the Deregulated Airline Industry, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 
XXXI, 173-202.
[3] Berry. Steven (1990.) Airport Presence as Product Differentiation, 
American Economic Review, vol. 80, 2, 400-404.
[4] Bamberger, Gustavo et al (2001.) An empirical investigation of the com­
petitive effects of domestic airline alliances, NBER Working Paper 8197.
[5] Borenstein, Severin (1989). Hubs and high fares: dominance and market 
power in the US airline industry, RAND Journal of Economics7 Vol.20, 
n.3, 344-365.
[6] Borenstein, Severin (1990). Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance and 
Market Power, American Economic Review, vol. 80, 2, 400-404.
[7] Borenstein, Severin (1991). The Dominant-Firm Advantage in Multi­
product Industries: Evidence from the US Airlines, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 1237-1266.
[8] Borenstein, Severin (1992) The Evolution of US Airline Competition, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, 2, 45-73.
[9] Borenstein, Severin (1996). Repeat-Buyer Programs in Network Indus­
tries, in Sichel Werner and Alexander Donald (eds) Networks, Infrastruc­
ture and the New Task for Regulation, Univ. of Michigan Press.
135
136
[10] Borenstein, Severin et al. (1995). The Economics of Customer Lock-In 
and Market Power in Services, in P. Harker (ed.) The Service Produc­
tivity and Quality Challenge, 225-250, Kluwer.
[11] Borenstein, Severin and Nancy Rose (1995). Do Airlines in Chapter 11 
Harm their Rivals? Bankruptcy and Pricing Behaviour in US Airline 
Markets. NBER Working Paper 5047.
[12] Brueckner, Jan and Tom Whalen (2000). The price effects of interna­
tional airline alliances, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIII, 503- 
544.
[13] Cairns, Robert and John Galbraith (1990). Artificial Compatbility, bar­
riers to entry and frequent-flyer programs, Canadian Journal of Eco­
nomics, 807-816.
[14] Evans, William and Ioannis Kessides (1993). Localized Market Power 
in the US Airline Industry, Review of Economics and Statistics, 66-75.
[15] Evans, William and Ioannis Kessides (1994). Living by the "Golden 
Rule": Multimaxket Contact in the US Airline Industry, Quarterly Jour­
nal of Economics, 341-366.
[16] GAO/T-RCED-90-147, (1990) Aviation Competition, Industry Operat­
ing and Marketing Practices Limit Market Entry.
[17] GAO/T-RCED-97-4 (1997) Airline Deregulation, Barriers to Entry Con­
tinue to Limit Competition in Several Key Domestic Markets.
[18] GAO/T-RCED-97-120 (1997) Domestic Aviation: Barriers to Entry 
Continue to Limit Benefits of Airline Deregulation
[19] GAO/T-RCED-98-112 (1998) Airline Competition: Barrier to Entry 
Continue in Some Domestic Markets.
[20] GAO/T-RCED-98-176 (1998) Domestic Aviation, Service Problems and 
Limited Competition Continue in Some Markets.
[21] GAO/T-RCED-98-215, (1998) Aviation Competition, Proposed Domes­
tic Airline Alliances Raise Serious Issues.
137
[22] GAO/T-RCED-99-37, (1999) Aviation Competition, Effects on Con­
sumers from Domestic Airline Alliances Vary.
[23] Greene, William (1993). Econometric Analysis, Second Edition, Macmil­
lan.
[24] Ichino, Andrea (2000). Topics in Micro-Econometrics, Course outline, 
European University Institute.
[25] Levine, Michael (1987). Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: 
Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, Yale Journal on Regulation, 
voi. 4, 393-494. voi. 60, 687-721.
[26] Levine, Michael (1992). Airline Deregulation: A Perspective. Antitrust 
Law Journal, voi. 60, 687-721.
[27] Morrison, Steven (1996). Airline Mergers, a Longer View. Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, 237-250.
[28] Morrison, Steven and Clifford Winston(1995). The Evolution of the Air­
line Industry, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
[29] Nako, Steven (1992). Frequent Fler Programs and Business Travellers: 
An Empirical Investigation, Logistics and Transportation Review, voi. 
28, n.4.
[30] Toh, Rex and Michael Hu, (1988). Frequent-Flier Programs: Passenger 
Attributes and Attitudes, Transportation Journal, Voi. 28, n.2, 11-22.
[31] Transportation Research Board- National Research Council (1999). En­
try and Competition in the US Airline Industry: Issues and Opportuni­
ties, Special Report 255
138
A p p e n d ic e s
3.A Timing and nature of agreements
3.A.1 Continental-Northwest26
The announcement of the formation of a strategic global alliance between 
Continental and Northwestern was made at the end of January 1998. The 
agreement foresaw code-sharing arrangements, the reciprocity of the FFPs 
and the co-operation between Continental and Northwest’s important part­
ner KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. Furthermore, Northwest was to purchase 
51% of Continental’s voting stock and Continental’s Board of Directors was 
to expand to allow the appointment of one director designated by Northwest. 
Contrary to the intentions of the two airlines, hovrever, the agreement took 
long to materialise.
Due to the cross-ownership clause, the agreement required the approval 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to go ahead. However, the necessary 
thumbs-up from the DOJ, did not arrive as this Department began to in­
vestigate the alliance on anti-trust grounds. Despite Northwest’s pledge to 
maintain the two operations separate and to not exercise its voting rights 
for 10 years, the DOJ initiated a law suit challenging Northwest’s proposed 
purchase of Continental. Nevertheless, the two airlines went ahead with their 
plans and in late November 1998, they announced that Northwest had pur­
chased the stake in Continental. In addition, it was announced that North­
west would not use its voting rights in Continental for the next six years at 
least.
The marketing side of the alliance was phased in over the ensuing months. 
Subject to regulatory review, reciprocity in mileage earnings was announced 
on the 3rd of December and taken into effect three days later. In addition 
it was announced that beginning on the 1st February 1999 members of one 
program may request awards from the other program for travel beginning 
the 1st of March. Code-shared flights between the two airlines started on the 
29th December 1998 and covered 28 weekly flights between US and Japan 
and 21 weekly flights beyond Japan. *28
2 6 Information was collected from Continental Press Releases dated 26 January 1998,
28 December 1998, on Frequent Flier issues dated 22 and 29 October 1998, 5 and 19 
November 1998, 3 December 1998 and on the October 1998 issue of Inside Flyer.
3.A .2 American-US Airways2'
The agreement between American Airlines and US Airways was announced 
towards the end of April 1998. The alliance was to centre almost exclusively 
on the pooling and reciprocity of the loyalty programmes offered by the two 
airlines and the proposed plans were introduced over the following 4 months.
Effective from the start of August 1998, members of American’s AAd- 
vantage program could earn air miles when flying on US Airways’ flights. 
Similarly, members of US Airways’ Dividend Miles program were able to 
earn air miles on this program when flying on an American Airlines flight. In 
addition, air miles from either program could be redeemed on either airline. 
At the end of August 1998, the two loyalty programs were brought further 
together. From then on, members of both airlines’ FFP  would be able to 
combine the miles from both accounts to claim an award for travel in either 
airline. It should be noted, however, that the pooling of miles could not be 
used to apply for awards on other airlines that are also partners in either 
American Airlines’ AAdvantage or US Airways’ Dividend Miles program.
The two airlines also agreed to allow reciprocal access to the domestic 
and international club facilities operated by the two airlines.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that in their initial announcements 
the two airlines hinted at the desire to set-up code-shared flights. The two 
airlines acknowledged, however, that such plans could not take place without 
consulting the pilots and they were not pursued during the period analysed 
in this chapter.
3.A.3 Delta-United Airlines28
On the 29th of April 1998, within a week of American and US Airways’ 
announcement, Delta and United Airlines let their intention to form an al- 
liancebe known. According to the initial plans, the alliance was to revolve 
around the agreement to run code-shared flights and on the reciprocity of 
the airlines’ loyalty programs.
The implementation of the code-sharing agreement, however, was subject 
to the approval of both carriers’ pilot unions. Following lengthy negotiations, 278
27Information was collected from : AMR Press Release, April 23 1998, US Airways Press 
Release, July 27th and August 24th 1998 and on the Frequent Flier issues of 1st August, 
8th October.
28 Information based on: Delta Air Lines Annual Report 1998, United Airlines Press 
Release, 31st August 1998, Frequent Flier issues from 4th July, 5th September.
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Delta was not willing to pay the price asked for by its pilots - a voting 
seat on its board of directors -and consideration of code-shared flights was 
discontinued in August.
The steps to bring the FFPs of the two airlines closer, however, went 
ahead. Starting from the 1st September 1998 members of both United’s 
Mileage Plus and Delta’s Sky Miles programmes could earn miles and class- 
of-service bonus when travelling on either carrier within the US, Puerto Rico 
and the US Virgin Islands.
3.B Definition of variables and sources of data
Fare^t is the logarithm of the average one-way fare on the given route. 
Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report, DOT. Data from the first 
quarter 1998 through to and including the first quarter 1999 was used.
Passenger Si jt is the logarithm of the total number of passengers flying 
on observed route in the given quarter. Source: Market size was extracted 
from Table 5 of Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report, DOT.
Route Shartijt is the share of passengers transported by carrier i on route 
j in quarter t. Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report, DOT.
C ity Shareijt is the weighted average of airline ¿’s share of passengers 
travelling on routes that start from or end at either end-point of route j  at 
time t. This variable was calculated as,
C ity Shareijt = P assljt * City Shareijt +  Pass2jt * City Share2ijt P assljt +  Pass2jt
where Passljt are the number of passengers travelling on routes that land or 
take off from one end-point of route j  and Pa$s2jt the number of number of 
passengers on routes that land or take off from the other end-point of route j. 
The respective share of passengers of carrier i at each of the two end-points 
are denoted by City Sharelijt and City Share2ijt. Source:Domestic Airline 
Fares Consumer Report, DOT.
National Shareu is the number of passengers travelling on carrier i at 
time t  divided by the total number of travellers at time t across all routes. 
Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report, DOT.
Hubij is equal to 1 if route j  starts or finishes at a hub of carrier i and is 
0 otherwise. The following cities were considered as hubs.
Table 3.B.1: Hubs
Airline Hubs
Continental New York, Houston, Cleveland
Northwest Minneapolis/St. Paul, Detroit, 
Memphis
American Dallas, Chicago, Miami
US Airways Pittsburgh, Charlotte, Philadelphia
Delta Airlines Atlanta, New York, Dallas, Cincin­
nati, Salt Lake City
United San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, Los 
Angeles
TWA St. Louis, New York
America West Columbus, Phoenix
Reno Air Reno, Las Vegas
American Trans Air Chicago
AirTran Airways Atlanta
Frontier Airlines Denver
Source: Aiports were identified as hubs on the basis of information collected 
from the 1998 annual reports of the various companies and from the companies’ 
web-sites.
Low CosU is equal to one if, on average, airline i ’s price on a route relative 
to the industry’s average price on routes of similar distances was 30 per 
cent or more lower. Source: Calculations based on Domestic Airline Fares 
Consumer Report, DOT.
Tourismj is defined as the maximum of the tourist index of the two end­
point cities of route j . In turn, the tourism index of a city is calculated as 
the income per capita generated from hotels and other accomodation in the 
metropolitan areas where the city is located. This index was truncated at 
2.5 at the upper end.
An alternative tourism index for a city is used for the regressions reported 
in Appendix 3.C. This alternative index is defined as the share of income of 
the metropolitan area where the end-point city is located that is generated 
from hotels and other accomodation. Here, the index was truncated at 0.6.
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Table 3.B.2: Quarters in which the alliances operated
1998 1 1998 2 1998 3 1998 4 1999 1
American-US Airways V V V
United-Delta V
Continental-Northwest y
Source: Company press releases and various issues of Frequent Flier
Source: Calculations based on Economic Census - Accomodation and Food- 
services, 1997 and State and Metropolitan Areas Data Book, 1997-98.
Tourism  * Route S h a r e s , Tourism  * City Share^t and 
Tourism  * National Share^t are defined as the product of Tourismj with, 
respectively Route Share^t, City Share^t and National Sbarest.
The remaining variables, those capturing the existence and size of the 
F F P  alliances, were defined in detail in the main text. Their construction is 
based on data from Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report, DOT and on 
the interpretation of company press releases and of various issues of Frequent 
Flier as to when the alliances operated. Table 3.B.2 shows the latter.
3.C Robustness of results to choice of tourism index
Table 3.C.1 below presents the results of running Regressions B  and C  under 
an alternative tourism index. As explained above in Appendix 3.B, this 
alternative index is based on the share on income in the metropolitan area 
where the end-point cities are located that is generated from hotels and other 
accomodation.
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Table 3.C.1: Regression results
Dependent variable Regression
Fare B ’ C ’
Passengers -0.173 -0.172
(0.008) (0.008)
Rank -0.018 -0.016
(0.003) (0.003)
City Share 0.134 0.137
(0.020) (0.019)
National Share 0.824 0.675
(0.047) (0.050)
Hub 0.052 0.056
(0.006) (0.006)
Low Cost -0.187 -0.168
(0.006) (0.006)
Tourism  % Route Share 0.083 0.083
(0.034) (0.034)
Tourism  * City Share 0.394
(0.204)
0.373
(0.203)
Tourism  * National Share -1.109 -0.824
0.482 (0.480)
Rival Alliance -0.018
(0.004)
Own Alliance 0.010
Concentration Increment Route 
Concentration Increment City
(0.004)
-0.109
(0.054)
-1.168
(0.120)
Concentration Increment National 0.583
(0.114)
Partner's Route Share 0.000
Partner's City Share
(0.000)
0.036
(0.023)
Partner's National Share 0.305
(0.045)
Observations 12,388 12,388
Prob >F 0.0 0.0
Correl.^j, Xb) 0.017 0.008
Hausmann: Prob> \ 2 0.0 0.0
R 2 0.378 0.386
Note: The Hausmann specification tests the equivalence of fixed and random
effects estimates. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with 19 
degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are given by the number of estimable 
parameters in the fixed-effects model, which includes the four time dummy variables. 
All variables are significant at the 5% level except for T o u r ism  * C ity  Share, 
T o u r is m  * N a tio n a l S h a re ,P a r tn e r 's  R o u te  Share  and P a rtn er 's  C i ty  Share. 
in Regression C\ The first three are significant at the 10% level.
r n  i f  i*' Tr F  i i
[ i n  i  I A

JIIXJ*


